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 1. Introduction 
After a period of meager international media interest in the Angolan civil war, the 
breaking news on February 23, 2002, announcing the death of a man once described as 
“A Key to Africa”1 was astounding. Jonas Savimbi, the longtime leader of the insurgent 
movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), had died 
in combat. Overnight commentators began to discuss the possible implications of this 
sudden change, and within weeks, a peace agreement was signed, promising millions of 
suffering Angolans a new chance to rebuild their lives under peaceful conditions. On 
the background of the emerging peace building process in Angola, the relevance of this 
development to the analytical interest of this paper must be clarified. The main 
argument for choosing the Angolan war as a case study was the possibility of observing 
patterns of social organization during a prolonged conflict. Between the mid-1960s and 
the late 1990s, UNITA exercised control over vast territories in Angola, until significant 
elements of the UNITA system of organization disintegrated in the late 1990s. With an 
analysis of this period, the functional mechanisms of UNITA’s system of domination 
are examined in context of the continuous evolution of the insurgent organization. The 
current peace-building process does not challenge the relevance of such a detailed 
analysis of the UNITA system, as the main aim of recognizing patterns of social 
reproduction in an insurgent system of organization and the dynamic adaptability of the 
insurgent war economy, can still be met. An additional structural change with relevance 
to the organization of insurgencies was the collapse of the Communist block. Despite 
being considered a watershed in recent history, the end of the totalitarian communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe did not fundamentally alter the nature of violent conflicts in 
1989/90. Due to the gradual decline of East-West antagonism, its influence on the 
nature of conflicts must be analyzed as a historical process. In this paper this 
requirement is met by examining the period of insurgent control over major Angolan 
provinces with a primary focus on the structural changes of the UNITA system of 
organization over time. In regard to the current situation in Angola, this study 
contributes to a better understanding of the societal basis of the insurgent movement, 
which is significant to the consolidation of peace as this process depends on the ability 
to integrate the former UNITA-controlled areas into the rest of Angola’s political and 
social system.  
The primary motivations for a case study on UNITA were an interest in the analysis 
of contemporary wars and the current trend of an economic approach to conflict studies. 
In recent years, the economic approach gained increasing attention, exemplified by the 
establishment of a multimillion-dollar research project on “The Economics of Civil 
Wars, Crime and Violence“ at the Post-Conflict Unit of the World Bank.2 With a focus 
on the ability of certain actors to profit from war, the economic approach theorizes 
primarily on how economic activities influence conflict dynamism. Despite this 
predominance of economic aspects, however, the interaction of economic and political 
factors is explicitly recognized as the central analytical category. But further theoretical 
                                                 
 
 
1  Bridgland, Fred: Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. London: Hodder and Stoughton 1986. 
2  For more information on this research project, see http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict  
 
 elaboration on this interaction is scarce, and instead the primary focus remains on 
economic motives for violence. In this regard, the economic approach is vulnerable to 
criticism. The following study addresses this shortcoming and defines the 
interconnection between political and economic structures as the central analytical 
question: How can the interaction between political and economic structures in 
contemporary wars be examined? Due to this theoretical objective, the main emphasis 
of this study is on the development of an alternative analytical approach to war 
economies. This approach is then tested in the case study on UNITA. The results of the 
empirical study are used to define theoretical requirements for further study of war 
economies.  
With this focus on the interaction between political and economic aspects, the 
internal functional logic of contemporary war economies emerges as the core object of 
analysis. For the purpose of this paper, a war economy is conceptualized as a form of 
social organization. The functioning of this social system is dependent on the existence 
of both a system of domination and an economic structure guaranteeing the material 
means of support of the system. In contrast to this focus on the societal level of war 
economies, the economic approach primarily emphasizes the interaction between local 
war economies and the world market. The economic approach thus defines the 
international system as the main level of analysis. Interaction with global trading 
networks is recognized as a central condition for the sustainability of local war 
economies in this study as well. However, external factors are assessed exclusively in 
regard to their influence on the internal functioning of war economies.  
The objective of this study both draws upon and supplements the economic 
approach. To begin with, therefore, the emergence of an economic approach to conflict 
studies is examined in chapter one. The valuable contribution of this approach to the 
academic discipline of conflict studies is ascertained. On the basis of a shortcoming of 
this novel approach, however, the theoretical foundation of this study is developed in 
chapter three. The theoretical section is concluded with the introduction of a hypothesis 
in chapter 3.3. Successively, the theoretical framework is tested in the case study on 
UNITA in chapter four. Both the political and the economic structures of UNITA’s 
system of insurgent organization are examined. In chapter five, the results of the 
empirical study are discussed in regard to the central research question on the 
interaction between political and economic structures. In the concluding chapter six, we 
discuss how the empirical results of the case study influence the theoretical 
considerations on how to study war economies, as presented in chapter three. 
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 2. The Emergence of an Economic Approach  
As an object of research, war is recognized as a complex social phenomenon causing 
considerable methodological and theoretical challenges.3 Even defining war has proven 
difficult, in spite of a basic consensus on the reference to ‘organized mass violence’.4 
Adding to this complexity, in the post-Cold War-era conflict research has been 
dominated by a discussion of apparent novel and altered dynamics in contemporary 
wars. From this discourse, the economic approach originated. Due to “the role of the 
debates as images in shaping self-understanding and practice in the discipline”5, we 
briefly examine the central debates in conflict studies in the post-Cold War-era, and 
subsequently define the central research questions within the economic approach.  
2.1. From “Proxy Wars” to “New Wars” 
The first debate is recognized in the criticism of the Cold War-approach to conflict 
studies, in which the notion “proxy war” was particularly paramount. According to this 
paradigm, every battlefield in the Third World6 could potentially be used in the bipolar 
power struggle, thereby avoiding direct confrontation between the two superpowers and 
the risk of nuclear devastation. Insurgents and incumbents in internal conflicts 
frequently attracted support, both financial and logistical (including troops), from either 
the Communist block or the West during the Cold War. The main emphasis on external 
factors in this concept came, however, to be viewed as increasingly overrated in 
comparison to the influence of internal determinants. This perception was strengthened, 
when the initial illusion of a prompt termination of presumed “proxy wars” with the end 
of the Cold War was devastated, and it became clear that the expected ‘peace dividend’ 
would not pay off. If there was a peace dividend to be had on the African continent, 
very few countries reaped the benefits from it, as wars continued unabated in Angola 
                                                 
 
 
3 The challenges involved in theorizing about war have been elaborated extensively elsewhere, see for 
example Jung, Dietrich: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg. Grundlegung einer Methode zur Erforschung 
kriegsursächlicher Prozesse im Kontext globaler Vergesellschaftung. Münster: LIT Verlag 1995, pp. 
14-24 and Siegelberg, Jens: Kapitalismus und Krieg. Eine Theorie des Krieges in der 
Weltgesellschaft. Hamburg, Münster: LIT Verlag 1994, pp. 16-36.  
4 Cf. Siegelberg: op cit., p. 17. 
5 Wæver, Ole: Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms. In: 
Neumann, Iver B.; Wæver, Ole (eds.): The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making? 
London, New York: Routledge 1997 (pp. 1-37), p. 9. With this in mind, Wæver compartmentalized 
the history of the discipline International Relations into four main debates. His intention is here 
transferred to the examination of the study area conflict research in the post-Cold War-era. However, 
the ‘debates’ discussed here are selective and not to be (mis-)understood as a comprehensive review 
of the discipline. The debates are not systematized periodically, as they partly overlapped and 
continue to represent different research agendas within the discipline. 
6 During the Cold War-era, this term distinguished certain countries from the ’First’ World (the West) 
and the Communist ‘Second’ World. Although anachronistic, the term ‘Third World’ is used 
throughout this paper as a matter of convenience, in order to distinguish broad geographical areas. 
The ‘South’ is used as a synonym.  
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 and invariably on the Horn of Africa, and new wars began in Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Rwanda. Nonetheless, when the Communist block collapsed, the influence of both 
external and internal factors on internal wars could be reassessed, unrestrained from 
global power relations and the concept of bipolarity. 
Researchers then suggested the emergence of new patterns of violence in 
contemporary wars, based in particular on the observation of wars in Africa and Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. An influential contribution to this second debate 
was Kaldor’s introduction of the term “new wars”, projected as a mixture of pre-
modern and modern characteristics. “New Wars” involve a blurring of “the distinction 
between what is private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, 
between what is done for economic or political motives.”7 In comparison to earlier 
wars, Kaldor defined the distinctiveness of “new wars” with reference to the goals, the 
mode of warfare, and how wars are financed. Firstly, while “old” wars were dominated 
by geo-strategic and ideological goals, “new wars” are dominated by identity politics.8 
Secondly, the new mode of warfare draws upon experiences from guerrilla wars, 
although the “winning-hearts-and-minds”-strategy of former “freedom fighters” is 
replaced by intimidation of insecurity and fear for the purpose of establishing territorial 
control: “Hence, the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through 
various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of 
political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation.”9 Various combatants 
are involved in contemporary conflicts, including regular soldiers, paramilitaries, 
warlords, police forces and mercenaries, who may both confront and co-operate with 
each other. Thirdly, economic activities in “new wars”, such as plunder or black market 
operations, are incorporated into the globalized world economy. The sustenance of these 
activities is dependent on continued use of violence; hence, the perpetuation of war is 
inherent in the functional logic of the war economy.10 However, the concept of “new 
wars” also attracted criticism, particularly in regard to the justification of the noted 
characteristics as fundamentally “new”. The broad distinction between “new” and “old” 
wars was described as an ‘overestimation’ and a ‘misinterpretation’ of old wars.11 
According to the “new wars”-theory, old wars were dominated by well-defined 
ideological causes, while new are caused by tribal, ethnic or no cause; grievance in old 
is replaced by greed and loot in new wars; popular support is replaced by lack of 
popular support, and the central control of use of violence in old, is contrasted by 
senseless, sporadic violence in new wars.12 However, a broad distinction between new 
and old wars cannot be supported by empirical evidence, which demonstrates the 
coexistence of various features.13  
                                                 
 
 
7 Kaldor, Mary: New & Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press 2001 
(reprint of the 1999 edition, with a new afterword.), p. 2. 
8  “[T]he claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or 
linguistic.” Ibid., p. 6. 
9 Ibid., p. 8. 
10  Cf. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
11  Cf. Kalyvas, Stathis: “New” and “Old” Civil Wars: Is the Distinction Valid? May 2000, p. 6, paper 
retrieved December 12, 2001 from www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/warpeace. 
12  Cf. Ibid., p. 5.  
13  Kalyvas’ rejected the distinction between new and old wars by arguing that ideological concerns are 
not eliminated from new wars; popular support in general varies; violence is per se cruel, and it is not 
 4
 Kaldor’s proposition of ”new wars” also influenced a debate on the political nature 
of current conflicts. In contrast to Kaldor’s emphasis on the struggle for access to the 
state, Mark Duffield rejects the idea that current conflicts are mainly about the control 
over state power.14 Duffield recognizes the emergence of alternative political projects in 
the South, which include the state system, but “no longer seek or even need to establish 
territorial, bureaucratic or consent based political authority in the traditional sense.”15 
A central feature of this process is the emergence of globalized political economies, 
characterized by parallel and gray structures operated by influential non-state actors. 
The development of new forms of political and economic interaction beyond the state, 
is not temporary, but must be understood as “a reflection of embedded and long-term 
processes.”16 In consequence, the conceptualization of current conflicts in terms of the 
nation-state must be rethought. Despite their diverging assessments of the political 
nature of contemporary wars, Kaldor focusing on access to the state and Duffield on the 
emergence of alternative forms of governance, both authors are concerned with the use 
of violence in context of globalization and changing political structures. This discussion 
of the political nature of war was in the early 1990s challenged by an idea of war as 
apolitical, here recognized as a third debate. These arguments provoked vehement 
criticism, however, which emanated in the economic approach to conflict research.17 
2.2. The Irrationality versus the Rationality-Argument 
The scholars recognized in the third debate, most prominently Robert D. Kaplan (1993, 
1994), were strongly criticized among academics, but achieved considerable attention 
among central policy makers: Kaplan’s analysis of the political development in Sierra 
Leone (Kaplan 1994) was faxed to every US embassy in Africa.18 In addition to Kaplan, 
Martin Van Creveld (1991) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1993) are referred to as 
representatives of the same trend. By its opponents, this trend was termed ‘New 
Barbarism’ and ’chaos theory’ in an attempt to subsume the central criticism in 
captivating slogans.19 The idea of barbaric and chaotic wars was based on observations 
of the course of events in internal wars erupting when the Communist block eroded. 
Characteristics such as tribal or ethnic sympathies, a blurred distinction between war 
and crime, and the weakening of the state were interpreted as a re-emergence of the 
                                                                                                                                               
clear whether certain groups go to war in order to loot, or loot in order to continue fighting. Cf. 
Kalyvas: op cit.  
14  Cf. Kaldor, Mary: Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence, 2000, p. 5, paper retrieved December 
15, 2001 from www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/authors/kaldor.htm, and Duffield, Mark: Post-modern 
Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection. In: Civil Wars, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1998 (pp. 65-102). 
15  Duffield: Post-modern Conflict, 1998, p. 76. 
16  Ibid., p. 98. 
17  An additional debate focusing on the ethnic aspects of war is not examined here, due to minimal 
influence on the development of an economic approach. Despite criticism, however, the ethnic 
approach remains the single most dominant approach co-existing with the economic approach, and 
continues to influence, in particular, media analyses of war. 
18  Richards, Paul: Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: 
James Currey 1996, pp. xiv. Kaplan’s most prominent analyses are Kaplan, Robert D.: Balkan Ghost: 
A Journey through History. London: Macmillan 1993 and Kaplan: The Coming Anarchy. In: Atlantic 
Monthly, Vol. 273, No. 2, 1994 (pp. 44-76).  
19  Cf. Richards: Fighting for the Rain Forest, 1996, pp. xiii and Keen, David: The Economic Functions 
of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998, p. 10. 
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 ‘formlessness’ of medieval wars in Europe, prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.20 
According to this argument, current conflicts are characterized by a confusion of 
political, social, economic and religious motives. With a “neo-Malthusian” view, based 
on the demographer Thomas Malthus’ doomsday’s prophecies resulting from 
exponential population growth, New Barbarism argues that overpopulation, diseases 
and migration, combined with a scarcity of resources, disrupt the social environment 
and evidently cause the eruption of violent clashes.21 The order experienced during the 
Cold War ideological struggle is replaced by a perception of contemporary wars as 
anarchic. Both the idea of inevitable cultural clashes, most prominently propagated by 
Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), and natural causes of violence were instrumental in 
bringing about an impression of essentially uncontrollable conflicts, in which 
belligerents operate as bandits in an anarchic environment.22 
The chaos theory attracted strong criticism, most clearly expressed by David Keen, 
who emphasized the inability of analysts to imagine the existence of rational structures 
in an unfamiliar environment: “We tend to regard conflict as, simply, a breakdown in a 
particular system, rather than as the emergence of another, alternative system of profit 
and power.”23 When analyzing the functioning of the apparent anarchy, the ‘irrational’ 
features are likely to represent a ‘reconstituted system’ shaped by political and 
economic interests of the various actors involved. Conflict analysts must therefore 
direct attention to the “vested interests, political and economic, which are driving the 
apparent ‘chaos’ – and indeed the vested interests that may be driving its depiction as 
chaos.”24 In order to understand the logic of this emerging alternative system, 
researchers must focus on the possible positive effects of war: “What use is conflict? In 
whose interest is it waged? Who produces violence, how, and why?”25 Both political 
and non-political functions of violence in contemporary internal wars are recognized: 
                                                 
 
 
20  Cf. Kaplan: The Coming Anarchy, 1994, p. 46. Duffield also elaborated on the re-emergence of 
features of medieval warfare, but focused exclusively on the forms of political authority: “[T]he 
neomedieval model of political authority (…) is the emergence of multiple, overlapping and 
autonomous areas of sovereignty side by side with a weak central competence.” Duffield: Post-
modern Conflict, 1998, p. 88.  
21  Cf. Kaplan: The Coming Anarchy, 1994, p. 48, p. 54. Kaplan draws extensively upon work by 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, who argued that environmental degradation and resource scarcity inflict 
conflict upon poor countries. Kaplan welcomes Homer-Dixon’s argument because finally, natural, 
and not social causes of social and political changes are in focus (Cf. Ibid., p.60). Homer-Dixon 
developed his argument in the early 1990s when he was Director of the research group “Project on 
Environmental Change and Acute Conflict”, and explained his view in Homer-Dixon: Destruction 
and Death: As Resources Are Wasted, Mass Violence Will Rise. In: New York Times, January 31, 
1992, and Homer-Dixon: Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press 1999. 
22  Cf. Richards: Fighting for the Rain Forest, 1996, p. xiv. One particularly evident example of this 
perception of anarchic conflicts is Kaplan’s literary description of young rebels, who he observed 
while traveling in West Africa: “They are like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid 
that was clearly on the verge of igniting.” Kaplan: The Coming Anarchy, 1994, p. 46. 
23  Keen, David: Organised Chaos: Not the New World We Ordered. In: The World Today, Vol. 52, No. 
1, 1996 (pp. 14-17), p. 14. Expressing his determined rejection of perceptions of irrational, apolitical 
banditry in contemporary conflicts, Keen noted: “Faced with international analysts’ depictions of 
’mindless violence’ in troublespots around the globe, we need to ask whether it is the violence that is 
mindless or the analysis.” Ibid, p. 15.  
24  Ibid., p. 14.  
25  Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 11.  
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 Firstly, political functions aimed at changing the law and administrative policies in 
order to alter the distribution of economic resources and privileges controlled by the 
state, either progressively, i.e. reducing political and economic inequalities, or 
regressively, i.e. maintaining or increasing these inequalities. Secondly, non-political 
functions aimed at creating a system in which violence is means to achieving economic 
benefits, personal security and an increased social status, thereby ignoring the rule of 
law.26 According to these functions, conflicts are dominated by both economic and 
political motives. During the course of the conflict, these motives may change if parties 
to the conflict experience new economic opportunities and develop an interest in 
prolonging the conflict. The political aim of winning the war can then become 
subordinate to economic agendas for which the continuation of conflict is beneficial. In 
order to understand such logics, the economic structures in contemporary conflicts must 
be examined.27  
Although an analysis of the economic advantages experienced by certain actors and 
groups can improve the understanding of conflict dynamism, prominent protagonists of 
the economic approach emphasize that it cannot replace the analytical interest in 
political aspects. The economic structures must be examined in correspondence with 
political agendas, and the emphasis should be on an “emerging political economy from 
which the combatants can benefit.”28 While recognizing the impact of economic 
agendas on conflict dynamism, François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin argued that 
decision making-processes in conflict situations are primarily political in character, and 
that protracted conflicts remain dependent on power.29 Due to this emphasis on the co-
existence of economic and political agendas, the economic approach is recognized as a 
complementary, rather than a unique, explanatory framework within conflict research. 
A coherent theory of a political economy of war, however, has yet to be elaborated. The 
economic approach primarily theorizes about the impact of economic activities on 
conflict dynamism, while particularly emphasizing the international context, i.e. the 
                                                 
 
 
26  Cf. Berdal, Mats; Keen, David: Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy 
Implications. In: Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997 (pp. 795-818), pp. 798-799, and Keen, David: 
Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. In: Berdal, Mats; Malone, David M. (eds.): Greed and 
Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000, (pp. 
19-41), p. 23. 
27  Drawing on the paradigm that ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ introduced by Carl 
von Clausewitz, Keen created the slogan “war has increasingly become the continuation of 
economics by other means.” Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 11. On emerging 
economic motives in war, see also Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic Agendas, 1997, p. 798 and 
Keen, David: A Rational Kind of Madness. In: Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997 
(pp. 67-75), p. 69. 
28  Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 12. “Rather than abandoning a ’political’ 
analysis in favour of an ‘economic’ one, it is important to recognise that contemporary ‘complex 
emergencies’ have been characterised by the interaction of political and economic agendas. We are 
not suggesting that contemporary civil wars, the resort to violence, and the breakdown of peace 
processes can be understood by reference to economic motivations alone. It is the relationship 
between economic factors and other sources of violence, especially their interaction with political 
objectives, which is our main concern.” (emphasis in original) Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic 
Agendas, 1997, p. 800. 
29  Cf. Jean, François; Rufin, Jean-Christophe: Vorwort. In: Jean; Rufin (eds.): Ökonomie der 
Bürgerkriege. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition 1999 (pp. 7-14) (originally published in French: 
Economie des guerre civiles. Paris: Hachette 1996), p. 9.  
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 internationalization of war. In the following section, the central analytical variables 
within the new research agenda are examined. 
2.3. A New Research Agenda: War Economy 
In a traditional perception of war economies, the state is the central actor: An intensive 
mobilization of resources under state control can significantly increase production 
during wartime.30 Contemporary war economies are, however, observed primarily in 
internal conflicts and are dominated by informal and criminal activities, in which both 
state and non-state actors are involved. A significant premise of these war economies is 
the dependence on external markets, i.e. the interaction with regional and international 
trading networks.31 For the purpose of distinguishing analytically between intricate 
forms of trade, Peter Lock introduced a holistic model with three spheres: (1) The 
regular economy, regulated by the rule of law and tax payments ensuring the 
reproduction of the state; (2) the informal economy, with limited applicability of the rule 
of law and marginal tax payments, partially regulated by violence, and (3) the globally 
organized criminal economy, a parasite to the other two sectors, characterized by 
lawlessness and violent interaction.32 Other authors, such as Kate Meagher and Mark 
Duffield, also focus on various forms of global economic exchange, termed ‘parallel 
trade’ and ‘transborder trade’.33 Evidence of the interaction between the informal 
economy and the formal sector can be detected in statistical anomalies, such as 
countries exporting what they do not produce and importing what they cannot 
consume.34 This informalization of the economy represents a methodological challenge 
in particular to traditional economic research, which is faced with a lack of reliable 
statistical data required for the conduct of classical economic analysis. Instead, detailed 
empirical and historical analyses are essential in order to understand the structure and 
                                                 
 
 
30  Cf. Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, p. 12. 
31  The insight that war economies must be examined in context of global economic interaction is a 
universal statement among central authors within the economic approach. See Berdal, Mats; Malone, 
David M.: Introduction. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 1-15), p. 2; Jean; 
Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, pp. 9-10; Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 11, and Lock, 
Peter: Söldner und Rebellen: Zur Rolle der Gewalt in afrikanischen Ökonomien. In: Internationales 
Afrikaforum, 36. Jhg., Nr. 1, 2000 (pp. 63-74), p. 66. 
32  Cf. Lock, Peter: Sicherheit à la carte? Entstaatlichung, Gewaltmärkte und die Privatisierung des 
staatlichen Gewaltmonopols. In: Brühl, Tanja et.al.: Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. 
Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz 
Nachfolger 2001 (pp. 200-229), pp. 207-209. 
33  Parallel trade comprises trade in legal goods through illegal or unofficial channels, e.g. cheap textiles 
from East Asia may be informally imported and incorporated into regional trading networks. 
Transborder trade comprises trade both in legal and illegal goods through the same channels. Due to 
the similarities in the organizational structure, Duffield favors the term transborder trade for 
comparative purposes. Cf. Meagher, Kate: Informal Integration or Economic Subversion? Parallel 
trade in West Africa. In: Lavergne, Réal (ed.): Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa. 
A Multidimensional Perspective. Trenton (NJ), Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 1997 (pp. 165-187), 
pp. 167-168, Meagher, Kate: The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in Northwestern 
Uganda. In: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 47, 1990 (pp. 64-83) and Duffield, 
Mark: Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and 
Grievance, 2000 (pp. 69-89), p. 76.  
34  Cf. Meagher: Informal Integration or Economic Subversion, 1997, p. 181. 
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 origin of parallel trade.35 The economic approach to conflict studies reflects upon this 
research interest and addresses the qualitative changes in wars related to informalization 
and criminalization of global economic interaction.  
The concept of globalization, despite its “notoriously imprecise”36 nature, is 
recognized as a central analytical variable within the economic approach. This process 
transforms the economic and financial systems and creates new economic opportunities, 
also for actors in civil wars.37 When bipolarity eroded and the external support from one 
of the superpowers and their allies to clients in various wars terminated, alternative 
economic strategies began to play a more prominent role. With control over local assets 
and access to global markets, combatants sought to establish a financial base. The 
dependence of local war economies on international trading networks is summarized in 
the motto that “today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally, but to 
survive they have to think globally.”38 The internationalization of internal wars is, 
however, not limited to interactions with global trading networks. Through presumable 
apolitical human relief operations, the international community has also influenced 
conflict dynamism. The delivery of humanitarian aid into a conflict area requires the 
consent of the armed group(s) controlling the specific territory. Aid can be taxed or 
seized by rebels, who may distribute it to selected groups. In this manner, relief 
agencies can be co-opted by parties to a conflict and become politically involved.39 The 
economic approach addresses how the changing structures of global economic 
interdependence and the import of external resources into a conflict-ridden country 
influence the functioning of local war economies. 
In context of globalization, the role of the state is also redefined, and several 
research projects have in recent years addressed these changes, i.e. the ‘weak’, ‘failed’ 
                                                 
 
 
35  Cf. Carbonnier, Gilles: Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the 
Literature. WSP Occasional Paper No. 2, 1998, retrieved February 11, 2001 from 
www.unrisd.org/wsp/pop2/toc.htm; Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, pp. 12-13 and Meagher: The Hidden 
Economy, 1990, p. 81. Jean and Rufin note that the problem related to statistical data explains why 
relief workers were the first to observe changing economic activities in conflict areas, among them 
Jean himself, who worked for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).  
36  Berdal; Malone: Introduction, 2000, p. 7. 
37  Cf. Ibid., pp. 7-8. “In short, it is the highly “transnational and networked characteristics” of modern 
war economies that allows us to talk of a fundamentally new context in which to study and approach 
wars.” Ibid., p. 8. Globalization and liberalization do not cause war economies, but they represent 
fundamental conditions of global economic interaction, both legal and illegal. 
38  Duffield: Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies, 2000, p. 84. The 
internationalization of contemporary wars has led to considerations of complicity: “A high level of 
complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments 
has assisted the development of war economies.” Ibid. Duffield suggests that the supply of arms from 
Northern companies to the South is an “extreme example of the commercial complicity (…). Without 
this help, war economies would find it difficult to survive.” Ibid., p. 85. 
39  Cf. Duffield, Mark: The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies 
and International Aid. In: Macrae, Joanna; Zwi, Anthony (eds.): War and Hunger. Rethinking 
International Response to Complex Emergencies. London, New Jersey: Zed Books 1994 (pp. 50-69), 
pp. 58-63. Awareness has been increased on this issue, but the discussion on whether or not 
humanitarian aid does have an impact on the course of civil wars continues. See Shearer, David: 
Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and Its Economic Role in Civil Wars. In: Berdal; Malone 
(eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 189-203). 
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 and ‘Shadow’ state.40 In regard to internal wars, the core concern is the ability of the 
state to control resources as well as legal and political developments. An erosion of such 
capacities can be exploited by insurgents or other internal actors: “In shadow states, 
where no authority exists that is willing or capable of providing a public good, 
entrepreneurs manage their own economic environment through means of violence.”41 
Parallel to the erosion of the state monopoly of violence, private arrangements of 
protection emerge under the control of insurgents, warlords or mercenaries. With the 
ability to exercise territorial control by means of violence, establish a trading monopoly 
and install a taxation system, belligerents can develop a ’mini-state’.42 Based on the 
assumption that “the emergence of war economies (…) reflect and feed on extreme 
cases of state collapse”43, the economic approach examines the interaction between the 
nature of state authority and conflict dynamism in context of a changing international 
environment.  
In contrast to the focus on the international context, Keen introduced the terms “top-
down” and “bottom-up” violence, for the purpose of systematizing how economic 
considerations influence the strategies of local actors: “Top-down violence refers to 
violence that is mobilized by political leaders and entrepreneurs – whether for political 
or economic reasons.”44 With the objective of maintaining power and hindering 
opposition to their unrestricted access to economic resources, elites encourage violence, 
which is then exploited as a justification of repression. In contrast, “bottom-up” 
violence is induced by civilians, for security, psychological or economic reasons, and 
resembles crime: “The violent may be intent on preserving their physical security; they 
may be looking for excitement or for the immediate rectification of a perceived wrong. 
They may also be following their own economic agendas.”45 In response to the 
disintegration of the state, civilians also respond with developing a grassroots war 
economy.46  
In addition to these considerations of qualitative changes in current wars, a 
quantitative approach to war economies has emerged from the field of development 
economics.47 Economies in wartime have conventionally been considered a deviation 
                                                 
 
 
40  For an overview of the numerous studies in this field, see Schlichte, Klaus: Why States Decay. A 
Preliminary Assessment. Research Unit of Wars, Armament and Development. Hamburg: Institute of 
Political Science, Nr. 2, 1998.  
41  Reno, William: Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): 
Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 43-68), p. 54.  
42  Cf. Keen: Organised Chaos, 1996, p. 16. Keen referred to this development of insurgent controlled 
state-like organizations as “privatising war”. 
43  Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic Agendas, 1997, p. 812. 
44  Keen: Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, 2000, p. 25. 
45  Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 46. On top-down and bottom-up violence, see 
Ibid., pp. 23-54.  
46  Chingono and Mwanasali both focus on the re-organization of the economy in context of the 
disintegration of the state (“coping strategies”) and insurgent activities. See Chingono, Mark F.: The 
State, Violence and Development. The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992. 
Aldershot, Brookfield, Hong Kong: Avebury 1996 and Mwanasali, Musifiky: The View from Below. 
In Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 137-153).  
47  As such, qualitative and quantitative approaches epitomize an interdisciplinary approach to war 
economies. Economists in “The Development Research Group” of the World Bank, centered round 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, and researchers at the Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 
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 from a benevolent development path, a ’normality’ that must be reestablished rapidly, 
and have therefore mainly been neglected by development economists. Recently, 
however, economists have defined the examination of the human costs of war with 
statistical analysis, i.e. entitlement losses and distributional consequences, and how the 
economy functions in conflict situations, i.e. production, agriculture, import dependence 
and changes in economic behavior, as scholarly aims.48 A novel research tool is an 
extended view of Sen’s entitlement approach, i.e. the claims of households to goods and 
services such as food, water supply, health services and education. By examining the 
destruction and creation of entitlements, the aim is to assess how standards of living are 
affected by conflict, i.e. the distribution of losers and winners, in order to clarify whom 
experiences incentives to prolong the conflict.49 In addition to these attempts to enter 
the ‘black box’ of economic activities during war, statistical analysis have been applied 
on the question of economic agendas as causes of conflict. In the operationalization of 
the hypothesis “greed or grievance” as motives for civil war, Paul Collier contrasted 
proxies of greed with those of grievance.50 From a statistical comparison of large-scale 
internal conflicts since 1965, Collier concluded that „economic agendas appear to be 
central to understanding why civil wars start. Conflicts are far more likely to be caused 
by economic opportunities than by grievance.“51 Collier’s study is noteworthy because 
it diverges from the core interest in conflict dynamism, i.e. what is caused by conflict, 
within the economic approach.  
The main objections to Collier’s study, however, concern the questionable choice of 
proxies and the inability to theorize on the interaction between political and economic 
factors, a fundamental assumption of the economic approach. The utility of the 
economic approach, as defined by Keen, was expected in the ability to note the 
development of altered socio-economic power arrangements, as mentioned above. So 
far, however, the economic approach has failed to address the emergence of alternative 
power structures as a consequence of interactions between economic and political 
structures. In most analyses, the primary focus is on economic motives for violence. 
Although the analysis of economic agendas in internal wars is a positive contribution to 
the field of conflict research, an exclusive focus on economic aspects is simplistic. The 
economic approach has therefore implemented a one-dimensional approach, which 
initially prompted the protest against the irrationality-argument and the rejection of New 
Barbarism. The insight that apparent anarchic social processes can represent a different 
                                                                                                                                               
in particular Frances Stewart and Valpy FitzGerald, have dominated the increased research interest in 
war economies among development economists. 
48  Cf. Stewart, Frances; FitzGerald, Valpy: Introduction: Assessing the Economic Costs of War. In: 
Stewart; FitzGerald (eds.): War and Underdevelopment Vol. 1: The Economic and Social 
Consequences of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001 (pp. 1-20), pp. 5-18, and 
FitzGerald, E.V.K; Stewart, Frances: Editor’s Introduction. In: Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 25, 
No. 1, 1997 (pp. 5-10), p. 6. 
49  Sen’s definition of direct (subsistence) and market entitlements (monetary transactions) is extended 
by public, civic and extra-legal entitlements. For further elaboration see Stewart; FitzGerald: 
Introduction, 2001, p. 6. Sen introduced his entitlement approach in Sen, Amartya: Poverty and 
Famines: An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981. 
50  As proxies to measure economic agendas in wars, Collier used primary commodities, the proportion 
of young men in society and the endowment of education. Proxies of grievance were ethnic or 
religious hatred, economic inequality (ownership of land), lack of political rights and government 
economic incompetence. Cf. Collier, Paul: Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In: 
Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 91-111), pp. 91-97. 
51  Ibid., p. 91. 
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 order with its own logic, was convincingly argued by Chabal and Daloz in their 
hypothesis of the “instrumentalization of disorder.”52 The economic approach has 
recently proven receptive to these ideas, and the analytical objective is redefined in the 
direction of a broader social science category, concerning the transformation of political 
authority in a global context.53 The objective of this paper is affiliated with this study 
area. In the following chapter we develop a theoretical framework for an integrated 
analysis of both political and economic aspects. 
                                                 
 
 
52  Chabal, Patrick; Daloz, Jean-Pascal: Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James 
Currey 1999. 
53  This development was noted in an unpublished paper by Aust, made available to the author. Aust, 
Björn: Kriegswirtschaften in innerstaatlichen Kriegen: Aufarbeitung und Diskussion des 
Forschungsstandes. Fall 2001. 
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 3. The Internal Functional Logic of War Economies 
Developing a theoretical framework 
In the economic approach to conflict studies war economies are conceptualized as 
alternative socio-administrative systems of power, profit and protection. The interaction 
of political and economic structures is recognized as the central object of analysis. 
Beyond these key statements, however, further theoretical elaboration on how to study 
war economies as systems of social organization has not been accomplished. This 
chapter reflects upon this theoretical shortcoming of the economic approach. With 
exclusive focus on insurgent movements, war economies are here understood as a form 
of social organization, which we refer to in the present as ‘social order’. Analytical 
interest focuses on the social reproduction and dynamic adaptation within this order, 
comprising both a political and an economic structure. The interaction between these 
two structures determines the functional logic of an insurgent ‘social order’. In order to 
analyze this functional logic, in this chapter we develop a theoretical framework with 
two basic pillars: (I) a framework for the isolated analysis of the political and the 
economic structure, and (II) a framework for the analysis of the reciprocal influence 
between these two structures. The chapter concludes by presenting a hypothesis to 
account for the external influence on the internal structure of an insurgent ‘social order’. 
The primary task below is to define the constitutive elements of this order.  
3.1. War Economy as a ‘social order’ 
An insurgent war economy is located within the geographical borders of a state, but is 
also intermeshed with regional and global trading networks. This ‘open’ character of 
contemporary war economies illustrates the necessity of carefully assessing the 
influence of both external and internal factors on conflict dynamism. The exchange 
between an insurgent war economy and the world market is important due to 
belligerents’ dependence on the opportunity to sell commodities and gain access to fluid 
(‘hard’) currencies and commodities, such as weapons and other military and non-
military equipment, from abroad. The state in whose territory the insurgent economy is 
located also represents an external influence. Hence, the two war economies, the 
economy of the state and the insurgent economy, are considered distinct systems which 
are external to one another, but which nevertheless interact in a two-level competitive 
relationship. The insurgent movement competes with the state apparatus both for 
political authority and for access to economic resources within a specific territory. 
Although contemporary war economies are characterized by interaction between 
internal and external factors, the core research interest here is in the internal functional 
logic of an insurgent war economy. While the external influencing factors cannot be 
ignored, the international system is not the central level of analysis. The scope of 
interest with regard to external factors is limited: The aim is not to examine the motives 
of the numerous international agents with which an insurgent economy interacts, nor 
how the war economy of the state functions. Interest in external factors is exclusively 
defined in terms of how the interplay between the external dimension and the insurgent 
war economy potentially influences and changes the internal structure of an insurgent 
system of organization. 
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 Derived from the economic approach, war economies are in this paper 
conceptualized as socio-economic power arrangements: A war economy is a form of 
social organization with two central analytical categories – namely, a political and an 
economic structure – which, taken together, are here referred to as a ‘social order’54. 
The perpetuation of this order is a prerequisite for a sustained insurgency. In his 
amplification of the sociological theory of Norbert Elias, Dietrich Jung emphasized that 
“social reproduction theoretically comprises three elementary functions all empirical 
societies have to fulfill – the control of physical force, the guarantee of material means, 
and the production and preservation of symbolic means of orientation.”55 How societies 
fulfill the elementary functions is based on both modern and traditional, or mixed, forms 
of social organization.56 The two elementary functions, internal control of physical force 
and the guarantee of material means, correspond directly to the two main categories of 
an insurgent ‘social order’, as referred to in this paper. The third elementary function, 
symbolic means of orientation such as collective symbols and customs, is in our 
analysis included in the political structure (see p. 25). Before introducing a working 
definition, we shall explore the central categories of an insurgent ‘social order’ in 
greater detail. 
The two central categories of an insurgent ‘social order’ are supplemented by the 
additional component violence, defined as “an act of power with the intention of 
hurting someone physically.”57 Violence does not represent a single category, but is 
rather inherent in the two main categories. Max Weber averred that the threat of or use 
of physical force is the ultima ratio of all forms of political organization: “It is possible 
to define the “political” character of an organization only in terms of the means 
peculiar to it, the use of force.”58 Thus, the exercise of political authority is inextricably 
linked to the monopolization of the use of physical force. More recently, Georg Elwert 
has elaborated a link between economy and violence in his conception of ‘markets of 
                                                 
 
 
54  The use of ‘order’ in our context is based on the definition of order as “[t]he condition in which the 
laws or usages [i.e. informal institutions (KS)] regulating the public relations of individuals to the 
community, and the public conduct of members or sections of the community to each other, are 
maintained and observed.” The Oxford Dictionary, Second Edition. Prepared by J.A. Simpson and 
E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989 (keyword: order), p. 905. 
55  Jung, Dietrich: The Political Sociology of World Society. In: Europen Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 7(4), 2001 (pp. 443-474), p. 452. Jung’s detailed analysis of Elias is included in his 
dissertation, see Jung: Tradition–Moderne–Krieg, 1995, pp. 91ff. 
56  In order to account for the various forms of social reproduction, Elias introduced the term 
“figuration”. The dynamic development of societies involves the continuous erosion and formation 
of new figurations, which exemplifies the changing and interdependent character of society. Cf. Jung: 
Tradition-Moderne-Krieg, 1995, p. 95. 
57  Author’s translation of Popitz’ definition: “Gewalt meint eine Machtaktion, die zur absichtlichen 
körperlichen Verletzung anderer führt.“ Popitz, Heinrich: Phänomene der Macht. Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr 1992 (2. stark erw. Aufl.), p. 48. 
58  Weber, Max: Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Roth, Guenther 
and Wittich, Claus: Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 1978 (1st printing 1968), 
p. 55. Cf. Weber, Max: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. 
Studienausgabe Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1980 (fünfte, rev. Auflage), p. 29. 
The analysis of Weber’s terminology is based on the original German text, but the quotes are cited 
from the English edition. Henceforth quoted as: Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980 and 
Weber: Eng. ed., 1968. 
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 violence’ (Gewaltmärkte).59 While rejecting an approach to violence as something 
irrational and emotional that neglects the “specific social character”60 in the majority 
of cases in which the use of violence is observed, Elwert theorizes on how rational 
economic behavior determines the social structure on markets of violence. Such markets 
occur particularly in areas in which a monopoly of physical force is non-existent, i.e. 
arbitrary use of violence is a general characteristic. Actors operating on these markets 
(micro-level) develop their own instruments (extortion, robbery, trading in stolen 
property and illegal commodities) for the purpose of generating profits. Their rational 
economic motives help to explain the development of certain routines, norms and 
expectations, which shape a specific social structure in which the use of violence is 
unrestricted.61 The emergent patterns of organization (macro-level) can stabilize this 
distinctive order, which may prove to be highly profitable.62 Hence, Elwert’s primary 
interest is in how the strategic use of violence for the generation of profits forms the 
social structure on markets of violence and consequently, influences conflict dynamism. 
The interplay between economic activities and altered forms of social organization is 
also the central research topic of William Reno, who particularly emphasizes the 
changing forms of political authority in Africa.63 With an analytical focus on informal 
markets, Reno examines how these markets determine the reallocation of production 
factors, the access to resources and the control of populations.64 On the basis of the 
dynamic developments of informal markets, alternative arrangements of political 
authority emerge, for which Reno has introduced the term ‘Shadow State’, comprising 
“the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their abilities to control markets and 
                                                 
 
 
59  Elwert, Georg: Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt. In: Trotha, Trutz 
von (ed.): Soziologie der Gewalt. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 
Sonderheft 37/1997. Opladen, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1997 (pp. 86-101). 
60  “Wer Gewalt mit begrenzter rationaler Kontrolle und Adrenalinausstoß assoziiert, verkennt den 
spezifisch sozialen Charackter der menschliche Gesellschaften dominierenden Gewaltform, nämlich 
der strategischen Gewalt.” Ibid., p. 87.  
61  Cf. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Tyrell strongly criticizes Elwert’s singular focus on actors’ economic motives as 
oversimplified: Although violence can be instrumentalized for economic purposes, Elwert’s 
elaboration on ‘markets of violence’ completely excludes the possibility that cultural and idealistic 
aspects also influence the dynamic use of violence in civil wars. Cf. Tyrell, Hartmann: Physische 
Gewalt, gewaltsamer Konflikt und der Staat. Überlegungen zu neuerer Literatur. In: Berliner Journal 
für Soziologie, Band 9(2), 1999 (pp. 269-288), pp. 276-277.  
62  Although the overall damage experienced by a war-torn society is negative, certain actors and 
warlords may continue to consider the ability of using violence for the purpose of maximizing profits 
as preferable in comparison to alternative social orders. Cf. Elwert, Georg: Vorwort: Gewalt als 
inszenierte Plötzlichkeit. In: Koehler, Jan und Heyer, Sonja (eds.): Anthropologie der Gewalt. 
Chancen und Grenzen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Berlin: VWF (Verlag für 
Wissenschaft und Forschung) 1998 (pp. 1-7), pp. 6-7. Inflicting an end to the functioning of this 
social order can, according to Elwert, be achieved through the establishment of a monopoly of 
violence, the depletion of internal resources and/or by terminating the supply of external resources. 
Cf. Elwert: Gewaltmärkte, 1997, p. 94. 
63  See Reno, William: Warlord Politics and African Studies. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 1998, Reno, William: Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1995, and Reno, William: Welthandel, Warlords und die 
Wiedererfindung des afrikanischen Staates. In: WeltTrends, Nr. 14, Jg. 5, 1997 (pp. 8-29). 
64  Cf. Reno: Corruption and State Politics, 1995, pp. 9-10. 
 15
 their material rewards.”65 Rulers with access to state institutions as well as informal 
sources of power act to sustain their control over people and territory by establishing 
informal deals with local leaders. Local strongmen, who are not formally recognized as 
heads of state, exercise power in accordance with their personal interest and attempt to 
enhance their power by exploiting markets, i.e. private interests gain preponderance 
over collective interests. The term warlord therefore embraces both (1) warlord tactics, 
meaning local strongmen challenging the power of the head of state, as well as (2) 
heads of weak states who use warlord politics to privatize their pursuit of power 
through informal deals.66 The changing forms of political authority in Africa are a result 
of these interactions between informal economic activities and power. The emergence 
of altered social institutions in the context of war economies is also emphasized by 
Trutz von Trotha in his consideration of a ‘sociology of violence’.67 Trotha argues that 
the development of such a sociological theory must begin by recognizing the 
characteristics of violence (phenomenology), which are then transformed into a theory 
of different ’forms of violence’ (Ordnungsformen der Gewalt).68 For the development of 
a ’sociology of violence’, the analytically distinct micro- and macro-levels, i.e. the links 
between individual social action and structural processes in society, must be 
combined.69 The use of violence should thus be analyzed as a sociological process, in 
which violent actions shape new structures and altered forms of societal organization.70  
While Weber defined violence as a fundamental category of all forms of political 
organization, Elwert, Reno and Trotha focus on the links between violence, economic 
rationality and modified social structures. Thus, the contemporary authors examine 
violence as a form of social action, as Trotha has explicitly noted.71 In context of an 
                                                 
 
 
65  Ibid., p. 3. Reno is elsewhere more specific in his definition of a Shadow State: “[A] very real, but 
not formally recognized, patronage system that was rigidly organized and centered on rulers’ control 
over resources. This control bound rulers’ potential rivals to them in exchange for largesse without 
the need to create strong bureaucracies they feared would heighten independent tendencies among 
elites.” Reno: Warlord Politics and African States, 1998, p. 2.  
66  Cf. Reno: Warlord Politics and African States, 1998, p. 16. In contrast to the usage of the term 
warlord on both heads of state and local strongmen, the term Shadow State refers exclusively to 
formally recognized heads of state using both state institutions and informal markets in order to 
perpetuate their political authority. 
67  Trotha distinguishes the ‘sociology of violence’ from the ‘sociology of causes’, which has previously 
dominated sociological studies of violence and war. He advocates a shift in focus away from causes 
and the question “why?” to the question “how?“. Trotha argues that the correlation between causes 
and violence in the sociology of causes has developed into a listing of factors, based on the principle 
of multicausality, which equals a broad description of social problems in society. This 
multidimensional approach and its comprehensiveness undermine the explanatory capability of the 
sociology of causes, thereby evidently making the case for an increased focus on violence itself and 
its dynamics. Trotha, Trutz von: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt. In: Trutz, T. von (ed.): Soziologie der 
Gewalt, 1997 (pp. 9-56), pp. 16-20. 
68  “Der Schlüssel zur Gewalt ist in den Formen der Gewalt selbst zu finden.“ Ibid., p. 20. 
69  Trotha suggests that Clifford Geertz’s concept of “thick description” is suitable for establishing the 
necessary theoretical link between micro- and macro-levels of analysis. The combination of levels of 
analysis comprises a fundamental methodological debate in the social sciences and will not be further 
elaborated here. Ibid., p. 21. See Geertz, Clifford: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers 1973.  
70  Cf. Trotha: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, 1997, p. 21. This idea can be explained as a chain of 
causality: cause – effect – cause.  
71  Ibid., p. 12. 
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 insurgent ‘social order’, the primary analytical interest is also in the functioning of 
violence as a social action. However, in contrast to Elwert, who emphasizes the use of 
violence exclusively for a rational economic purpose on markets of violence, the 
analytical focus here is on the functioning of violence as a social action both within the 
economic and the political structure. The specific functions of violence within an 
insurgent ‘social order’ can only be established on the basis of empirical investigation. 
We shall now attempt to introduce a working definition of the term insurgent ‘social 
order’.72 
An insurgent ‘social order’ comprises both a political system of authority and an 
economic structure. In the economic process of achieving access to resources and 
applying them profitably, violence functions as a mechanism enabling the extraction of 
resources.73 The political structure is a reflection of the importance of social 
institutions74 in a war economy dominated by informal activity and the necessity of a 
form of social organization for the reproduction of a sustained insurgency. 
Although Reno, Trotha and Elwert focus on the dynamic interaction between 
economic activities, violence and forms of political authority, which, taken together, 
encompass the research interest in this paper, neither of the authors delivers a 
framework for the operationalization of this approach in a case study. The challenge is 
then to create a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of the interactions 
between political and economic structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The two 
dimensions are approached using different theoretical frameworks, and to begin with, 
we focus on the political structure.  
3.1.1. The Political Structure 
An insurgent movement75, which challenges the authority of the state with the objective 
of capturing power, gaining control over economic resources or instituting an 
                                                 
 
 
72  This conceptualization was developed in co-operation with Dr. Jens Siegelberg, the managing 
director of the Research Unit on Wars, Armament and Development, University of Hamburg. The 
Working Group on the Causes of War (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, AKUF) is an 
outstanding example of successful co-operation between students and researchers connected to this 
group, due to the positive influence on students’ education and the synergistic effects generated by 
well-established researchers. Another researcher connected to the AKUF-network, Dr. Klaus 
Schlichte, presented a similar definition of war economy: “Eine Kriegsökonomie ist also ein sozialer 
Raum, in dem die Verteilung und Aneignung von Ressourcen gewaltgesteuert verläuft: Physische 
Gewalt wird eingesetzt, um Güter zu erlangen, um Chancen ihrer Veräußerung abzusichern, und um 
Ressourcen zu generieren.“ Schlichte, Klaus: Profiteure und Verlierer von Bürgerkriegsökonomien. 
Unpublished version, made available to the author, of Schlichte’s presentation at the International 
Conference “Economy of Civil Wars”, in Hofgeismar, October 19-21, 2001, organized by the NGO 
“medico international” in co-operation with Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). 
73  Riekenberg emphasizes the tendency of warlord systems to exhaust, as opposed to ensure sustainable 
development of resources, thereby limiting the dynamic development and prevailing abilities of this 
particular economic system. Cf. Riekenberg, Michael: Warlords. Eine Problemskizze. In: 
Comparativ, Heft 5/6, 1999 (pp. 187-205), p. 190.  
74  Institutions, here understood as informal institutions, are based on the regularity of social 
interactions, such as norms, customs and tradition. See North, Douglass C.: Institutionen, 
institutioneller Wandel und Wirtschaftsleistung. Tübingen: Mohr 1992.  
75  The term insurgency is adopted from Clapham, who stated that this term incorporates guerrilla 
movements, but also movements that developed from a small-scale guerrilla to the size of 
conventional armies. With the term insurgency any romantization connected to the terms guerrilla 
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 alternative political agenda, is required to establish an organizational structure to 
mobilize for a coordinated and sustained armed struggle. An insurgent administration 
adopts a political agenda, a military and a financial strategy, a recruitment plan and 
develops a tactic for the control of captured territories and interactions with civilians. 
To various extents, insurgent movements can rely on being considered legitimate by the 
population inhabiting the territory under their control, thereby challenging the 
legitimacy of the state and the state monopoly of physical force.76 In competition with 
and parallel to the officially recognized state apparatus, the organizational structure of 
an insurgent movement can be conceptualized as a ’quasi-state’. The concept of quasi-
state was initially introduced by Robert H. Jackson77, albeit with a different connotation. 
In order to validate an application of quasi-state, which deviates from the original 
definition, we revisit the central assumptions in Jackson’s extensive elaboration of the 
concept and examine the possibility of transferring the term to an insurgent ‘social 
order’. The importance of establishing the viability of an alternative application of the 
term quasi-state is explained by our intention of applying theoretical concepts, 
predominantly used in analyses of the state, on the object of an insurgent ‘social order’. 
If we are able to define an insurgent ‘social order’ as a quasi-state, an alternative usage 
of such a concept would be justified. 
Jackson’s central research interest is the nature of sovereign statehood in Third 
World states. In the de-colonization process subsequent to the Second World War, the 
right to independence of every colony, regardless of the ability to self-government, was 
justified by a new doctrine establishing “the principle of self-determination as an 
unqualified human right of all colonial people.”78 Colonization was deemed illegitimate 
and ‘juridical statehood’ was ensured through international law in support of territorial 
jurisdiction.79 In contrast to strong juridical statehood, which implies that “ex-colonial 
states have been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights and 
responsibilities as all other sovereign states”80, the weak ‘empirical statehood’ 
challenges the concept of statehood in Third World-states. Empirical statehood 
embraces the advantages traditionally enjoyed by populations within an independent 
state, such as the institutionalization of protection of human rights and the provision of 
socio-economic welfare. The beneficiaries of empirical statehood in Third World states 
are often narrow elites, who co-exist with a disadvantaged citizenry. Based on this 
discrepancy between secure juridical and underutilized empirical statehood, Jackson 
refers to the “new” states as quasi-states: Quasi-states enjoy equal sovereignty in legal 
                                                                                                                                               
and ‘freedom fighters’ is avoided. Cf. Clapham, Christopher: Introduction: Analysing African 
Insurgencies. In: Clapham (ed.): African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey 1998, p. 1. However, 
throughout the text we alternate between ’insurgency’ and ’armed movement’.  
76  Cf. Clapham, Christopher: Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 222. 
77  Jackson, Robert H.: Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990. Jackson initially elaborated the concept of “quasi-
state” in co-operation with Carl Rosenberg, see Jackson; Rosenberg: Sovereignty and 
Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis. In: The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 24(1), 1986 (pp. 1-31), and Jackson; Rosenberg: Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The 
Empirical and Juridical in Statehood. In: World Politics, 35(1), 1982 (pp. 1-24).  
78  Jackson: Quasi-states, 1990, p. 25. 
79  International law and material aid function as a “kind of international safety net” (Ibid., p. 5) for 
Third World States. Therefore, for the study of these states Jackson favors an analytical approach 
combining studies of both the legal and the normative order which secure their continued existence.  
80  Ibid., p. 21. 
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 terms, but they do not possess the institutional capacity to constrain individuals in 
administrative offices, although they exercise limited respect for the constitution and the 
rule of law.81 The distinction between juridical and empirical statehood, which Jackson 
uses to clarify the term quasi-state, cannot be directly transferred to an insurgent ‘social 
order’. On the contrary, insurgent movements seem to represent quasi-states in opposite 
terms: Insurgent movements do not possess juridical statehood, but through provision of 
services, such as basic needs and security, to civilians under insurgent control, their 
status can be considered an alternative form of empirical statehood. In contrast to our 
emphasis on empirical statehood, however, Clapham, notes that insurgent movements 
are involved in international diplomatic activities, which represent an alternative form 
of juridical statehood: Although participation on the international diplomatic arena is 
largely restricted to officials representing legally recognized governments, insurgent 
leaders have, while travelling on documents issued by ‘friendly states’ or even the 
targeted state, engaged with political leaders world-wide in almost the same manner as 
representatives of recognized states.82 An insurgent order may also be underpinned by 
specific rules and norms, for example sanctions on sexual abuse, either imposed by the 
insurgent leadership or based on social conventions.83 As such, insurgent movements 
may be considered legitimate by civilians and may also exceed the legitimacy of the 
formal government. Although insurgent movements do not qualify in strict terms of 
juridical statehood, Clapham states that “insurgent movements may for many purposes 
be regarded as quasi-states themselves, and they exercise many of the functions of 
statehood, including the conduct of external relations.”84 Thus, an insurgent movement 
can be conceptualized as a quasi-state, though necessitating an adjustment of the 
original definition, which emphasizes the existence of juridical and the lack of empirical 
statehood: An insurgent ‘social order’ can be perceived in terms of empirical statehood 
when providing socio-economic benefits and security, and can invariably qualify in 
terms of juridical statehood through international diplomatic activities. 
The applicability of the term quasi-state to the social organization of an insurgency 
underlines the necessity of examining the political structure of an insurgent ‘social 
order’. The political structure is composed of an institutionalized system of authority, 
and as an analytical approach to the analysis of the functioning of this system we confer 
with Max Weber’s ‘Sociology of Domination’ (Herrschaftssoziologie). The central 
argument in Weber’s sociological theory is that a secure order is based on a belief in the 
legitimacy of this specific order. In “Economy and Society”, Weber elucidated the three 
ideal types of legitimate authority: Legal, traditional and charismatic authority. How a 
                                                 
 
 
81  Cf. Ibid., 1990, pp. 21-22. Jackson argues that the novelty of quasi-states is not found in their 
empirical differences, but in the evaluation and response of the international society to inequality and 
underdevelopment in these states. Due to the prominent principle of sovereignty, external 
intervention is not a qualified response to deficiencies in Third World states, which can hardly be 
deprived of their sovereign status. Consequently, “quasi-states are creatures and their elites are the 
beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms.” Ibid., p. 24. This linkage between the 
prevalence of quasi-states and the norms and principles of the international system explains why the 
level of analysis in Jackson’s study is not the state, but the state-system and its norms. This aspect is 
not elaborated further here, since we are exclusively interested in the terminology and not in 
Jackson’s analytical methodology. 
82  Cf. Clapham: Africa and the International System, 1996, p. 223.  
83  Cf. Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 10. 
84  Clapham: op cit, 1996, p. 222. 
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 system of domination claims support for the order, i.e. legitimacy, determines the 
functioning of the administration and the nature of the exercise of authority. Hence, 
Weber’s primary sociological interest was the administration of authority, i.e. “how 
systems really work.”85 The three ideal types of legitimate authority represent a 
standardized approach to the study of systems of domination. The ideal types cannot be 
empirically observed in their ‘pure’ forms, but as analytical concepts, the ideal typical 
categories serve as a basis for the comparison of empirical reality, which is 
characterized by a mix of features.86 The conceptualization of social phenomena as ideal 
types (idealization) is based on an abstraction from reality and “the reconstruction of 
some isolated particularities of social instances and their regular and genetic 
correlation.”87 Logically, ideal types fall short of incorporating the complexity of ‘real’ 
phenomena. Ideal types are merely a scientific tool for the systematization of empirical 
observations, i.e. comparing, testing and explaining, in societies characterized by 
increasingly interdependent relations, and should not be confused with reality. The 
astonishing feature of Weber’s theory is its universal character, which allows a 
comparison of virtually all different arrangements of authority by defining the question 
of the foundation of their legitimacy as the core analytical interest.88  
With a focus on the arguments behind an insurgent movement’s claim to legitimacy, 
Weber’s sociological theory is here applied for the purpose of establishing the 
mechanisms ensuring the sustainability of an insurgent political order. In the empirical 
analysis, observations regarding the political structure in an insurgent ‘social order’ will 
be tested against the criteria defined on the basis of Weber’s theory. With the aim of 
specifying a matrix of questions as a guide to the empirical case study, we shall now 
explore Weber’s sociology of domination in greater detail. 
3.1.1.1. The Terminology of Weber 
While Weber defined power (Macht) as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless 
of the basis on which this probability rests”89, the probability of domination 
(Herrschaft) is based upon a belief in the ‘rightfulness’ (legitimacy) of an authority to 
achieve obedience from a specific group of persons when commands are issued.90 
Power may be exercised in an inexhaustible number of social relations, that is, in all 
                                                 
 
 
85  Roth, Guenther: Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States. In: 
World Politics, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1968 (pp. 194-206), p. 195. 
86  “The concept is ideal typical in the sense that ‘it removes itself from empirical reality which can only 
be compared or related to it’ (Weber, 1904, p. 102, cf. pp. 93-4). Hence ideal types cannot be directly 
falsified if empirical reality seems not to fit them even approximately.” Quoted from Outwaite, 
William; Bottomore, Tom (eds.): Dictionary of Social Thought. Oxford, Malden (MA): Blackwell 
1993, p. 270 (keyword: ideal type). The Weber-text referred to here is an English translation of the 
“Objektivitätsaufsatz”: Weber, Max: Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und 
sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis. In: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Johannes 
Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1973 (1904) (pp.146-214). 
87 Jung: The Political Sociology of World Society, 2001, p. 447. 
88  Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 105. 
89  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 53.  
90  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 28, p. 122 and p. 544. “Domination (Herrschaft) is 
the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of 
persons.” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 53. 
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 conceivable situations, in which a person is in a position to impose his will. 
Domination, in order to be precise and viable as a scientific category, is limited to a 
constellation in which the governed obediently respond to commands issued by the 
authority: “In our terminology domination shall be identical with authoritarian power of 
command.”91 The process of carrying out an order is indistinguishable from their, i.e. 
the subjects’, individual principles for rationalizing their own conduct (’Maxime ihres 
Handelns’).92 The incorporation of a command into personal motivation for action is a 
fundamental characteristic of the concept of domination. The exercise of domination is 
therefore not based on the existence of corresponding interests, but on ideas as the 
essence of authority: Domination is the claim to obedient responses to commands, 
irrespective of whether such commands coincide with actual interests.93 However, 
Weber’s specification of the two forms (interest vs. ideas) as ideal types implies that the 
distinction must not be confused with reality, where both interests and ideas are the 
foundation of authority. This aspect is reexamined in chapter 3.1.1.2. with the 
presentation of a guide to the empirical analysis.  
The process of exercising authority is based upon the ability of a ruler to achieve 
obedient response to his commands from the governed. This process is organized by an 
administration, and hence authority is primarily an organizational task.94 The threat of 
or use of physical force (Gewaltsamkeit) is, as noted in chapter 3.1., the ultima ratio of 
enforcement of obedience within a political organization.95 Physical force, however, is 
neither considered the only, nor the normal instrument for the enforcement of 
                                                 
 
 
91  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 946. 
92  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 544. With this specification, Weber defined 
authority as a specific form of power. “To be more specific, domination will thus mean the situation 
in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one 
or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially 
relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their 
conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the other end, this situation will be called 
obedience.” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 946. 
93  “Eine Autorität, d.h. ein unabhängig von allem Interesse bestehendes Recht auf “Gehorsam” 
gegenüber den tatsächlichen Beherrschten” Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 542. Jung 
makes clear, that this presumption is fundamental to Weber‘s definition of authority as an ideal type: 
„Mit dieser idealtypischen Abstraktion versucht Weber, Herrschaft nicht über interessenbedingtes, 
sondern über das an einer Ordnung orientierte, also über Ideen vermittelte Handeln zu präsisieren.“ 
Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 103. Weber specified two ’pure forms’ of authority in 
relation to this disctinction between ideas and interests: (I) Domination by virtue of a constellation of 
interests, and (II) Domination by virtue of authority (power to command and duty to obey). While the 
former is found in a monopoly position on an economic market, the latter is found in the authoritarian 
power of the father in a house or a prince. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 542. 
94  “Every domination both expresses itself and functions through administration.” Weber: Eng. ed., 
1968, p. 948. The exercise of authority is dependent on the existence of an administration, either a 
„Verwaltungsstab“ or „Verband“, which Weber subsumed in the term „Herrschaftsverband“ Cf. 
Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 29.  
95  The general term ‘political organization’ was specified by Weber in the term Vergesellschaftung, 
comprising different societal arrangements for the control and monopolization of violence: 
“politische Gemeinschaft”, “politischer Verband” and “Staat”. These different forms of political 
Gemeinschaft have in common the basic characteristic of control of use of physical force within a 
geographical territory. The three arrangements represent different levels of institutionalization in the 
development of a state. Cf. Schlichte, Klaus: Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Afrika. Ein Beitrag zur 
Theorie des Krieges. Münster: LIT Verlag 1996, p. 84. 
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 obedience, but applies when alternative instruments fail to achieve the objective.96 
Hence, a stable system of authority cannot rely exclusively on the enforcement of 
obedience through violent means, but must be complemented by a perception of 
legitimacy.97 By focusing both on administration and legitimacy, “Weber emphasized 
both the organization that implements and the beliefs that sustain a given system.”98 
An administrative apparatus establishes the link between the leadership and the 
governed and exercises the task of enforcing obedience over time: “A circle of people 
who are accustomed to obedience to the orders of leaders and who also have a personal 
interest in the continuance of the domination by virtue of their own participation and the 
resulting benefits, have divided among themselves the exercise of those functions which 
will serve the continuation of the domination and are holding themselves continuously 
ready for their exercise. (…) The term apparatus shall mean the circle of those persons 
who are holding themselves at the disposal of the master or masters in the manner just 
defined.”99 The willingness of officials in the administrative apparatus to comply with 
the orders of the ruler is based both on the readiness to exercise certain functions and 
the existence of benefits in the continuation of this order, such as material benefits, 
remuneration and social honor.100 The dependence of the ruler on his administration for 
the delegation and the implementation of orders is a structural problem, which may 
challenge the stability of the regime. The primary advantage of the leadership in relation 
to the governed, is the limited number of members, i.e. the “law of the small 
number.”101 The ruling minority can relatively promptly reach agreements on strategies, 
thereby securing the continued existence of their powerful administrative positions. By 
means of for example secrecy, in regard to decision-making processes, intentions and 
information, the leadership can limit the ability of the governed to express criticism and 
protest.102  
The sociological character of relations of domination is determined by, firstly, the 
relations between the ruler, his administrative apparatus and the masses, which Weber 
specified as: (I) The relationship between the master(s), and the apparatus, and (II) the 
relationship between (a) the master/masters and the apparatus, and (b) the ruled 
(civilians). Secondly, the sociological character of the structure of domination is 
                                                 
 
 
96  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 29. “The threat of force, and in the case of need its 
actual use, is the method which is specific to political organizations and is always the last resort 
when others have failed.” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 54.  
97  Jung specified that Weber’s emphasis of a common idea and not interests as the foundation of 
domination, excludes the option of enforcing obedience exclusively by violent means. The existence 
of a shared consciousness between the sovereign and the governed is a presupposition for the 
perception of legitimacy. Understanding legitimacy therefore implies tracing the foundation of a 
shared consciousness and the reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the governed. Cf. Jung: 
Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 104. 
98  Bendix, Reinhard: Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait. London: Heinemann, 1960, p. 297. 
99  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 952. 
100  “When a civil servant appears in his office daily at a fixed time, he does not act only on the basis of 
custom or self-interest which he could disregard if he wanted to; as a rule, his action is also 
determined by the validity of an order (…), which he fulfills partly because disobedience would be 
disadvantageous to him but also because its violation would be adhorrent to his sense of duty (of 
course, to varying degrees)” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 31. On the relationship between the 
administration and the ruler, see also Bendix: Max Weber, 1960, pp. 296-297. 
101  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 952. 
102  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 548. 
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 influenced by the specific organizational principles and norms of the administration, 
which determine the distribution of powers of command.103 Weber applied this structure 
of organizational units within a system of authority as a standard approach to the 
discussion of political order.104 In regard to the examination of the political structure of 
an insurgent ‘social order’, these formal categories can be transformed and adapted for 
the systematization of a hierarchy of organizational units in an insurgent political order. 
Weber distinguished three units (master, administration, civilians), but for our purposes, 
soldiers are introduced as an additional unit, and therefore, in total four units are 
recognized: The leader, the administration, soldiers and civilians. This deviation from 
Weber’s standardized approach is justified by the challenge of recruiting soldiers to a 
non-state organization lacking formal legitimacy. The relationship between the 
leadership and the soldiers in an insurgent movement is therefore of specific interest. 
Thus, in our adaptation of Weber, soldiers are considered a sub-unit of the 
organizational apparatus, which Weber specified as master(s) and administration. The 
central analytical interest concerns, firstly, the interaction between the sub-units in the 
organizational apparatus and secondly, the interaction between these and civilians. In 
order to develop a guide to the empirical analysis, we now focus on the principles and 
norms underlying the functional logic of the organization of domination.  
Weber specified the sociological character of relations of domination by focusing on 
the primary principles explaining the existence of obedience in a stable political order, 
subsumed in the term legitimacy.105 Weber distinguished three ‘pure forms’ of 
legitimate domination and categorized the primary premises of legitimacy as legal-
rational, traditional and charismatic domination. Based upon these ideal types of 
legitimacy, we develop a guide to the analysis of an insurgent political structure. The 
central question converges around the assessment of the foundation of legitimacy: To 
what extent do rational-legal arguments, traditional beliefs or charismatic aspects 
legitimize the authority of an insurgent movement? Prior to the introduction of a matrix 
of questions as a guide to the empirical analysis, we now examine the three ideal types 
in more detail.  
Legal Domination 
The fundamental principles of legal domination (Rationale Herrschaft) are the rule of 
law, impersonality and knowledge.106 The legitimacy of the ruler is dependent on his 
willingness to govern in accordance with rules and laws underpinned by an impersonal 
order. Obedience is based on respect for the legal foundations of authority, and not 
related to a specific sympathy for the ruler as a person. A rational-legal form of 
domination is thus based on “a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of 
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.”107 The structure of the 
                                                 
 
 
103  “The sociological character of the structure of any particular case of domination is determined by 
the kind of relationship between the master or masters and the apparatus, the kind of relationship of 
both to the ruled, and by its specific organizational structure, i.e., its specific way of distributing the 
powers of command.“ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 953. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, 
p. 549. 
104  Cf. Schlichte: Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Afrika, 1996, p. 86. 
105  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 549.  
106  Cf. Ibid., pp. 124-130. 
107  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 124.  
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 administrative apparatus is characterized by division of labor and specification of areas 
of competence. Although the legitimacy of the ruler is based on the rule of law, the 
nature of the leader may be characterized as charismatic or traditional, e.g. hereditary 
monarchy. The relevance of charisma also to legal domination supports the idea of the 
potential universal character of charismatic authority.108 However, the basic principles 
of rational authority, i.e. legality and impersonality, remain unaffected, in spite of the 
influence of charisma.  
In the ‘pure form’ of legal-rational domination, the hierarchically organized 
bureaucracy is characterized by a clear distinction between the private person and the 
official position, i.e. impersonality. The appropriation of public commodities for 
personal benefit is unacceptable. The bureaucrats are linked to their ruler through 
contracts and are hired not due to their personal relations, but their qualifications and 
knowledge. The juridical rules and principles in a legal-rational form of authority 
establish formality as the superior characteristic and thereby eliminate arbitrariness 
from the leadership.109 
Traditional Domination 
A traditional form of authority (Traditionale Herrschaft) is based on “an established 
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them.”110 The relationship between the ruler, his administrative staff 
(personal retainers or vassals) and the ruled is based on respect and admiration for the 
leader as a person, i.e. reverence and piety, and/or religious explanations for obedient 
behavior towards this particular person.111 The relationship between the administrative 
staff and the ruler is determined by “[p]ersonal loyalty, not the official’s impersonal 
duty.”112 Traditional authority is also limited by a set of rules and principles, but their 
‘rightfulness’ is accepted on the basis of customs and traditions preserved over time, in 
contrast to the rationality and formality of legal-rational principles. The limitation of 
obedience is defined by the perception of what constitutes a break with tradition: The 
ruler can design his regime in accordance with his interpretation of tradition, but must 
be sensitive to the prospect of retainers and subjects interpreting the traditional 
framework differently.113 This lack of formally defined rules implies that the 
relationship between the sovereign and the governed is characterized by elastic 
                                                 
 
 
108  Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 106. The debate on the potential universal character 
of charismatic authority is of theoretical interest, but will not be elaborated further here, due to 
minimal relevance to our objective. 
109  The basic principles of formality and rationality are also inherent in a capitalist market economy, and 
Weber stressed the parallel development of a legal-rational state apparatus and capitalism. Cf. Jung: 
Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 129. 
110  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 124.  
111  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 130. Bendix noted that the administrative apparatus 
in traditional domination consists of personal retainers in a patrimonial form of traditional authority, 
and of vassals in a feudal society. Cf. Bendix: Max Weber, 1960, p. 298. 
112  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 227. 
113  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 130. In the case of dissatisfaction with the behavior 
of the leader, criticism will eventually be directed towards the leader as a person, and not the system 
as such, and “the accusation may be that he failed to observe the traditional limits of his power.” 
Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 227. 
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 restrictions of authority: The ruler is equipped with powerful instruments for exercising 
authority according to his personal preferences and material wishes.114 
Traditional authority may be exercised without an administration in small family 
units, but with the necessity of organizing authority in larger social units, an 
administration and a military force emerge as a consequence of socio-structural 
developments.115 In such an administration, the staff is bound to the sovereign through 
personal relations in a patrimonial form of authority. Primary characteristics of 
patrimonial authority are the dependence of the administration on the ruler and the lack 
of a distinction between position and person, i.e. resources are considered private, in 
contrast to public, goods.116 
Charismatic Domination 
Charismatic authority expresses an exceptional quality of a single individual “by virtue 
of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional power or qualities.”117 On the basis of 
such qualities, an individual exercises influence and leadership over a group of people, 
the ‘followers’ or ‘disciples’. The acceptance of authority is independent of the 
objective assessment of the qualities of the leader, since the commitment to obedience is 
based on followers’ perceptions of these qualities, and not on the acceptance of the rule 
of law. Hence, charismatic domination is “resting on devotion to the exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative 
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.”118 The charismatic mode of authority is 
based on emotional relations with the absence of any form of technical training. Rules 
and principles are non-existent and instead the charismatic leader practices an ad hoc-
decision-making strategy.119 Legitimacy is dependent on the ability of the charismatic 
leader to secure the well being of his followers. Due to the personalized character, it is 
difficult to establish charisma as a sustainable form of authority. If, however, the 
followers are interested in the continuation of the nature of the authority, and the 
members of the administration are concerned with the preservation of their societal 
positions and their links to the leadership, charismatic authority may be ‘routinized’ 
(Veralltäglichung). Charisma is then channeled into traditionally or legally oriented 
institutions. For example, the heroism of the leader is transformed into a hereditary rule 
                                                 
 
 
114  Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 141. Jung emphasizes that this is a fundamental 
feature of all forms of traditional authority.  
115  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 133. 
116  Cf. Ibid., pp. 134-136. The organization of the economy is affected by the structure of a traditional 
form of domination: The belief in traditional rules and customs, and the ability of the authority to 
influence societal relations in accordance with his personal, arbitrary wishes, hinder the development 
of rationality as a guiding principle for economic interaction. Monopolies prevail and the 
development of a free market economy is obstructed. Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
117  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 241. 
118  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 124. 
119  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, pp. 140-141. “There is no such thing as appointment 
or dismissal, no career, no promotion. There is only a call at the instance of the leader on the basis of 
the charismatic qualifications of those he summons. (…) There is no system of formal rules, or 
abstract legal principles, and hence no process of rational judicial decision oriented to them.” 
Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 243. 
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 or a bureaucratic office. Over time, charismatic authority is then challenged by an 
increasing importance of principles of rationality.120  
While the legitimacy of both legal and traditional authority is derived from specific 
rules, principles and norms, which define the limitations of legitimate actions, 
charismatic authority differs fundamentally in regard to the absence of any rationally 
defined rules.121 The specific impersonal character of legal authority is contrasted by the 
obsession with a person and personality both in traditional and charismatic forms of 
domination. 
3.1.1.2. Implications for the Conduct of the Empirical Study 
Two central aspects of Weber’s sociology of domination define the key components of 
our theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the political structure of an 
insurgent ‘social order’. Firstly, the analytical units are specified in accordance with 
Weber’s categorization of relations of domination (see pp. 20-21). Secondly, the term 
legitimacy constitutes the fundamental concept for analyzing the mechanisms ensuring 
stability and perpetuation of a ’social order’.  
Two main analytical units within the political structure of an insurgent ‘social order’ 
were recognized above: (I) the organizational apparatus, comprising the sub-units 
leader, administration and soldiers, and (II) civilians. In order to highlight the 
mechanisms, which institutionalize these units in an insurgent system of authority, we 
develop a matrix of questions regarding the foundations of legitimacy. The core 
question must incorporate the influence of time122: How does the leadership of an 
insurgent movement manage to reproduce and sustain legitimacy over time? The 
leadership of an insurgent movement must on the one hand create mechanisms for the 
perpetuation of the leadership itself in competition with potential rival factions within 
the administration. On the other hand, the leadership must create mechanisms, which 
hinder civilian opposition, and instead further the perception of legitimacy. The matrix 
of questions on the foundation of legitimacy is specified in regard to the analytical units 
recognized: 
Legal-rational legitimacy: Is the organizational structure and the choice of strategy 
based upon a legal framework, i.e. a constitution and/or a political program, and an 
impersonal order? Which rational incentives exist for (a) members of the apparatus, (b) 
civilians to co-operate with and be loyal to the leader of the insurgent movement? Such 
incentives comprise access to education, medical treatment and/or a societal network. 
Traditional beliefs: To what extent is tradition (customs and norms) used as a 
justification for action, strategy, and thus, authority? What forms of tradition are used to 
claim the ‘rightfulness’ of authority?  
Charismatic aspects: To what extent does the leader as a person strengthen the 
legitimacy of the movement, due to his perceived charismatic qualities?  
                                                 
 
 
120  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, pp. 142-143 and p. 148, and Jung: Tradition – 
Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 107. 
121  Jung therefore characterizes the foundation of charismatic authority as “specifically irrational.” 
Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 106.  
122  The importance of time has been emphasized by Clapham, who defined “dispensability” as the 
“ultimate test” of the effectiveness of a leadership in an insurgent movement over time, tested for 
example on whether a leader was successfully and peacefully replaced or if the loss of a leader would 
result in the collapse of the movement. Cf. Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 9. 
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The adaptation of Weber’s framework sketched out here differs from Weber in one 
specific theoretical assumption. While Weber emphasized that legitimacy is based on 
the perception of ideas and the development of a common consciousness between the 
ruler and the governed (Maxime ihres Handelns), the transformation of the ideal types 
into a matrix of questions stresses the importance of interests to a somewhat greater 
extent. Weber did emphasize the importance of shared interests in regard to sustaining 
the loyalty of administrative officials, but in regard to the masses he considered ideas 
the specific foundation of legitimacy and obedience.123 Nonetheless, ideas and interests 
cannot be understood as separate aspects, but represent ideal typical categories, which 
in reality are observed in mixed forms. Jung argued explicitly that an empirical study of 
relations of domination must begin at the ‘intersection’ of interests and ideas.124 In order 
to understand this ’intersection’, we recall the elementary functions of social 
reproduction, comprising the control of physical force, the guarantee of material means, 
and symbolic means of orientation, introduced in chapter 3.1. Collective symbols and 
customs function as means of orientation, which shape certain patterns of behavior and 
define a specific group-identity. The identification of individuals with the group further 
integration, i.e. the coherence of the ’social order’.125 Jung’s argument explains the 
necessity of combining an analysis of the foundation of legitimacy with a focus on 
symbolic means of orientation. A matrix of questions on the political structure of an 
insurgent ‘social order’ must therefore include a focus on group-identity: How is a 
group-identity, i.e. group solidarity, shaped within the ‘social order’?  
With an analytical focus on legitimacy, social mechanisms are defined as the 
nucleus of the analysis. Recent insurgency-oriented studies have also emphasized the 
importance of focusing on social mechanisms. In his comparative study of the 
insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola, William Minter did not define “technical 
military questions, but rather the social mechanisms”126 as the key concern regarding 
the question “How Contra Warfare Works: The Military Component.”127 Christopher 
Clapham stressed both the existence of a shared “commitment to common principles 
and goals” as well as “an effective structure through which it [an insurgent movement 
(KS)] seeks to achieve those goals”128 as basic analytical criteria for the examination of 
insurgencies. For the comparative analysis of insurgencies, Clapham defined the 
internal structure of the organization (leadership, ideology and organization), the 
relations with host societies, the links to the international system and the outcomes of an 
insurgency, i.e. the impact on the functioning of the state, as the main analytical 
categories. The two former are incorporated in our theoretical approach based on 
                                                 
 
 
123  The importance of ideas and interests was discussed in Ch. 2.1.1.1., p. 25. Weber also noted that an 
obvious shared interest between the authority and the administrative officials may undermine the 
perception of legitimacy among civilians. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 123. 
124  “Die Analyse empirischer Herrschaftsverhältnisse muß daher am Schnittpunkt von Interessen und 
Ideen (…) ansetzen.“ Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 104. 
125  Jung stresses the instrumental role of a common social identity (“sozialer Habitus”) for the creation 
of “survival units”. The use of physical force and identity must therefore be analyzed as related 
concepts. Cf. Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
126  Minter, William: Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. 
London, New Jersey: Zed Books/Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press 1994, p. 173. 
127  Ibid., Ch. 7, pp. 172-203. 
128  Both quotes from Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 10. 
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 Weber’s sociology of domination. The question of relations with the international 
system is relevant only to a limited extent, concerning the external influence on the 
internal structure, as defined above. Assessing how insurgencies can be related to the 
continuing problems of African statehood (outcomes) requires an analytical focus on the 
state, which is not relevant here. Clapham suggested that informal variables could be 
tested by examining aspects such as the functioning of the formal structure, the level of 
coherence and discipline within the movement.129 Minter emphasized aspects of the 
same nature, such as recruitment strategies, control systems, assimilation of new 
recruits and patterns of strategic organization.130 Due to his analytical interest in the 
strategic role of South Africa in the insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola, Minter 
also examined the operational role of external sponsors. Based on these variables 
suggested by Clapham and Minter, the mechanisms influencing the relations between 
the units in the organizational apparatus of an insurgent ‘social order’ recognized above, 
can be enumerated. Firstly, the relationship between the leader and the administration is 
influenced by incentives for loyalty, the access to or exclusion from power and the 
centralization of power. Secondly, influential variables for the relationship between the 
leadership and the soldiers are recruitment strategies, socialization programs and control 
systems.  
In regard to the relations with civilians, we are facing a different challenge, which 
both Clapham and Minter have called attention to. Although he recognized the 
importance of relations with civilians for insurgencies, Clapham emphasized the 
difficulty of operationalizing “cultural criteria”.131 A potential influential variable is 
identified in the receptivity of host societies to ideologies or organizational models.132 
Clapham is nevertheless skeptical to the analytical validity of such an analysis, and 
abandons any attempt to pursue an analytical method based on cultural criteria.133 
Clapham does, however, stress the necessity of insurgent movements to establish 
                                                 
 
 
129  The formal structure includes units such as a command council, military formations etc. Aspects to 
be examined are for example: (a) The level of autonomy enjoyed by the various organizational units 
in comparison to the ability of the leader to assert himself; (b) whether or not the movement is 
operating in a bureaucratic fashion or on an individual level in areas outside of conflict, and (c) 
whether the new recruits enjoy formalized training, or are left on their own. Level of coherence 
involves examining any fragmentation processes within the movement and eventually the character 
of the splits, e.g. along ethnic, personal or ideological lines. Discipline can be examined with 
questions such as: Is criminal behavior (murder, rape, looting) by the soldiers tolerated or is a system 
of punishment for lack of discipline in place? Are children recruited? Cf. Ibid., p. 10. 
130  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, pp. 172-203. 
131  “Insurgent organizations must nonetheless be created on the ground, to an appreciably greater 
extent than any other form of African political organization, and it is plausible to assume that they 
must be constructed in large part from the social materials that they find there.” Clapham 
accordingly concluded that analyzing and understanding insurgencies is “a job for the political 
anthropologist.” Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 11. 
132  “Organization may in essence come, not from the top down, but from the bottom up.” Ibid., p. 12. 
133  “Even if this exercise [behavioural studies with attitudinal surveys (KS)] can be conducted with some 
degree of plausibility, and there have been very few attempts to conduct such studies of African 
guerrillas, there are still considerable hazards in applying the results to specific political 
circumstances. It is all too easy to use supposedly entrenched cultural criteria to ‘explain’ what turn 
out to be no more than transient political phenomena.” Ibid., p. 13. The best known study within the 
social sciences, in which such variables were operationalized, in context of the developed world, is 
Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney: Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. An Analytical Study. Boston, Little Brown: Princeton University Press 1965. 
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 alternative identities, which bind their supporters together and simultaneously 
distinguish them from their opponents with the purpose of mobilizing support.134 In 
Weber’s terminology, this perception of identity is incorporated in the conception of 
creating a common consciousness, an idea, which legitimizes the specific mode of 
authority. In our analytical approach, we additionally refer to symbolic means of 
orientation, on the basis of which a common idea, i.e. group solidarity, is established. 
Minter operationalized the analytical interest in co-operation with civilians by focusing 
on ‘how life was’ in the territories under insurgent control. Analytical criteria were the 
supply of food and services, the role of tradition and the use of persuasion or violence in 
order to obtain co-operation from civilians.135 From these examples on how to approach 
an analysis of the relationship between civilians and insurgents, three categories of 
incentives are identified: 1. Materialistic incentives (services), 2. Idealistic incentives 
(common identity, solidarity), and 3. Violent incentives (corporal punishment, fear of 
torture etc.).  
In Weber’s heuristic approach, legitimacy and physical force represent fundamental 
categories. With our focus on the foundation of legitimacy as well as on the functioning 
of violence within the political structure of an insurgent ‘social order’, the balance 
between repression and legitimacy over time is a basic category in the empirical study.  
While the theoretical framework developed for the political structure was based 
upon the work of a classical theorist within the social sciences, the analytical framework 
for the economic structure, to which we now turn, is based upon the contemporary 
economic approach to conflict studies.  
3.1.2. The Economic Structure 
The economic approach to conflict studies includes a diverse research agenda with a 
focus on multiple actors and their various economic strategies. The exclusive interest 
here concerns the economic activities of an insurgent movement. In analogy to the 
political structure, the central research questions of the economic approach are 
transformed into a matrix of questions as a guide to the empirical analysis in chapter 
three.  
A prerequisite for a sustained insurgency is to solve a number of material 
challenges, such as mobilizing resources for the acquirement of military equipment, 
non-military equipment (communication tools, fuel, batteries, food) and the 
establishment of a reward system for administrative officials and recruits. How these 
material requirements are met, influences strategic choices and the organization of the 
insurgency, hence conflict dynamism.136 Due to the mobilization of local resources, 
contemporary war economies are diverse in character. Whether resource scarcity or 
affluence, the application of different economic strategies of combatants and civilians is 
subject to comparative empirical analysis.137 Keen introduced seven categories of 
                                                 
 
 
134  Cf. Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 13. 
135  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, pp. 204-217. 
136  Cf. Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, pp. 9-10. 
137  ‘Scarce resource war’ refers to the depletion or scarcity of resources as causes of increasing 
grievances which eventually result in violent conflict. ‘Abundant resource war’ refers to violent 
conflict over access to and control over valuable resources. Whether a resource is scarce or abundant 
is, however, not relevant: Any kind of resource represents a value, whether scarce or abundant is 
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 economic tactics, which usually involve disregard of existing laws: pillage, which 
supplements or replaces the salaries of soldiers; protection money demanded from those 
who are spared from experiencing violence and includes the organization of private 
security or militias; monopolistic control of trade, i.e. ‘forced markets’ with price-
control and the legalization of previously illegal trade, such as the drug trade; labor 
exploitation; depopulation of land in order to gain control over natural resources; 
stealing aid supplies138 and the institutionalization of benefits to the military as conflict 
may justify a sizeable military and its participation in the government.139 While Keen 
emphasized economic activities conducted both by government representatives and 
insurgent movements, Rufin, in contrast, introduced only two broad categories of 
economic strategies, for which the control of the state is not a prerequisite: pillage and 
organized criminality. Firstly, pillage involves the expropriation of resources from 
civilians, frequently combined with ransom demands. The novel aspect of pillage in 
contemporary war economies is found in the enhanced competition for control of 
internally available resources: While humanitarian sanctuaries used to be situated across 
the border, separated from the area of extended fighting, humanitarian assistance is 
nowadays increasingly supplied into combat areas, and thus, these resources are 
exposed to intensified competition.140 Secondly, in addition to destructive pillage 
insurgent movements can establish a prosperous war economy based on organized 
criminality, with the potential of improving the welfare of civilians.141 In a criminalized 
war economy, resources are illegally extracted and illegally produced. Insurgents may 
trade in illegal goods, such as drugs and goods protected by environmental laws, e.g. 
ivory and teak, but also in legal commodities, e.g. gold and precious stones. A 
criminalized war economy gains distinction in comparison with destructive pillage, due 
to considerations of sustainability.142  
The extraction of local resources by insurgent movements is similar to activities 
conducted by the state in a peace environment, except for the non-existence of tax 
                                                                                                                                               
relative, and this value can be exploited to enhance power. The significant aspect is how resource 
exploitation is conducted, the pattern of political economy, and the level of consensus over the 
distribution of power. Le Billon, Philippe: The Political Economy of Resource Wars. In: Cilliers; 
Dietrich: Angola’s War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds. Johannesburg: Institute for 
Security Studies, 2000 (pp. 21-42), pp. 22-26. 
138  “Violence may serve a purpose, first, in precipitating relief and, second, in gaining access to this 
relief once it arrives.” Keen: Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, 2000, p. 30. 
139  Cf. Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, pp. 15-17 and Keen: Incentives and 
Disincentives for Violence, 2000, pp. 29-31. 
140  When pillage is applied in a situation dominated by scarcity of resources, Rufin recognizes the 
possibility of induction of man-made hunger catastrophes. Cf. Rufin, Jean-Christophe (eds.): 
Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten. In: Jean; Rufin: Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege, 1999 (pp. 15-
46), pp. 28-30. Keen examined this aspect in his extensive study of the hunger catastrophe in Sudan, 
see Keen, David: A Disaster for Whom?: Local Interest and International Donors During Famine 
Among the Dinka of Sudan. In: Disasters, 15 (2), 1991 (pp. 58-73). Such catastrophes may prompt 
increased contributions by international humanitarian organizations, which supply external resources 
into the conflict area. In situations dominated by scarcity, external supply can change the relationship 
between insurgents and civilians, because of fierce competition for resources. The relief agencies 
must take into account extensive pillage, both from combatants and other possible perpetrators.  
141  Local populations can profit from this criminalized economy, e.g. heroin production in Afghanistan 
and Burma, cocoa production in Colombia. Cf. Le Billon: The Political Economy of Resource Wars, 
2000, p. 32. 
142  Cf. Rufin: Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten, 1999, pp. 30-32. Trade in restricted products give 
insurgent movements profit from price distortions, which they can exploit with their extra-legal 
position. 
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 payments and the lack of respect for legal restrictions. In competition with the state-
controlled, regular economy, an insurgent war economy functions as a parallel 
economic system. Criminal production requires effective organization for the control of 
territory and civilians, in which the use of physical force functions as a central 
instrument of governance.143 The condition of ‘decaying’ or ‘weak’ states can affect the 
establishment of a parallel insurgent economy, as both political and economic control of 
the state erodes and insurgent movements are faced with a less coherent contender.  
Empirical analyses have indicated the importance of the nature of the resource in 
question, i.e. whether or not a resource is easily transportable and exchangeable. 
Empirical studies have also identified a tendency to avoid resources that require large 
infrastructure investments, such as oil.144 An alternative source of income for insurgent 
movements may be the supply of security services to international companies investing 
in conflict zones, as insurgent movements demand payment in return for guarantees of 
the security of foreign workers.145  
The novelty of contemporary war economies is found in the incorporation of 
insurgent parallel economies in international trade networks. The extraction of local 
resources is the basis for trade with external agents, in exchange of which armaments 
and other goods are imported. While war economies in the 1980s were dominated by 
(humanitarian and military) sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the current ‘shadow’ 
trade networks rely on a number of secret connections operating in a potentially global 
system of distribution.146  
The reliance on local resources alters insurgent military strategies. The dominant 
principle of mobility in guerrilla warfare is substituted by increased attention to the 
tactics of conventional forces and the establishment of territorial control in close 
proximity to resources and transportation routes. Insurgents become interested in 
establishing control over airports, harbors and cities, due to their significance for the 
generation of profits (banks, transportation) and the control of access to markets 
abroad.147 The development of local war economies can also change insurgent 
movements’ organizational patterns. In comparison to the Cold War-era, during which a 
number of insurgent movements received external patronage and the economic benefits 
were distributed from the top to the bottom, the operation of a parallel economy requires 
a different form of organization. An insurgent movement must mobilize recruits, who 
extract, produce or loot resources. A distributional system from the bottom to the top 
                                                 
 
 
143  Cf. Ibid., p. 32. This aspect is accounted for in Elwert’s market of violence. 
144  Le Billon argued that whether a war economy is based on productive, e.g. crops or extractive 
resources, e.g. minerals, influence the use of violence. While production involves structural violence, 
such as in labor coercion and the control of trade, for the extraction of resources, violence is used 
primarily to establish territorial control, possibly including battle for the state. These two forms of 
violence are not mutually exclusive, as some resources may involve both territorial control and 
coercion of labor, for example plantations or cattle raising. Although Le Billion comments on a 
significant aspect of war economies, the lack of clarity in his terminology weakens his argument. The 
general question concerning what forms of violence are used for which objectives in war economies 
nonetheless remains an interesting research topic. See Le Billon: The Political Economy of Resource 
Wars, 2000, p. 26. 
145  Cf. Rufin: Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten, 1999, p. 33. 
146  The existence of a Diaspora can be influential to the global interconnectedness of insurgent 
economies. Cf. Ibid., p. 41. 
147  Cf. Ibid., pp. 37-39 and Le Billon: The Political Economy of Resource Wars, 2000, p. 30. 
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 must be established, in order to secure the resource base of the movement. Recruits 
may, however, develop a personal interest in keeping the resources, and start behaving 
in a similar manner to criminal gangs with the potential of causing fragmentation and 
weakening discipline and chains of command in the movement.148 In this context, 
violence may function as a mechanism both for the implementation of discipline within 
the organization itself and in interaction with civilians for the purpose of achieving 
access to resources.149 How economic strategies influence the functional logic of the use 
of physical force in an insurgent ‘social order’ is therefore a significant analytical 
aspect.  
The existence of various economic agents, applying diverse strategies for the 
extraction of resources, has led to an interest in the systematization of different types of 
war economies. As criteria for comparison, Rufin suggested the relationship between 
external and internal resources, the role of the state, pre-war economic conditions, 
geographical distribution of resources, and access to external political support.150 The 
task of systematizing and categorizing diverse war economies is therefore an interesting 
future research topic. 
The core research interest guiding our analysis of the economic structure in an 
insurgent ‘social order’ is how an insurgent movement generates resources, establishes 
a financial basis and operates an exchange system. Two main dimensions are 
recognized in the economic structure: Firstly, the generation of internal resources, i.e. 
the internal dimension. Secondly, the interconnectedness with external trade networks 
for the purpose of acquiring cash and material, i.e. the internal-external dimension. The 
relationship between these two dimensions is the central analytical criterion for the 
establishment of a matrix of questions:  
Internal dimension: How are local resources generated (nature of resources, control 
of territory, population, infrastructure)? How is the local economy organized?  
Internal-external dimension: How are external contacts established? How does the 
exchange system function?  
The economic approach draws attention to how economic activities correspond to 
conflict dynamism in regard to organizational patterns (fragmentation, discipline), the 
military strategy (territory, infrastructure, control over civilians) and the importance of 
competition for political power in comparison to control over resources.151 Although the 
                                                 
 
 
148  Cf. Rufin: Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten, 1999, pp. 42-43. An analysis of organizational 
changes related to the allocation of resources was applied in Mozambique. The author concluded that 
the altered methods of resource allocation partly erased the distinction between the leader and the 
fighters. While the organization offered armaments and territory for the extraction of resources as 
well as trade networks and slave labor, the fighters were confronted with multiple opportunities for 
individual economic strategies. The author labeled these changes a shift from a client network to a 
‘protoclient network’. Cf. Weissman, Fabrice: Mosambik: Krieg als Mittel der Bereicherung. In: 
Jean; Rufin: Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege, 1999 (pp. 243-277). 
149  Cf. Rufin: Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten, 1999, p. 44. Civilians can also be a hindrance to 
resource exploitation and this perception may lead to forced eviction, massacres, forced labor, or total 
neglect. Le Billon: The Political Economy of Resource Wars, 2000, p. 32. 
150  Cf. Rufin: Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten, 1999, pp. 34-36. 
151  In his study of the war economy in Liberia, Montclos is interested in the relationship between 
competition for economic resources and political power positions, and formulates the question “ob 
das Streben nach Ressourcen Vorrang vor den politischen Machtkämpfen bekommen konnte, bei 
denen es ja auch um Pfründe und den Anteil am nationalen Kuchen ging.” Montclos, Marc-Antoine: 
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 economic approach has directed attention toward the interactions between economic 
strategies and political authority, a theoretical framework has yet to be elaborated. In the 
following section, we discuss a theoretical concept emphasizing the interconnectedness 
of political and economic aspects, and develop a strategy for the application of this 
concept to our main research question. On the basis of this discussion, a hypothesis is 
introduced. 
3.2. Reciprocal Influence of Political and Economic Structures 
The central research interest of this paper is how political and economic structures 
mutually influence one another and define the internal functional logic of an insurgent 
‘social order’. A theoretical framework for the isolated analysis of both the political 
structure, based on Weber’s three ideal types of authority, and the economic structure, 
derived from the economic approach to conflict studies, has been developed. For the 
implementation of our main research objective, however, the analytical distinction 
between the two structures needs to be transcended. This task requires a theoretical 
framework for describing the reciprocal influence of political and economic structures 
in an insurgent ‘social order’. For the purpose of analyzing another political entity, the 
state, Weber’s concept of patrimonialism was in the 1970s adopted as an analytical tool 
for the assessment of the functioning of newly de-colonized states in the Third World. 
The lack of a distinction between political and economic spheres was the main 
analytical condition for the application of patrimonialism to the analysis of these states. 
The interconnectedness of political organization and economic activities also explains 
the attractiveness of this concept for our objective. An alternative application of 
patrimonialism to the study of an insurgent movement, instead of a state, is justified by 
the consideration of an insurgent ‘social order’ as a quasi-state (see pp. 21-23). 
Although lacking strict juridical statehood, an insurgent movement can qualify as quasi-
state in terms of empirical statehood and/or juridical statehood. Additional justification 
for an alternative application is provided by a prominent protagonist of this concept 
S.N. Eisenstadt, who has suggested that patrimonialism is applicable to the analysis of 
various forms of political organization, not exclusively the state. Eisenstadt argued that 
the usefulness of patrimonialism is ‘greatest’ for the assessment of problems of political 
life and organization, which is the essence of our objective.152 A basic assumption is 
therefore that the concept of patrimonialism can be usefully adapted and applied as a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the interaction between political and economic 
structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. 
The first step in the process of applying patrimonialism in this context is to establish 
the constituent components of the concept: What are the key features defining the 
reciprocity between economic and political structures in patrimonialism? The second 
step is to transfer patrimonialism to our object of research: Which mechanisms are 
recognized as the theoretical parameters influencing the reproduction of a patrimonial 
‘social order’? 
                                                                                                                                               
Liberia und die Ausplünderung eines Landes. In: Jean; Rufin: Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege, 1999 (pp. 
219-242), p. 219. 
152  Cf. Eisenstadt, S.N.: Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. Sage Research 
Papers in the Social Sciences. Vol. 1, Series No. 90-003 (Studies in Comparative Modernization 
Series), Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1973, p. 12.  
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 3.2.1. Patrimonialism in Weber’s Terminology 
In Weber’s sociological theory, patrimonialism is a specific form of traditional 
domination. The original form of patrimonialism, patriarchalism, is defined as private 
authority within the oikos, i.e. the domestic household. The expansion of authority 
through the subjection of extrapatrimonials, i.e. civilians outside the original area of 
influence (domain), required increased organization. Patrimonialism then emerged from 
the process of decentralizing the authority in the oikos (Hausgewalt), which 
materialized through subordinates’ acquirement of property rights to housing, land and 
livestock.153 As a consequence of the expansion of authority, patrimonialism is 
redefined as political patrimonialism, beyond the private authority over relatives and 
servants in the oikos.154 The decentralization of the oikos does not, however, alter the 
organization of subordinates, which follows the same logic as the original form of 
authority in the oikos, based on loyalty and fidelity. This specific form of patriarchal 
authority is by Weber defined as patrimonial: “We shall speak of a patrimonial state 
when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political 
subjects – which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion – just like 
the exercise of his patriarchal power.”155 The legitimacy of a patrimonial authority is 
based on personal loyalty and the lack of an impersonal legal framework. Traditional 
norms and customs ensure obedience and simultaneously restrict the power of the 
sovereign.156 Those subject to patrimonial authority are obliged to secure “the material 
maintenance of the ruler”157 through services and taxes. The loyalty of the ruled is 
based on reciprocity, as the master’s dependence on their compliance and regular 
payments implies that he must provide services in reward. The value of reciprocity is 
defined by “external protection and help in case of need, then “humane” treatment and 
particularly a “customary” limitation of economic exploitation.”158 
                                                 
 
 
153  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 583. The decentralization of authority was the 
intention of the ruler (lord), who “settles dependents (…) on plots within his extended land-holdings, 
with a house and a family on their own, and provides them with animals (…) and equipment.” 
Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1010. 
154  Cf. Breuer, Stefan: Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie. Frankfurt a.M., New York: Campus Verlag 
1991, p. 87. Breuer examined Weber’s discussion of patrimonialism not only in “Economy and 
Society” but also in other articles and books, and emphasized diverging features of the concept within 
Weber’s work as a whole. However, Breuer concluded that the research community has, for the most 
part, received the term patrimonialism positively. Ibid., pp. 85-90. Médard also noted that Weber did 
not offer a systematic definition of patrimonialism, but that the essence of this form of traditional 
authority is expressed in the lack of a distinction between public and private spheres. The discussion 
of a lack of differentiation between patrimonialism and patriarchalism will be elided here, since the 
primary concern is the organizational structure of political authority referred to as patrimonialism, 
which can be examined independently of this theoretical debate. See Médard, Jean-François: 
Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism and the Study of the Post-colonial State in Subsaharian Africa. 
In: Marcussen, Henrik Secher: Improved Natural Resource Management – the Role of Formal 
Organisations and Informal Networks and Institutions. Occasional Paper, No. 17, Roskilde: 
International Development Studies, Roskilde University 1996, (pp. 76-97), p. 80.  
155  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1013. Despite the reference to the state in this quote, the main argument 
here concerns the applicability of patrimonialism to alternative forms of political organization, as 
defined above. 
156  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 178 and p. 584.  
157  Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1014. 
158  Ibid., p. 1010. 
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 The expanding domain is managed by a patrimonial administration organized 
according to the personal interests of the sovereign: “The patrimonial ruler treats all 
political and administrative affairs as he would his personal affairs.”159 In an 
expanding organization, a personal relationship between the sovereign and the 
‘bureaucrats’ is difficult to maintain. The distribution of privileges (benefices, fiefs, 
rewards) to individuals exercising an administrative office is therefore introduced as a 
mechanism for the enforcement of compliance.160 The patrimonial ‘bureaucrats’ are 
granted access to economic resources, with which they secure their personal prosperity 
while also producing a surplus for the ruler.161 The sovereign thus establishes a common 
interest between the continuation of his authority and the economic and social 
advantages of privileged groups, by linking administrative posts to social and economic 
privileges. 
The practice of attaching material benefits to administrative offices may lead to a 
tendency of monopolizing the access to such offices. The ‘bureaucrats’ may manage to 
secure their positions through the definition of legal foundations (‘stereotyping’), 
potentially challenging the authority of the ruler. The ruler attempts to avoid 
monopolization as well as the expansion of any individual power basis by creating a 
control system.162 Establishing a control system is necessary due to the potential threat 
to the unity of the central authority imminent in the emergence of an independent power 
basis. A powerful instrument for sustaining authority is the military, whose loyalty must 
be unconditional.163 To counter the development of powerful officials who constitute a 
potential threat to his authority, the sovereign may also appeal to the masses. The ruler 
legitimizes his authority by creating the perception of caring for the welfare of the 
subjects (‘followers’) and introducing social policies as an instrument for securing the 
control of the masses. 164 
                                                 
 
 
159  Médard, Jean-François: The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-
patrimonialism? In: Clapham, Christopher (ed.): Private Patronage and Public Power. Political 
Clientelism in the Modern State. London: Frances Pinter 1982 (pp.162-192), p. 178. 
160  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 596 and p. 598. “Free men derived such great 
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‘bureaucrat’ in this context. That is the reason why inverted commas are used here. 
161  Cf. Médard: The Underdeveloped State, 1982, p. 178. Such relationships are characterized as 
clientelism and political patronage. Clapham noted the origin of this concept in Mediterranean 
peasant societies, and described patron-client relations as following: “The essence of this relationship 
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which the patron offered some security or protection to the client against the uncertainties of peasant 
life, the whole exchange being encapsulated within a set of moral obligations, often symbolized for 
instance, by godparenthood.” (p. 2). In another definition Clapham reduced complexity: “clientelism 
is a relationship of exchange between unequals.” (p. 4). Quotations from Clapham, Christopher: 
Clientelism and the State. In: Clapham (ed.): Private Patronage and Public Power. Political 
Clientelism in the Modern State. London: Frances Pinter 1982 (pp. 1-35). 
162  Such strategies might include controlling the area under influence by travelling, letting loyal servants 
travel, spying, introducing time limits on administrative offices, letting family members exercise the 
most important posts, and supporting competitors in the case of the emergence of powerful 
administrators. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, pp. 605-606. 
163  Cf. Ibid., pp. 585-587 and p. 613. 
164  Cf. Ibid., p. 652.“The “welfare state” is the legend of patrimonialism, deriving not from the free 
cameraderie of solemnly promised fealty, but from the authoritarian relationship of father and 
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 The original economic base of patrimonial authority is barter economy, but the 
development of trade and monetary relations can create a monopolistic economic 
structure in addition to the establishment of a tax system.165 Independent economic 
power is disliked by the sovereign, who rejects the establishment of economic 
enterprises on a rational-legal basis, and instead attempts to control trade, import and 
export as powerful instruments for securing loyalty.166 The territory under patrimonial 
control is a source of economic profit both for the authority himself and his 
administrators. The mismanagement of resources (predatory behavior) can have 
potentially destructive effects, since it presupposes the existence of resources to exploit: 
“When patrimonialism is exacerbated it becomes self destructive.(…) When the public 
resources have gone, there is nothing left “to eat””167 
The examination of Weber’s concept of patrimonialism allows a specification of the 
social mechanisms determining the reciprocal influence of economic and political 
structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The link between administrative offices and 
economic privileges creates a common interest between the administration and the ruler 
in the continuation of a specific social order. The risk of an emergent, independent 
power base among individuals within the administration requires the ruler to establish a 
control system and a military arm, with which to coerce consent. Welfare policies are 
introduced in order to secure the loyalty of the masses. In return, the masses ensure the 
material maintenance of the ruler through services and tax payments. Administrative 
positions function as an instrument for the appropriation of economic benefits, and are 
treated as private, not public, positions: “Economic and political resources, wealth and 
political power are directly exchangeable.”168  
Regarding the application of patrimonialism to the analysis of an insurgent ‘social 
order’, we must note the implications related to the process of institutionalizing a 
specific order by establishing legal rules. This would distort the assumption of a 
patrimonial mode of political organization, as Médard made clear: ”By definition, 
patrimonialism is inversely proportional to the degree of institutionalization of the 
state.”169 A legal framework does not correspond to the traditional principles of 
patrimonial authority. This argument also affected the application of patrimonialism on 
the analysis of newly decolonized states in the 1970s. In order to validate our alternative 
application of patrimonialism, we briefly examine this debate.  
3.2.2. Contemporary Adaptation of Patrimonialism 
The research interest in “new” states resulted in a renewed discussion of the application 
of Weber’s sociological theory of domination. In a critique of earlier attempts to apply 
Weber in the field of African studies, Roth argued that Weber’s theory was 
                                                                                                                                               
children. The “father of the people” (Landesvater) is the ideal of the patrimonial state.” Weber: Eng. 
ed., 1968, p. 1107. 
165  Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 586. 
166  Cf. Ibid., p. 648. Weber also recognized the usefulness of possession of precious metals, which is 
interesting in regard to the discussion of ‘resource-based insurgencies’: “The power positions of all 
rulers transcending the level of the primitive village headman were based on their possession of 
precious metals in raw or unfinished form. They needed this treasure above all for the maintenance 
of their following, the body-guards, patrimonial armies, mercenaries and especially officials.” 
Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1092. 
167  Médard: Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism, 1996, p. 95. 
168  Ibid., p. 86. 
169  Ibid., p. 91. 
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 “underutilized, and, in fact, reduced to the dichotomy of bureaucracy and charisma.”170 
In the 1970s, a central theme in the debate on how to analyze developing societies was 
the coexistence of traditional and modern forms of societal organization. According to 
Eisenstadt, Roth, accompanied by Zolberg with his comparative study of several states 
in Africa171, was among the first scholars to apply Weber to the study of these 
societies.172 Eisenstadt explained the reemergence of the concept of patrimonialism as a 
response to the inadequacies of central assumptions in modernization theories, in 
particular the presumption of a one-directional development terminating in ‘modernity’. 
The patrimonial approach alternatively emphasized the existence of a specific internal 
‘logic’ in the societal development of “new” states.173 The mixed character of societies 
in these states, described as “post-traditional” in rejection of the ‘traditional versus 
modern’-dichotomy, did, however, also raise questions about the usefulness of applying 
patrimonialism, originally intended for the analysis of rather non-complex societies, to 
the analysis of these states. Eisenstadt argued that the concept of patrimonialism 
embraces societies with different degrees of political differentiation, from kinship, tribal 
forms of social order to more complex empires, all distinguished from the 
institutionalized, rational-legal order. The usefulness of patrimonialism was recognized 
in the ability to examine how difficulties of political organization are dealt with.174 In 
contrast to Eisenstadt’s positive appraisal of a universal applicability of patrimonialism 
as an analytical tool for studying political structures, Theobald critically argued that 
patrimonialism ignores substantial differences by merely focusing on the role of 
clientage networks in various societies: “Like its predecessor, charisma, patrimonialism 
is being used to explain political cohesion in virtually any society; it has become 
something of a catch-all concept, in danger of losing its analytical utility.”175 The 
analysis of political organization in “new” states led to the recognition of specific means 
of political struggle, among them clientelism, patronage, prebendalism, nepotism, ‘belly 
politics’ and factionalism.176 These terms, however, describe practices for which the 
common denominator is the lack of distinction between private and public spheres. This 
is exactly the essence of patrimonialism, and Médard therefore argued that the 
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 usefulness of patrimonialism is the ability to subsume a variety of observed practices, 
which express variations of the same phenomenon, i.e. the lack of distinction between 
private and public domains, in one heuristic theoretical concept.177 As an ideal type, 
patrimonialism demands generality, thereby avoiding confusion between the abstraction 
of the model and reality. This argument also explains the usefulness of patrimonialism 
for our objective, as it allows us to define a guide to the empirical analysis on the basis 
of the ideal typical character of a patrimonial system.  
The application of patrimonialism as a theoretical framework for the study of 
political organization in “new” states initiated a debate on the necessity of adding the 
prefix “neo-“ to the Weberian concept. In order to avoid a-historicity by applying a 
concept of traditional authority to the analysis of modern political societies, the prefix 
expresses the understanding of a historically mixed type, in which a patrimonial order 
co-exists with rational-bureaucratic institutions as the foundation of legitimacy.178 The 
process of decolonization led to the establishment of indigenous bureaucracies in “new” 
states, which simultaneously became patrimonialized and developed a specific 
functional logic: ”This patrimonialization of the state has brought about a ”neo-
patrimonial” state, a kind of hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy.”179 
Patrimonialism in “new” states is therefore not simply a survival of pre-modern, 
traditional forms of social organization, but the result of a specific historical experience. 
While Médard in 1982 referred to neo-patrimonialism as an ideal type180, he later 
explained that he had adjusted his ideas in response to criticism, and concluded that “in 
interpreting neo-patrimonialism only as a mixed and modal form, and not as an ideal 
type, there can be no more ambiguity.”181 In regard to the application of patrimonialism 
in the present study, this theoretical discussion requires us to decide whether the prefix 
“neo-“ is necessary for describing the patrimonial logic of an insurgent ‘social order’. 
While the analytical method of ideal types provides the justification for an alternative 
application of patrimonialism, and therefore requires the use of the ideal typical term 
patrimonialism, our object of research does not represent an unaltered pre-modern, 
traditional form of social organization. Instead, an insurgent ‘social order’ is the result 
of historical developments, which triggered the emergence of insurgent movements, e.g. 
decolonization led to the foundation of liberation movements. Thus, although 
patrimonialism serves as term of reference in this study, an insurgent ‘social order’ 
represents a neo-patrimonial system. We will now attempt to adapt the analytical 
concept of patrimonialism to our present undertaking.  
3.2.3. Patrimonialism in an Insurgent ‚Social Order‘ 
From the discussion of patrimonialism in the previous section, we extract a cluster of 
factors of special concern for examining the interconnection between economic and 
political structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The functioning of a patrimonial 
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 system is defined by factors such as (a) elite co-operation, (b) distributive policies, and 
(c) the control system. According to a patrimonial logic, an insurgent administration 
organized in a patronage system stabilizes the role of the leader as the head of the 
organization and the main distributor of patronage goods and services. The central 
mechanism securing the functioning of the ‘social order’ is the distribution of economic 
wealth and benefits among members of the administration. The reproduction of this 
social system depends on the ability of the leader to reinforce his control over central 
political powers and economic resources, and the ability to prevent the development of 
rival groups with an autonomous access to sources of power. Hence, the establishment 
of a network institutionalizing mutual dependency between the authority and the elite, 
distributing welfare as well as the operation of a control system, are decisive factors in 
the perpetuation of a ’patrimonial insurgent social order’. 
The use of physical force was in section 3.1. recognized as a superior dimension in 
the ‘social order’, influencing both the economic and the political structure. The use of 
physical force enables coercion, the ability to enforce discipline and consent, as well as 
the suppression of potential disruptions to the functioning of the specific order. Elites 
may use physical force for the purpose of hindering fragmentation, which can 
negatively influence their political, economic and social positions, thereby securing the 
continuation of the advantageous distribution of resources to the demanding elites. The 
use of physical force may also be related to a decrease in legitimacy. Weber noted that 
the monopoly of physical force is fundamental to internal control in a political 
organization, but should not be the central instrument for achieving obedience in a 
stable system of domination. Thus, increased use of violence in an insurgent ‘social 
order’ corresponds to decreasing legitimacy. On the basis of these considerations, 
including the use of violence for economic purposes, we examine the use of physical 
force in an insurgent ‘social order’ in this paper.  
In regard to the impact of external factors on the internal functional logic of an 
insurgent ‘social order’, a question concerning the possible limited explanatory 
capability of patrimonialism emerges: To what extent can patrimonialism explain the 
character of an insurgent movement’s interaction with the world market? External 
factors are primarily examined in the internal-external dimension of the economic 
structure. This exchange process is based on the ability to make trade agreements, i.e. to 
negotiate prices and quantities. Patrimonialism may be less useful for explaining the 
functioning of the internal-external dimension than a rational, profit-maximizing logic. 
Insurgent movements’ interactions with external actors are, however, not limited to 
trade. Additional external influences are inherent in interactions with representatives of 
the world community, state and non-state actors, on issues such as emergency relief, 
financial assistance and negotiations of a cease-fire or a peace agreement. An insurgent 
movement must be familiar with the international diplomatic language and present its 
political attitudes in accordance with international norms, for example those of human 
rights and democracy. Similarly to the connections between insurgent movements and 
their international business partners, the communication with international political 
actors may also be based on the principle of rationality, rather than patrimonialism. The 
concept of patrimonialism therefore describes the main, but cannot be the exclusive, 
approach to the examination of the ‘social order’. In order to assess the influence of 
external relations on the internal functional logic of an insurgent ‘social order’, the 
explanatory framework of patrimonialism must be supplemented. On the basis of this 
argument, we can then develop the central hypothesis.  
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 3.3. Hypothesis 
The distinction between an internal logic and the impact of external factors indicates 
that structural heterogeneity is a fundamental feature of an insurgent ‘social order’. In 
his consideration of the structure of societal change in developing societies, Jung 
presented structural heterogeneity, observable in the co-existence of interdependent 
traditional and modern elements, as the essence of his argument.182 Uneven historical 
processes have led to a “patchwork of contradicting societal elements”183 which 
transforms traditional forms of political organization, patterns of material production 
and values in context of modern elements.184 As a social phenomenon, this process of 
transforming traditional forms of social organization, both co-existing with and 
reciprocally influenced by modern forms of organization, has been termed as 
“contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous” (Gleichzeitigkeit des 
Ungleichzeitigen).185 The actions of ‘big men’ in neo-patrimonial African states is 
explained in accordance with this concept of the ‘contemporaneity of the non-
contemporaneous’: “Caught in a complex network of international, transnational, 
regional, local and personal ties, the ‘big man entrepreneur’ must act according to a 
hybrid normative setting of tradition and modernity at the same time.”186 The analytical 
tool for the analysis of hybrid forms of social organization is the ideal typical 
differentiation between modern and traditional societies.187 With reference to structural 
heterogeneity and hybrid forms of authority, a hypothesis on the internal functional 
logic of an insurgent ‘social order’ is introduced, which accounts for external influence. 
Hence, both the internal, societal dimension and the international level are combined in 
the hypothesis. The central argument is that the logic of the internal system’s 
organization differs from the logic underlying the functioning of the external relations, 
and thus, creates a hybrid internal logic in the ‘social order’.  
The internal system of authority in an insurgent ‘social order’ is dominated by a 
patrimonial network institutionalizing mutual dependency between the elites and the 
ruler, in which the central functional mechanism is the ruler’s monopoly on political 
authority and economic resources. An internal control system is installed in order to 
enforce coherence and consent from soldiers and civilians. The use of physical force is 
intensified when the basis of legitimacy and the symbolic reproduction erodes. The 
functional logic of external relations is economic and legal rationality. The co-existence 
of a patrimonial logic and the modern rational logic results in a hybridization of the 
insurgent ‘social order’. 
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 4. The UNITA ‚Social Order‘ in Angola 
War has been ravaging in Angola for four decades. The liberation war (1961-1975) was 
succeeded by an internal war, in which the insurgent movement UNITA fought against 
the Angolan state, which has been governed by the Movimento Popular de Libertação 
de Angola (MPLA) since independence was attained in 1975. The social consequences 
are devastating, expressed by Angola’s ranking as number 146 out of 162 countries in 
the 2001 Human Development Report.188 Absurdly enough, the protracted nature of the 
Angolan conflict defines its attractiveness for our theoretical objective. The central 
analytical question is how political and economic structures have interacted and shaped 
the functional logic of the UNITA ‘social order’ over time. The perpetuation of the 
conflict suggests that UNITA has managed to establish a viable organization for the 
reproduction of both its political authority and its economic system. The insurgent 
movement UNITA therefore well suits our purpose of observing patterns of social 
organization over time. The availability of sources is another reason for choosing 
UNITA as a case study, as UNITA is a rather well documented insurgent force. 
Scholarly analysis, in particular by William Minter (1994), who based his study on 
interviews with several ex-UNITA combatants, and Linda Heywood (2000, 1998, 
1989), who emphasizes Angolan rural history and culture, are among the most 
prominent sources on UNITA’s political structure. Additionally, a number of foreign 
journalists visited UNITA in the 1970s and the 1980s and provided eyewitness reports 
on the organization of UNITA-administered villages. Among the most well known 
journalistic travelers are Franz Sitte, Leon Dash and Fred Bridgland. Particularly, the 
massive book by Bridgland (1986) is a useful source on the early years of UNITA’s 
insurgency, although the political context of the Cold War must be kept in mind when 
examining these sources. On the development of UNITA’s political structure since the 
late 1980s, the fortnightly journal Africa Confidential (AC) was informative, as were 
also various publications by Human Rights Watch (HRW). Recently, three reports 
published by the United Nations (UN) have contributed to novel information on both 
UNITA’s political and economic structure. These reports were the result of 
investigative work done by two committees established by the Security Council in order 
to monitor the application of sanctions against UNITA. The success of the first 
committee, the Panel of Experts (Res. 1237 (1999)) under the leadership of the 
Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, led to the establishment of a Monitoring 
Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (Res. 1295 (2000)).189 A further source, which 
is particularly informative on UNITA’s economic structure, is a detailed study 
published by the South African Institute of Security Studies (Cilliers & Dietrich 2000).  
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 The sources will be critically analyzed, keeping in mind the Angolan information 
deficit, described as “few solid facts, merely disputed versions of reality.”190 The same 
scholar stated that “one can only relate to Angola, with some sort of dignity, through 
first hand experience”191, thereby disputing the believability of external observers. In 
particular, the structures of UNITA’s system of social organization and interaction with 
the world market have been described as mainly concealed: “With respect to territories 
held by UNITA, much remains unknown, including their social organisation and their 
links with wider (shadowy) regional economies.”192 In contrast, the following analysis 
is a qualitative study of the form of insurgent organization based exclusively on 
thorough analysis of the available literature. Aspects, on which more information is 
required, are identified. This study therefore illustrates the procedure for critically 
examining sources pertaining to complex realities.  
Prior to our inquiry into the UNITA ‘social order’, we shall recapitulate the history 
of the war.  
4.1. The History of the Angolan Civil War  
The war in Angola, designated as “the World’s Worst War”193, began as a struggle for 
independence from Portuguese colonial domination in the liberation war 1961-1975. 
Since the late 15th century, the Portuguese had gradually extended their domination over 
the territory, which is now Angola. In an international environment favoring anti-
colonialism subsequent to the Second World War, the Portuguese reluctance to 
decolonize and prepare their colonies for a stable transition, was seen as a reflection 
upon the authoritarian policies of the Salazarist regime of Estado Novo (New State, 
1928-1974). The Portuguese center was economically dependent on the exploitation of 
the colonial economic resources.194  
The anti-colonial struggle was dominated by three liberation movements, which 
displayed distinctive perceptions of Angolan nationalism.195 The three movements have 
been described as representatives of the main ethno-linguistic groups, the Ovimbundu 
(35-40 percent of Angola’s population) of the Central Highlands, the Mbundu (25 per 
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 cent) of Luanda and its hinterland, and the Bakongo (15 percent) of the northern areas. 
A simplistic ethno-linguistic interpretation of the conflict is, however, deficient. As we 
will see, other structural distinctions considerably shaped the relationship between the 
three movements. As one of the earliest movements founded in 1956, the MPLA 
combined Angolan nationalism with Marxist ideology. The Mbundu was their primary 
political constituency, with a considerable membership of urban mestiço (mixed race) 
and assimilado (Portuguese status acquired through education).196 At the outbreak of the 
war, the União das Populações de Angola (UPA)197 was the most prominent liberation 
movement. In 1962 the UPA joined a united front, which was renamed Frente Nacional 
de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and initiated the Angolan revolutionary government 
in exile (GRAE).198 The FNLA represented a distinct anti-Communist form of Angolan 
nationalism, and attracted support primarily from the Bakongo. The third liberation 
movement, UNITA, was established in 1966 by a former prominent member of the 
FNLA, Jonas Savimbi. His resignation from the FNLA was eventually caused by 
dissatisfaction with the centralized leadership of Holden Roberto, the leader of the 
FNLA. With claim to the support of his fellow Ovimbundu, Savimbi and UNITA 
mobilized the largest ethnic group in Angola, which had not yet been recruited by the 
other movements. UNITA positioned itself ideologically as anti-Communist, but 
established a radical image by incorporating the teachings of Mao.199  
Despite their links to different regional constituencies, the liberation movements 
unanimously advocated Angolan nationalism and the independence of the Angolan state 
from Portugal. Regardless of their similarities and the primary aim of independence, 
however, the three movements were unable to establish a united front against 
Portuguese rule. Angola’s independence was therefore only indirectly a result of 
internal efforts, and was rather strongly influenced by the military coup in Portugal on 
April 25, 1974.200 Subsequently, the Portuguese government initiated negotiations with 
the three movements, which culminated in the Alvor Accords on January 15, 1975. 
Independence was scheduled for November 11, 1975, but the process of colonial 
withdrawal and transfer of authority to an interim government rapidly collapsed into a 
fierce rivalry between the three movements. The inability to establish a transitional 
arrangement, combined with the rapid exodus of the Portuguese regime, created a 
power vacuum in which the internal Angolan power struggle, underlying the anti-
colonial struggle, materialized.  
The underlying causes of the antagonism between the three movements are 
explained with reference to ethnicity, socio-economic disparities, ideological 
differences and personal rivalries. While the ethnic aspect does shed light on the links 
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 between the liberation movements and their primary supporters, it does not explain the 
origin of the conflict. This is partly due to the frequent interactions between the 
different groups, observable in the membership of the movements, and partly due to the 
lack of an ethnic component in the respective political agendas.201 Alternatively, the 
inter-group conflicts became critical in context of socio-economic disparities emanating 
in colonial society. The distinction between urban capitalist society (MPLA) and rural 
peasant societies (FNLA, UNITA) has been interpreted both as a center-periphery 
conflict (the dependency perspective) and as a class struggle.202 Personal rivalries 
during the anti-colonial struggle, e.g. between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi and 
internal quarrels within the MPLA, further aggravated the structural disparities. The 
broad ideological dispute between Marxists and anti-Marxists fortified these cleavages. 
The rural nationalists of the FNLA and UNITA, whose primary supporters were 
disadvantaged under colonial rule due to lack of educational opportunities, explicitly 
distanced themselves from the MPLA. The other movements criticized the MPLA-
constituency of urban mestiço and assimilado, as these were considered the main 
beneficiaries of colonialism.203 Multiple causal variables generated the impression of a 
“complex interplay of personal ambition and regional factors that created turmoil in 
the anti-colonial forces in the early 1960s.”204 The internal animosities, linked to 
different identities, socio-economic disparities and the historical experience of 
colonialism and anti-colonialism, are ingrained in the dynamic of the Angolan conflict.  
An external component was added to the internal power struggle when the liberation 
movements attracted foreign assistance after 1974.205 The Soviet Union aided the 
MPLA, while the USA assisted the FNLA and UNITA. In 1975, Cuba sent military 
advisors and ground troops to support the MPLA. In the same year the regional 
hegemon South Africa entered the conflict in alliance with the FNLA and UNITA, 
motivated by the objective of undermining nationalist aspirations in South-African ruled 
Namibia.206 With the assistance of Cuban troops and Soviet aid, the MPLA gained 
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 control of the capital Luanda and proclaimed the People’s Republic of Angola with 
Agostinho Neto as president on November 11, 1975. In response, the FNLA and 
UNITA announced a united government of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Angola, which soon failed. Subsequently, political changes in the USA led to the 
adoption of the Clark Amendment in December 1975, according to which US support to 
the anti-MPLA forces temporarily came to an end. This development, combined with 
the retreat of South Africa in 1976, significantly changed the military balance, most 
clearly recognizable in the deterioration of the FNLA as a fighting force after 1976.207 
With control of the post-colonial state, the MPLA emerged as the victorious party and 
attempted to rebuild a strong and centralized state with the backing of Cuba and the 
Soviet Union.  
In contrast to the FNLA, UNITA was, with South African support, able to 
reorganize and establish an effective insurgent movement. Based on the guerrilla 
strategy of “hit-and-run”, UNITA soon launched attacks on important infrastructure, 
such as the Benguela Railway, and aimed at hurting the MPLA economically.208 During 
the 1980s UNITA expanded its military capability to a conventional level, and with 
assistance from the South African Defense Force (SADF), established control over large 
territories in the southern provinces and the Central Highlands. UNITA practically 
exercised parallel sovereignty with the MPLA government, functioning as a “state-
within-the-state” (quasi-state).209 Under the Reagan-Administration (1980-1988) US 
involvement resumed, and after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, direct 
assistance followed.210 In response, Soviet arms transfers to the MPLA increased, as did 
the continuous presence of Cuban troops, reaching a height of 50,000 troops in the mid-
1980s. The internal conflict in Angola became heavily entrenched in the bipolar 
struggle for international hegemony and came to be viewed as a ‘proxy war’. Certainly, 
the external intervention during the crucial years between 1974-76, significantly 
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 influenced the course of the conflict, and in order to attract continued external support, 
the belligerents adjusted their political agendas in accordance with their alliances. The 
liberation movements thus achieved external support by successfully presenting their 
interests in the international context of the Cold War, i.e. by “importing an 
international rivalry.”211 The internal power struggle, however, continued to define 
conflict dynamism. The importance of domestic factors was evident when the external 
initiation and backing of an Angolan peace process, following the international changes 
in the late 1980s, collapsed with the resumption of conflict in 1992.  
In their diplomatic efforts to reach a peace agreement in Angola, US strategists 
linked the issue of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops. After 
hesitant negotiations throughout the 1980s, an agreement was reached in 1988.212 
Subsequently, the external backers to the warring parties in Angola pushed for 
negotiations, which led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991. Prior to the 
talks, the MPLA had adopted a new political agenda, favoring a multi-party system, and 
liberalized the economy.213 The peace agreement foresaw the incorporation of UNITA’s 
armed branch into the unified armed forces, the Forças Armadas de Angolanas 
(FAA).214 In addition, the agreement entailed plans on demobilization, the extension of 
government administration to UNITA controlled areas, as well as parliamentary and 
presidential elections. The UN established the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission II (UNAVEM II) to monitor and support the transformation to peace.215 This 
process, however, developed tediously, and the time schedule for the military reforms 
was repeatedly extended and completed only a few days ahead of the elections on 29-30 
September 1992. The weaknesses of the implementation process proved fatal, as 
UNITA rejected the election results, which were approved by international observers, 
and resumed fighting. As explanations for the failure of the peace process, analysts 
emphasized the inadequate UN mandate and its resources, the short time frame for 
implementation, the failure to ensure the fulfillment of the military conditions, the 
decision to carry out the elections despite unsatisfactory verification and the lack of a 
power sharing arrangement between the two main protagonists.216 Having lost the 
presidency to MPLA’s José Eduardo dos Santos, Savimbi led UNITA in the most 
violent phase of the Angolan conflict. Despite the withdrawal of external support in the 
                                                 
 
 
211  Guimarães: The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, 1998, p. 199.  
212  In the New York Accords 1988, or ‘Tripartite Agreement’, Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed on 
Cuban and South African withdrawal, and UN supervised elections in Namibia. UNITA was not a 
party to this agreement. Cf. Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, pp. 11-12. 
213  Cf. Ibid., p. 12. 
214  UNITA’s armed branch, the Forças Armadas Libertação Angola (FALA) and MPLA’s military arm, 
the Forças Armadas Populares Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) were included in the united FAA, as 
defined in the peace agreement in 1991. To avoid an inflation of acronyms, exclusively UNITA and 
MPLA are referred to throughout the text, without distinguishing between the political organization 
and military units of the movements. When necessary, specifications are made. 
215  UNAVEM I verified the withdrawal of Cuban forces.  
216  Cf. Tvedten, Inge: The Angolan Debacle. In: Journal for Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993 (pp. 108-
118), p. 117, Marcum, John: Angola: War Again. In: Current History, Vol. 92, No. 574, 1993 (pp. 
218-223), p. 223, and Paffenholz: Waffenstillstand in Angola, 1995, p. 7. See also Anstee, the UN 
Special Representative during the transition phase, from March 1992 to June 1993, for a thorough 
examination of this process: Anstee, Margaret Joan: Orphan of the Cold War. The Inside Story of the 
Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-1993. London: Macmillan Press 1996. 
 46
 early 1990s, UNITA used its control over diamond mining areas and links to ‘friendly’ 
states and foreign business representatives to establish an intricate net of informal 
trading. The large weapons surplus caused by the collapse of the Communist block was 
beneficial to UNITA’s supply chains. UNITA initially achieved a military edge, but the 
government used oil revenues to rearm217, and eventually, the development of the 
military situation led to renewed peace negotiations under the auspices of the USA, 
Russia and Portugal, the so-called Troika. With the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 
November 20, 1994, a new attempt to resolve the Angolan conflict began. Again, the 
demobilization of UNITA proved difficult. The UN, which mobilized UNAVEM III, 
again experienced difficulties in influencing the situation, and in 1997, the UN 
withdrew its troops. A small observer mission, the Missâo de Observaçâo des Naçôes 
Unidas em Angola (MONUA) remained until 1999. The UN instead focused on close 
monitoring of the sanctions imposed on UNITA. Sanctions on the delivery of arms, 
military equipment and fuel to UNITA were adopted in 1993, and extended to UNITA 
bank accounts, foreign travel by UNITA representatives and the closing of UNITA 
offices abroad in 1997. Finally, in 1998 sanctions were introduced on diamond-trade, 
prohibiting the purchase of diamonds from UNITA or UNITA controlled areas.218 
Regardless of the intentions declared by the parties to the conflict in the Lusaka 
Protocol, violent clashes continued and the definitive resumption of war was obvious 
when President Dos Santos in December 1998 declared that the only path to peace is 
war.219 In the renewed military offensive, the government troops initially suffered 
serious losses, but throughout 1999 they imposed major defeats on UNITA. While 
UNITA had been able to control over 50-80 percent of Angolan territory during the 
1990s220, the insurgents were now forced to withdraw to the bush and readopted 
guerrilla tactics. Although the government was confident it would win the military 
battle, both parties seemed unable to achieve military control over major areas in the 
country. In 2001 there were reports on a willingness of leaders from both parties to 
negotiate. When Savimbi died in combat on February 22, 2002, renewed demands for 
negotiations emerged, and on April 4, 2002 a peace agreement was signed. During the 
last years, there were indications that UNITA was suffering from increasing transaction 
costs in their diamond trade, an effect of the UN sanctions imposed in 1998.221 The 
defections of high-profile UNITA-representatives throughout the 1990s, and the 
considerable number of deserters, which between December 2000 and August 2001 
amounted to 4,500, led to speculations about a deteriorating insurgent force.222  
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 During the 1990s, the dynamic development of the conflict further aggravated the 
historical socio-economic disparities. Urbanization, intensified by the military actions of 
the contenders, has led to an uprooting of traditional social structures.223 The number of 
internally displaced persons (IDP), at the end of 2001 estimated at 4,1 million, roughly 
one third of the approximately 12 million inhabitants, is an unmistakable indication of a 
critical societal situation.224 Political elites have used identity as a prominent argument 
in their competition for power, particularly in the 1992 election campaign, as UNITA 
emphasized fear of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and disadvantages for the Ovimbundu, and the 
MPLA focused on an intellectual, urban image.225 The resource wealth of diamonds and 
oil benefited the administration of the patrimonial state, and corruption is widespread 
among military and political elites incorporated in the clientelist system of the MPLA-
state.226 A renowned newspaper therefore concludes: “Only a war economy could veil 
the extent of enrichment and corruption.”227  
The paradox of a destructive war co-existing with the generation of enormous 
economic profits has emanated in the suggestion that a “new” war is observable in 
Angola. According to Clapham’s terminology, the Angolan war began as a ‘liberation 
insurgency’, which after independence in 1975 continued as a ‘reform insurgency’, 
succeeded in 1992 by a ‘warlord insurgency’.228 Additionally, Cillier suggested the term 
’resource-based insurgency’, which overlaps with the term warlord insurgency, but 
reflects upon the international context of these conflicts, as insurgents interact with 
global markets. The war in Angola represents such a category because it “demonstrates 
the dynamics of a new type of regional and economically determined insurgency war, 
much more closely linked to the regional informal economy and even the global 
economy and its criminal component than previous wars. (…) As with all insurgencies, 
so-called resource wars are essentially internal in character and regional in their 
dynamics.”229 Yet another scholar argues that UNITA’s current insurgency against the 
Angolan state is best described as a ’criminal insurgency’, due to the lack of political 
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 objectives and the dominance of economic motives.230 These attempts at re-labeling the 
war in Angola draw attention to the dynamic development of the conflict, but must be 
criticized for the tendency to isolate the resource-base as the single determinant. The 
central argument in this paper is that UNITA’s economic strategies must be analyzed 
within the context of the political organization of the insurgency. A theoretical 
framework was developed for the isolated analysis of political and economic structures 
respectively. To begin with, we examine the political structure of the UNITA ‘social 
order’, with an analytical focus on the foundation of legitimacy.  
4.2. The Political Structure of the UNITA ‘Social Order’  
4.2.1.The Genesis and Consolidation of UNITA 
Under the leadership of Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (1934-2002), a group of liberation 
activists entered the province Moxico in Eastern Angola from Zambia in 1966 and 
established the first anti-colonial movement with a leadership present inside Angola. 
While the leadership of the internationally well-known movements, the FNLA and 
MPLA, resided in exile in Kinshasa and Brazzaville respectively, Savimbi succeeded in 
implementing his central political tenet of living among the people. Based on the 
teachings of Mao, the mobilization of civilians was considered crucial for effective 
guerrilla warfare.231 UNITA’s founding conference took place on March 13, 1966, as 
around 67 delegates elected a Central Committee and adopted a Constitution.  
Prior to the establishment of an internal base in 1966, Savimbi gathered his political 
experience in interaction with Angolan and other African liberation activists in the 
European exile community and on international conferences. Savimbi left Angola in 
1958, where he grew up in the Central Highlands, to study in Portugal, where he soon 
became involved in the Communist opposition movement associated with MPLA’s 
Agosthino Neto.232 In his early phase of political activity, Savimbi also met MPLA’s 
main rival, Holden Roberto of the UPA/FNLA, but Savimbi expressed his primary 
sympathies with the ‘progressive’ MPLA. From this diverse experience with exile 
politics, in February 1961 Savimbi nevertheless decided to join the UPA/FNLA. He was 
appointed Secretary General of the FNLA and later Foreign Minister of the GRAE.233 
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 Savimbi’s political engagement was dominated by disparities with Roberto, and as an 
advocate of reform, Savimbi became the leading figure of an opposition group within 
the FNLA/GRAE. On a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 
1964, Savimbi publicly criticized Roberto’s FNLA of tribalism in favor of the Bakongo, 
accused Roberto of incompetent administration, including corruption, and restated his 
disagreement with FNLA’s military strategy. Ultimately, Savimbi announced his 
resignation.234 Due to the increasing dissatisfaction with the co-ordination of the anti-
colonial struggle among the fractured Angolan exile community, a number of 
experienced activists joined Savimbi in his effort to establish a third liberation 
movement. Both experienced military and political leaders from the FNLA, Angolan 
students in exile, among them Jorge Valentim who later became the information 
secretary of UNITA, as well as a number of local leaders from different areas in 
southern Angola, supported Savimbi.235 From his broad political experience, Savimbi 
could also rely on support from various international and African diplomatic contacts. 
Emphasizing the importance of mobilization from inside, UNITA promoted an inclusive 
approach but nevertheless positioned itself as the representative of the majority groups 
inside Angola, primarily the Ovimbundu, but also Chokwe and other sub-groups in the 
south.236 Savimbi rejected a distinct ideological agenda, but emphasized the 
‘Christianity of Africans’. Marcum noted that these attitudes implied an exclusion of the 
Marxist and atheist MPLA.237 The reference to religion was of particular interest with 
regard to the Ovimbundu, as the activities of foreign Protestant missionaries since the 
late 19th century considerably influenced the development of a relatively autonomous 
Ovimbundu community. A successful appeal to the support of the Ovimbundu was 
dependent on the ability to establish an alliance with the Protestant church. Pro-MPLA 
authors argued that Savimbi exploited this sense of solidarity among Ovimbundu 
Protestants when he encouraged the Ovimbundu to unite. The appeal for unity was 
interpreted as a rejection of an inclusive approach to the struggle for independence.238 
The political agenda of the new movement thus combined the acclamation of Mao with 
the rejection of ideology, applied the slogan of inclusiveness simultaneously with a 
regional-cultural focus, and the warning against superpower involvement did not halt 
UNITA representatives’ plead for assistance both in the USA, in China and in Eastern 
Europe. One scholar has accordingly described UNITA’s political framework as “an 
ideological hotchpotch” consisting of “a loose mixture of terms such as ‘socialism’, 
‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’ that betrayed a rather broad ideological scope lacking any 
cohesiveness.”239 Hence, inconsistencies in UNITA’s political agenda were noted 
already in the initial phase of its existence. An analytical focus on the foundation of 
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 legitimacy, however, as elaborated in chapter two, helps explaining the ‘mixture’ of 
political ideas. From an analysis of UNITA’s political strategy in context of societal 
dynamics, the link between UNITA and rural communities in Central, Eastern and 
Southern regions is recognized as the core traditional foundation of UNITA’s 
legitimacy. In order to understand the foundation of UNITA’s legitimacy, the societal 
structure in the Central Highlands, which incorporated both Ovimbundu traditions and 
Protestant religious influences, is a core analytical variable. On this aspect, which is 
now examined in more detail, the extensive work of Linda Heywood is a profound 
source. 
A central argument in Heywood’s study is that the emergence of anti-colonial 
activities among the Ovimbundu differed from experiences in other regions in certain 
fundamental ways. This formed a specific Ovimbundu nationalism, distinguished from 
Bakongo (FNLA) and Mbundu (MPLA) nationalism.240 The political and social 
activities of Ovimbundu Protestants dominated this alternative path to political 
awareness. From the late 19th century on, Ovimbundu, in affiliation with foreign 
Protestant missionaries, directed the establishment of community institutions such as 
schools, hospitals and churches in the Central Highlands and southern Angola. 
Protestant Ovimbundu were, to a larger extent than in other regions and in Catholic-
influenced Ovimbundu regions, responsible for the conduct of community services. 
Their active involvement institutionalized a largely independent Ovimbundu-based 
organizational structure in the Protestant missionary regions. In contrast to the 
hierarchically (and racially) organized Catholic Church, the flexible and egalitarian 
Protestant structures provided Ovimbundu Protestants with opportunities to establish 
themselves as an influential social group. Traditional Ovimbundu beliefs and customs 
were adapted to the demands of their new faith. Ovimbundu institutions were 
incorporated into Protestant institutions, albeit with modifications, and Protestant 
Church representatives performed many of the same functions as traditional 
authorities.241 Prior to the expansion of colonial rule to the Central Highlands between 
1890-1904, the traditional structure of Ovimbundu society was dominated by around 20 
different Ovimbundu kingdoms. Although these kingdoms were not politically unified, 
they had a common set of political traditions and cultural beliefs. These included the 
belief in hereditary rights and the supernatural powers of the ruler, as well as the 
acceptance of the ruler as the highest juridical authority, based on his traditional 
knowledge and wisdom.242 Due to the growing influence of outsiders, the power and the 
privileges of the ruling lineage were in steady decline, but the Ovimbundu adjusted and 
created new societal institutions, which helped forming a distinct regional solidarity. 
The village structure established and managed by Protestant Ovimbundu facilitated the 
emergence of Pan-Ovimbundu solidarity, detached from colonial authority and instead 
closely linked to memories of pre-colonial times and resistance to Portuguese rule.  
In Protestant educational institutions, the younger generation was taught to be proud 
of their historical heritage. By law everyone was required to speak Portuguese, but the 
local language Umbundu was frequently used in communication and in education on the 
history of Ovimbundu kingdoms in the Protestant schools. The increased use of 
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 Umbundu after 1961 was evidence of a growing solidarity among Ovimbundu.243 In 
contrast to the other streams of nationalism, Ovimbundu nationalists gained 
distinctiveness from the knowledge of local languages, while particularly MPLA 
representatives knew only Portuguese. The oral tradition was particularly important in 
Ovimbundu tradition, as the older generations frequently relied on fables told in 
Umbundu when explaining values to the younger generation. UNITA incorporated this 
tradition into its political program, and used fables to mobilize local supporters. Hence, 
UNITA combined modern guerrilla strategy with traditional culture.244 Many younger 
Ovimbundu observed a clear contradiction between a distinct Ovimbundu legacy, 
disseminated through the Protestant educational institutions, and their parents’ 
assimilation into Portuguese society. They began to question colonial policies and this 
eventually undermined their willingness to accept assimilation.245 When Ovimbundu in 
the late 1950s became increasingly involved in the anti-colonial struggle, the children of 
educated Ovimbundu Protestants were the leading figures. The father of Jonas Savimbi 
for example, Loth Savimbi, was a teacher educated by North-American Protestant 
missionaries. Instead of teaching, however, Loth accepted better-paid employment on 
the railway and gained prominence among the Ovimbundu for establishing churches 
and schools in villages along the Benguela Railway.246  
Benefiting from close contacts with foreign missionaries, many Ovimbundu 
achieved scholarships to study abroad. The initiative to establish a distinct southern-
based liberation movement came from this group. The personal experience with the 
politics of decolonization and Western democracy at European and American 
educational institutions among these initiators, combined with concern for Ovimbundu 
culture, set the standard for a political program based both on tradition and forward-
looking political ideas, which also offers an explanation for the inconsistencies in 
UNITA’s ideology.247 When Jonas Savimbi emerged as the spokesman of the 
southerners in the Angolan exile community in the early 1960s, the dominant 
ideological agendas of Marxism, Pan-Africanism and Socialism were abandoned, in 
favor of regionalism: “To gain legitimacy within the anticolonial struggle, they pushed 
to protect southern interests and worked to secure parity for party positions for their 
members within the movements.”248 The Protestant Ovimbundu background influenced 
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 the crystallization of UNITA as a third force in the Angolan liberation struggle: “[T]he 
Protestant network of schools, meetings, and religious services that had first brought 
the young leaders together helped them to create rapidly a new organization, including 
not only Ovimbundu, but other Angolans (such as those of the east) who had been a part 
of the Protestant mission field.”249 Although diverse regional groups were a part of 
UNITA-administered areas, Savimbi exploited the regionalist sentiments among 
Ovimbundu, and simultaneously propagated his image of a dedicated Angolan 
nationalist, multi-lingual and educated, willing to deal with the same hardship as his 
supporters by living in the bush inside Angola. Thus, nationalism and regionalism were 
pragmatically combined in the genesis of UNITA as a cohesive liberation movement: 
“Crucial to his [Savimbi’s (KS)] success was his reliance on Umbundu ethnic loyalty, 
expressed through language and customs, and his opportunism in portraying UNITA as 
a multi-ethnic movement with long historic ties (through long-distance trading and 
migrant labor) to other parts of Angola and to Zambia, South Africa, and Katanga.”250  
After initial difficulties with coordinating its guerrilla strategy, UNITA applied a 
more coherent strategy from October 1968. UNITA combatants were instructed to 
establish contact with local chiefs and appeal to the sympathies of the peasants by 
referring to their cultural values and economic disadvantages in colonial society.251 
While Portuguese counter-insurgency tactics prevented large-scale infiltration of core 
Ovimbundu areas in the Central Highlands, UNITA successfully recruited supporters 
willing to resettle to newly established UNITA-villages, centered around the Lungue 
Bungu valley in Moxico-province. The organizational principles of Protestant villages 
in the Central Highlands, which had supported the development of Ovimbundu 
solidarity, served as a model for UNITA’s social organization from the early 1970s 
on.252 The village structure significantly influenced the perception of UNITA inside 
Angola, and Heywood concludes that “the villages associated with UNITA helped to 
give the movement an aura of legitimacy.”253 Around this time, Savimbi began to invite 
Western journalists, who came to live with UNITA. In their eyewitness reports, they 
commented on the well-organized UNITA-villages and a high morale among the troops. 
Dash reported to have registered four hospitals and ten elementary schools in UNITA-
controlled areas in 1973.254 With only few troops at its disposal in the early 1970s, 
estimated at 600-800255, the UNITA-administration had to rely on cooperative relations 
with the local population in order to establish territorial control and an area of influence 
at this early stage.  
Beyond the mobilization of local villagers, the organizational structure in UNITA 
was institutionalized on seminal congresses and internal conferences of cadres.256 A 
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 number of policy-making congresses were organized, during which delegates discussed 
strategies, introduced new policies, such as the people’s assemblies of 16 villages, and 
elected members to the central organs, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. 
After the founding Congress in Muangai in 1966, the second UNITA congress was held 
on August 12-30, 1969 and a third congress took place on August 13-19, 1973. Central 
personalities in UNITA’s leadership during these early years were Savimbi as president, 
nicknamed ‘Molowini’ (Son of the People); Miguel N’Zau Puna as Secretary General; 
Samuel Chitunda, whose nom de guerre was Samuel Chingunji, as chief of staff; José 
Samuel Chiwale as General Commander of the Armed Forces; Politbureau members 
Tony DaCosta Fernandes and Jorge Isaac Sangumba, and Savimbi’s close aide Pedro 
‘Tito’ Chingunji. Both N’Zau Puna and Fernandes originated from Cabinda and 
contributed to non-Ovimbundu representation in the top-leadership.  
UNITA’s organizational structure also included a military police, the ’Dragons’, a 
powerful unit responsible for ensuring soldiers’ compliance.257 As the central figure, 
Savimbi was protected by a personal security force, established in 1969, which 
increased from 100 to 400 members within a year.258 UNITA evidently established a 
viable organizational system securing the central control of physical force. With regard 
to the examination of the foundation of legitimacy, however, the question is whether the 
hierarchically organized administration underpinned a rational-legal perception of 
legitimacy in Weber’s terminology. Heywood notes that the establishment of formal 
institutions were, quite frankly, considered necessary for a professional movement: 
“Moreover, by transforming UNITA into a full-fledged hierarchical organization with 
its own flag and symbol (the cockerel), its Central Committee, its youth and women’s 
committee, and its party Congresses, Savimbi equipped UNITA with all the 
prerequisites of a nationalist movement.”259 The unifying symbols (flag, cockerel) 
functioned as symbolic means of orientation, which additionally to the incentives for 
loyalty inherent in the social services provided in the UNITA-villages, contributed to 
the development of a distinct UNITA identity. The preoccupation with establishing a 
hierarchic organization, with spheres of competence, inflicted the impression of 
professionalism. In context of the competition between the three Angolan liberation 
movements, a well-organized organizational structure was a prerequisite for effective 
and legitimate participation in the political struggle. To the extent that a specific 
education was required for UNITA officials, one of Weber’s criteria for rational-legal 
legitimacy, military experience was predominant. At this early stage, it appears that 
UNITA promoted efforts to establish an administration which embodied a form of 
rational-legal foundation of legitimacy.  
The impression of professionalism was enhanced when the UNITA-leadership 
responded skillfully to the changes in Portugal after the coup in April 1974. Savimbi 
traveled extensively and diplomatically advocated a unification of the fragmented 
Angolan forces, while simultaneously emphasizing that the centrist and multi-ethnic 
UNITA-agenda was the best option for a post-independence government.260 During the 
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 negotiations of a transition to independence, UNITA was also severely criticized: In 
July 1974 the pro-MPLA, Paris-based magazine Afrique-Asie published letters 
exchanged between Savimbi and Portuguese officials, which claimed that an alliance 
between UNITA and the Portuguese army had allowed UNITA to operate undisturbed 
in the Lungue Bungu area.261 As a result, UNITA was initially condemned by the FNLA 
and MPLA for signing a truce with the Portuguese in June 1974, shortly before the 
revelation of cooperation with Portugal. In lack of alternatives, the other movements 
soon thereafter followed suit. Instead of preparing for the elections stipulated in the 
Alvor Accord, however, the three rivals engaged in a ferocious arms race and plunged 
into internal war. Aimed at securing their respective regional bases, the FNLA launched 
attacks in the Bakongo-dominated areas; the MPLA in coastal urban areas, while 
UNITA struggled for Ovimbundu representation.262 When the tripartite interim 
government, inaugurated in January 1975, failed, and the prospects of elections 
deteriorated, Savimbi saw his chances of using UNITA’s Ovimbundu constituency as 
an electoral base ruined.263 In this turbulent period, UNITA expanded its influence in 
central Angola and Savimbi fortified his position as the leader of the Ovimbundu, 
evident in the expanding membership of UNITA. In June 1974, UNITA established a 
headquarter in Huambo, in a core Ovimbundu province, and began to create a party 
apparatus in the region. With a strategy of systematically establishing contacts with 
traditional chiefs and young educated Ovimbundu, UNITA attracted supporters based 
both on political persuasion and social pressure.264 From his interviews with 16 ex-
UNITA members in 1989, Minter concluded that the majority of UNITA-recruits 
between 1974-1976 joined UNITA voluntarily because “they saw UNITA as the natural 
movement for their region.”265 Recruits were trained by UNITA-members, veterans 
from the Portuguese army or UNITA-veterans, at training bases inside Angola, but 
some were also sent to Tanzania or Morocco for officer training.266 While UNITA in the 
early 1970s was considered the smallest anti-colonial movement, the increased 
recruitment during the transitional phase led to reports of 10,000 or even 15,000-16,000 
UNITA troops in 1975.267 Thus, the main Ovimbundu support for UNITA crystallized 
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 between 1974-1976. This period was important for the identification of Ovimbundu 
with UNITA and their perception of Savimbi as their legitimate leader: “It was during 
the months following the signing of the cease-fire [1974 (KS)] that Savimbi became the 
de facto leader of the Ovimbundu masses and the dominant force in Ovimbundu 
nationalism.”268  
When the MPLA emerged as the victorious party in 1975, UNITA nonetheless 
threatened to disintegrate. UNITA lost major external backing and suffered heavy losses 
in an attack on Huambo.269 UNITA then retreated to the bush and began its version of 
the counterpart Mao’s ‘Long March’ on February 9, 1976. The march lasted more than 
seven months and was invigorated in the movement’s history as a boost to the morale. 
Tito Chingunji recalled that “All of us who were on the march believed by the end of it 
that the war really could be won.”270 
4.2.2. The UNITA Regime in Jamba: “Terras Libres de Angola”271 
UNITA’s reorganization for continued resistance against the MPLA-state began in late 
1976. A central base was established in Cuelei, but the constant threat of attacks 
required frequent relocation. In 1979, UNITA finally established a permanent 
headquarter in Jamba, situated in the sparsely populated south-eastern province Cuando 
Cubango, close to the border of Namibia.272 From 1976-1979, however, UNITA’s re-
mobilization strategy included frequent visits by Savimbi or other representatives of the 
leadership to villages, particularly in the Central Highlands. Savimbi was greeted with 
singing, dancing and other traditional symbols expressing devotion to his leadership. A 
long-term strategy was recognizable in the efforts to train and educate both civilian and 
military personnel. Soldiers were sent to training camps in Morocco and Namibia, 
young women were sent to Paris to attend secretarial and language courses, and youths 
were sent abroad to study in Portugal, Switzerland, France and the USA, only to return 
years later. An increasing presence of nurses in UNITA-villages in central Angola 
around 1977 improved the ability to provide health services. While some chose to freely 
relocate to UNITA-villages, both the MPLA and UNITA used forceful displacement as 
a tactic to control the mobility of civilians. Caught in the middle between the MPLA 
and UNITA, civilians proved flexible, albeit having no other option but adapting to 
whichever fighting force controlled their area. Additionally, along with the indications 
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 that UNITA approached civilians both with forceful interaction and societal assistance, 
a third factor was the voluntary decision of village chiefs to bring villagers behind 
UNITA. Antonio Vakulakuta, a prominent village leader from the southern Cunene 
province, brought hundred of volunteers to UNITA’s resistance in 1977.273 
During the long march, UNITA had relied on ‘friendly’ villages for both food and 
shelter. Since the relationship between the insurgents and villagers was one of a 
complicated nature, there was always a risk of civilians working as MPLA informants. 
To avoid information leakage, a classification system was developed; according to 
which those loyal to UNITA were allowed to live close to government-controlled areas, 
while others were displaced to areas more difficult to flee, such as the bush.274 With this 
strategy, UNITA institutionalized its authority over civilians by implementing a control 
system.  
During the reorganization in the late 1970s, a new trend occurred in UNITA’s 
administrative structure. Young recruits who had benefited from expanding educational 
opportunities in the last phase of colonial rule, and who also had frequently served in 
the Portuguese army during the 1960s, joined UNITA. Despite the lack of experience 
from fighting against the Portuguese, their technical skills represented a valuable asset 
and, according to Savimbi, contributed decisively to the successful remobilization of the 
movement.275 Having initiated a revitalization of UNITA, in April 1979 the movement 
relocated to Jamba. The rationale for this strategic move was not exclusively the need to 
escape frequent government attacks, from which UNITA suffered heavily. Bordering on 
South African-controlled Namibia, the geographical location offered a cost-effective 
supply route for the delivery of South African aid by land, as an alternative to expensive 
transport by air.276 During the 1980s, UNITA expanded its territorial control and 
established an organizational structure in Jamba, consisting of a president, ministries, an 
army and a sub-level bureaucracy providing a link between villages and the central 
administration. Based on these UNITA governance structures in Jamba, one 
commentator labeled this system of authority the “”Republic” of Jamba”.277 A critical 
commentator, whose antipathy with UNITA leaders has led her to avoid interviews with 
any UNITA-representatives, argues that “Savimbi’s image and the entire creation of 
Jamba was South Africa’s, and on a day to day basis it depended entirely upon Pretoria 
and the CIA.”278 Contrary to this view, it appears that although UNITA relied on 
foreign support, both financially and militarily, the internal organizational structure, 
which ensured sustained cohesiveness, was the entire product of the UNITA leadership.  
In the late 1980s, the population in Jamba was estimated at 8,000 to 10,000, with 
80,000 to 100,000 in the surrounding area. Although UNITA-guerrillas were active in 
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 most Angolan provinces, this did not necessarily imply administrative control. Most 
rural areas became increasingly detached both from the MPLA-state and the alternative 
UNITA-administration during the 1980s. One source assumes that 250,000 people in 
the country as a whole (that is less than five percent out of a population-estimate of 10 
million in the 1970s) was directly or indirectly administered by UNITA. However, in 
1991, an estimated 600,000 to 1 million people lived in UNITA controlled areas.279 
The leadership structure in UNITA continued to consist of a Political Bureau and a 
Central Committee, which arranged three Congresses between 1977 and 1986.280 
During the Jamba-years, central figures in UNITA’s leadership were Savimbi as 
President; N’Zau Puna as Secretary General; Tito Chingunji as former Foreign Minister 
and Politburo member since 1983, who in the late 1980s was stationed in Washington 
D.C.; chief of staff and Savimbi’s nephew Isaac ‘Ben-Ben’ Pena; member of the unit of 
political orientation ‘Block’; secretary of information Jorge Valentim; foreign minister 
Tony DaCosta Fernandes and secretary of education Jaka Jamba.281 With ministries for 
agriculture, natural resources, education and civil administration, a UNITA-bureaucracy 
was established which provided services to the inhabitants in the ‘free lands’. One of the 
services UNITA proudly presented to Western observers was the educational system. In 
1988, UNITA reported to have 975 primary schools and eight secondary schools, as 
well as 300 students abroad. The health sector was also presented as a success, 
including both a central hospital in Jamba, and decentralized military and civilian health 
services. Although these figures must be assessed with the necessary skepticism, 
interviews with eyewitnesses indicate that there was a sustained effort to provide 
community services in UNITA-controlled areas.282 Food production in the Jamba-
system was partly organized on special UNITA-farms, such as the agricultural center in 
Mavinga, or in ‘joint ventures’ with local villagers, for which UNITA provided seeds 
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 against an obligation to hand over a quota of each product.283 When UNITA-troops 
operated in contested areas, food was either ‘taxed’ from UNITA-friendly civilians, or 
looted from government-controlled villages. In addition to food, there were reports on 
looting of cattle and clothing.284 Imports from South Africa contributed to a privileged 
position for the population in and around Jamba. The population in northern Angola, in 
the former FNLA-area of influence, also contributed to the UNITA-system of food 
production. UNITA did not exercise direct administrative control over civilians in the 
northern areas, but provided protection against attacks from the MPLA. In the eastern 
Moxico province, UNITA claimed authority, but frequent reports on mining of 
farmland, led Africa Watch to conclude that UNITA used food deprivation as a 
systematic tactic for denial of livelihood in this region. Another strategy frequently 
applied by UNITA in eastern Angola, was forcible resettlement of civilians who were 
forced to move to Jamba and provide both farming and military services.285 
The civilian organization in the Jamba-era was based on the same structures as in the 
Lungue Bungu-valley during the liberation war, but on a larger scale. In contrast to 
MPLA’s strategy of re-educating local leaders, UNITA incorporated traditional 
structures into the UNITA-system by leaving the village administration with local 
elders. The sekulu, i.e. the village counselor, whose authority was based on wisdom and 
experience, and the ocimbanda, religious practitioners who conducted ceremonial 
services, traditionally comprised the village leadership.286 In alliance with these 
traditional authorities, UNITA managed societal institutions, schools, health services 
and churches, in rural villages. In return, villagers mobilized food and gathered 
intelligence for UNITA. Religious institutions were also included in UNITA’s system 
of domination, due to the incorporation of traditional Ovimbundu beliefs in the 
Protestant missionary villages. Protestant leaders played a central role in administering, 
as well as training and mobilizing support from non-Ovimbundu inhabitants.287 Hence, 
UNITA relied on the well-established Protestant structures in combination with 
traditional beliefs for the organization of a civilian administration. With this strategy, 
UNITA established a common interest with local authorities, thereby ensuring the 
loyalty of central figures. The central role of these traditional individuals underlined 
UNITA’s legitimacy, as it “ guaranteed him [Savimbi (KS)] the allegiance of the 
villagers who still regarded the sekulus and ocimbandas as legitimate political 
representatives.”288 In addition to these links to rural society, UNITA administered a 
political program and appointed political activists to mobilize civilians by criticizing the 
                                                 
 
 
283  Bridgland describes a farm jointly owned by UNITA and villagers, where the villagers worked one 
day a week for UNITA in exchange for which they were allowed to use the tractor on private land. 
Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 402.  
284  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 219.  
285  Africa Watched reported extensively on forceful practices by UNITA, see Africa Watch: Angola, 
1989 and Africa Watch: Angola, 1991.  
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288  Heywood, Linda: Towards an Understanding of Modern Political Ideology in Africa: The Case of the 
Ovimbundu of Angola. In: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36 (1), 1998 (pp. 139-167), p. 
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 MPLA-state. Africa Watch reported on especially assigned organizers, so-called 
animadores, who visited villages to inform about UNITA and the political situation and 
provided goods, such as clothing, food, pots and pans, to the villagers.289 The planning 
of the northern offensive provided further insight into the local focus in UNITA’s 
political program. Before UNITA established cooperative relations with the Bakongo, 
UNITA officers frequently visited the region, interacted with the people and made tape-
recordings, which were then sent to the ‘cultural unit’ in Jamba.290 Thus, UNITA 
supplemented the Ovimbundu traditions and Protestant structures with modern 
strategies of political mobilization. In spite of voluntary support for UNITA, however, 
numerous reports on forcible resettlement revealed that kidnapping was also a UNITA 
strategy for building a social base. In this context, Minter’s lesson from his extensive 
comparative study of the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique must be recalled: 
“The success of guerrilla armies, as that of conventional armies, does not necessarily 
depend on extensive voluntary mobilization of civilians.”291 
The functioning of the military factor in the Jamba-regime was also based both on 
political mobilization and disciplinarian mechanisms.292 During the 1980s, recruits 
were, in contrast to the majority of volunteers in the period 1974-76, mainly forced to 
serve. Frequent practices were the conscription of recruits living in UNITA-zones or 
abduction from government-controlled areas. Due to the predominance of force in the 
recruitment process after 1980, Minter labeled this the ‘second generation’ of UNITA 
soldiers. In the military training, recruits learned that desertion would be punished with 
execution, and eyewitness reports confirmed such practices. In order to hinder recruits 
from fleeing, UNITA applied a strategy of relocation, separating recruits from their 
home communities to areas where both terrain and often also the local languages were 
unknown to them. Escaping from Jamba was difficult, due to the location far away from 
populated areas. The technical training of recruits was well organized with three months 
basic training and six months specialized training.293 Training camps were situated 
around Jamba, close to the Namibian border, with both UNITA and South African 
officers as instructors. The training included political justification of the UNITA-cause. 
In the highly politicized environment, political education was the central mechanism for 
mobilization, with the use of physical force as a subordinate sanctioning mechanism. 
With regard to the payment of UNITA-recruits, there were contradictory reports on both 
lack of payment and regular pay.294 The military service offered rewards, however, such 
                                                 
 
 
289  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 219 and Africa Watch: Angola, 1989, pp. 95-96. Africa 
Watch reports on several ‘information’ meetings between civilians and UNITA, e.g. Africa Watch: 
Angola, 1989, p. 92 and Africa Watch: Angola, 1991, pp. 11-12. 
290  Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 597-598. Apparently, UNITA was recording information on 
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such material was not encountered in any other sources, but if they exist, they would be an interesting 
source on UNITA’s system of organization and Angolan history.  
291  Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 288. 
292  On the military factor, see Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, pp. 172-203, unless otherwise noted. 
293  Africa Watch added that UNITA-recruits were instructed in aspects relevant to human rights 
protection during warfare, such as respect for signals of surrender and not to destroy peoples’ corps. 
The application of such practices, however, is a critical question. Cf. Africa Watch: Angola, 1989, p. 
67. 
294  Bridgland referred to an unpaid UNITA-army, while AC in 1989 reported on regular payments. It is 
imaginable that a change in payment occurred in the late 1980s, but such speculations could not be 
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 as advancement, overseas military and civilian training, medical care and the prospect 
of power after victory. In comparison to the average soldier, the military leadership was 
privileged. Officers experienced relative autonomy in the conduct of warfare and had 
close contact with Savimbi.295 During the 1980s, however, the deployment of SADF 
was of considerable importance to UNITA’s military performance. In contrast to the 
descriptions of a well-organized UNITA force, including both semi-regular forces, 
guerrillas and special forces, analyses of South Africa’s involvement impart the image 
that UNITA generally played a supplementary role, and was subordinate to SADF in the 
conduct of military operations.296 
Beyond the well-organized social services, military training and unifying UNITA-
symbols in the Jamba quasi-state, allegations of tactical use of physical force against 
critics from within, surfaced in the late 1980s. In 1988, UNITA defectors in Portugal 
first informed external analysts about their eyewitness observations of corporal 
punishment.297 According to these allegations, tactical use of physical force, including 
beating, killing and burning families alive after witchcraft accusations, was a deliberate 
strategy to eliminate prominent figures seen as a potential challenge to Savimbi’s 
indisputable authority. Two witchburning incidents were reported, which took place in 
March 1982 and September 1983, to which also eyewitnesses referred.298 In a public 
session on the Party Congress in 1982, the alleged ‘reactionaries’ Tony Fernandes, 
Samuel Chiwale and Colonel Kanjungu were severely beaten, but also other leaders 
were allegedly killed on Savimbi’s orders in the early 1980s. Linked to a dispute 
between Savimbi and the regional leader Vakulakuta from 1984, followed by 
Vakulakuta’s death, dissatisfaction with an increasing predominance of Ovimbundu-
representation within the movement also emerged during the 1980s.299 The most 
spectacular case of hindering an emergent individual power base within UNITA’s 
leadership was the eviction of one of UNITA’s most prominent families, the Chingunji-
family. This severe incident attracted international media attention in the early 1990s, 
when the popular former UNITA-representative in the US, Tito Chingunji, was detained 
and later killed in Jamba.300 While Savimbi throughout the 1980s was able to sustain his 
                                                                                                                                               
verified. Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 391 and p. 413 and AC: Angola: War and Peace in 
the MPLA, Vol. 30, No. 16, 1989 (pp. 1-2), p. 2.  
295  Cf. Bridgland, Fred: A War for Africa, 1990, p. 383. Bridgland’s description of UNITA (pp. 381-
388) in this book was based on the memories of SADF Colonel Fred Oelsig, who worked with 
Savimbi from 1986 to 1989. 
296  Cf. Minter, William: Glimpses of the War in Angola: Three South African Accounts… A Review 
Article. In: Africa Today, Vol. 39, Nos. 1&2, 1992 (pp. 130-134). Minter’s statement results from his 
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297  Cf. Randal, Jonathan C.: New Reports Charge Abuses By UNITA Rebels in Angola. In: The 
Washington Post, March 14,1989, p. A20 and Dash, Leon: Blood and Fire: Savimbi’s War Against 
His UNITA Rivals. In: The Washington Post, September 30, 1990, p. D1.  
298  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 222. UNITA also established own villages for witches, 
which suggests that the practice of recognizing witches was not such a rare incident. Cf. Ibid., p. 224 
and Heywood: Towards an Understanding, 1998, p. 165. 
299  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 220, p. 224. After he deserted N’Zau Puna denied 
Savimbi’s personal responsibility for Vakulakuta’s death.  
300  Tito was killed together with Wilson dos Santos and members of their families in 1991. Heywood 
refers to allegations that 35 members of the Chingunji-family were eliminated between 1980 and 
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 hegemony over UNITA with a stable, cohesive second-rank leadership, mainly 
including N’Zau Puna, Tito, Tony Fernandes and Jeremias Chitunda, the first high-
profile defection occurred in the run-up to the elections in 1992. UNITA co-founder 
Fernandes and long-time Secretary General N’Zau Puna, two central cadres from 
Cabinda, defected in early 1992. They held Savimbi personally responsible for the 
deaths of Tito Chingunji and Wilson Dos Santos.301 When Jeremias Chitunda died in an 
attempt to escape from Luanda after violent clashes broke out after the election in 1992, 
Savimbi was forced to rely on other top leaders.  
The contradiction is obvious between the evidence of a well-organized Jamba-
Republic, providing social services, and the brutal eviction of political opponents and 
tactical use of repression. Some commentators have therefore referred to Jamba as a 
Potemkin village.302 The inconsistency of the social organization on the one hand, and 
the terror machine on the other, did, however, not necessarily delegitimize UNITA as a 
system of domination. Although the terror practices were severely inhumane and 
undemocratic, they indicated the existence of other, alternative restrictions of legitimate 
authority. In his sociology of domination, Weber elaborated on the elastic restrictions of 
traditional authority, where customs and norms define the limit of subordinates’ 
tolerance of a ruler’s behavior. Based on the perception of what constitutes a break with 
tradition, however, the ruler must be sensitive to the prospect of retainers and civilians 
interpreting the traditional framework differently. Considering the fact that internal 
disparities among leading representatives in UNITA first emerged after 1988, with the 
first high-profile defections in 1992, it is presumable that elements of the terror tactics 
in the earlier years did not initially offend members of the cadres to such an extent that 
they decided in favor of defection. The terror tactics were not unknown to inhabitants in 
Jamba and surrounding areas, as eyewitness accounts demonstrate. A focus on the 
traditional legitimacy of the UNITA-system of domination helps explaining the 
functioning of the system and the coexistence of inconsistent practices, i.e. terror versus 
social services. Heywood supplies the basis for an alternative interpretation.303 
A core principle in traditional Ovimbundu political ideology, which was 
characteristic for most rural Angolans, is a dichotomous conception of political 
authority, comprising both a blacksmith king and a hunter king. The blacksmith king 
represented consultative qualities and attempted to achieve consensus in decision-
making processes. On the contrary, the hunter king represented absolutist principles and 
ruled in an independent, autocratic style. For the benefit of the common good, autocratic 
                                                                                                                                               
1991. Minter indicates that the eviction of the Chingunji-family began in 1974, but notes that these 
allegations could be retrospective explanations for natural deaths. Savimbi and the Chingunji-family 
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Potemkin village which functioned as “the centre of a highly organised and repressive terror 
machine” Brittain: Death of Dignity, 1998, p. 12.  
303  The following section is based primarily on Heywood: Towards an Understanding, 1998. 
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 practices were accepted. In addition to the ideal of a blacksmith and a hunter king, 
rulers were perceived as possessors of supernatural qualities, exercised through magic 
and witchcraft.304 Witchcraft accusations functioned as an instrument of social 
sanctioning and could also result in the elimination of the autocratic ruler, justified by 
charges of what “people regarded as overstepping his constitutional power.”305 The 
nature of this restriction defined the limits of manipulation, in consistence with Weber’s 
theory of traditional legitimacy. Witchcraft trials were thus “a critique of personal 
behavior, not a critique of the authoritarian concept of power”306, which is also a 
fundamental principle in Weber’s theory. The two antagonistic conceptions of political 
leadership, the absolutist hunter and the more democratic blacksmith king, exercised 
parallel influence on Ovimbundu political ideology. During colonial rule, this two-fold 
principle of political domination continued to influence Ovimbundu political beliefs. 
Foreign missionaries strengthened the blacksmith-component, due to the general 
principles of democracy and self-help in the church practices of foreign Protestant 
missionaries. Core traditional political beliefs nevertheless sustained as traditional 
norms and beliefs were incorporated into Protestant institutions managed by 
Ovimbundu. The autocratic elements in Savimbi’s leadership were therefore legitimized 
by the concept of the hunter king. As a leader, Savimbi possessed the ability to 
recognize witches and separate them from society, justified both by the necessity of the 
ruler to defend the common good and Savimbi’s image as an unselfish ruler. The 
defections in 1992, almost a decade after the alleged witchcraft burnings took place, 
may therefore have “less to do with their [the defectors’ (KS)] distaste for the 
witchcraft aspects of the traditional African ideology, and more to do with their 
resentment that Savimbi was using his power for personal aggrandisement.”307 
Heywood notes the impossibility of demonstrating a direct link between the sustenance 
of Savimbi’s authority and the use of traditions in UNITA’s system of domination, but 
concludes that “no one can doubt, however, that Savimbi’s willingness to incorporate 
rituals and beliefs from the Ovimbundu past helped to legitimise his rôle as one of the 
architects of modern Angolan nationalism.”308 The assessment of traditional beliefs in 
context of UNITA’s political structure demands a careful consideration of the 
distinction between manipulation and legitimization. In the following section, we 
examine how these tendencies influenced UNITA’s ‘social order’ in the 1990s. 
4.2.3. “Nem guerra, nem paz”309: UNITA Negotiating for Legitimate Access to State-
Power 
Throughout the 1990s, the political structure of UNITA’s ‘social order’ was dominated 
by a tendency towards fragmentation. Coinciding with this internal development, 
UNITA was a party to high-stake negotiations aimed at achieving a viable political 
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 agreement on peace in Angola. In the turbulence over political deals on the division of 
power and influence, disagreements emerged, not only in relation to the other main 
protagonist MPLA, but also within the movement. The internal disparities in UNITA 
are therefore seen as a consequence of the attempt to transform UNITA from a “war 
machine to political contender.”310  
Shortly after the election in September 1992, observers began to see the contours of 
two factions within UNITA: A political unit wanting to stay within the political process, 
despite electoral defeat, and a second unit in favor of a renewed military campaign.311 
The militarist faction clearly decided on UNITA’s strategy in the subsequent phase, as 
fighting resumed in late 1992. The Lusaka Protocol reportedly undermined the internal 
cohesion among UNITA cadres, as two camps of ‘moderates’ and ‘hardliners’ clashed 
on the eighth party congress in Bailundu in 1995, evident in a growing division between 
a ‘Huambo-camp’ and a ‘Bié and Benguela-camp’.312 Party congresses continued to 
take place during the 1990s, the seventh in Jamba in March 1991 and the eighth in 
1995.313 While the ‘Bié and Benguela-camp’ was close to Savimbi in earlier years, their 
involvement in the negotiations of the Lusaka Protocol reduced their influence. The 
central UNITA-negotiators, Secretary General Eugenio Ngolo ‘Manuvakola’ was 
penalized within the UNITA system, as the Protocol was considered a compromise with 
the government, which did not pay justice to UNITA’s military superiority at that 
time.314 Many of the formerly prominent representatives in UNITA’s administration 
were subsequently replaced by members of the ‘Huambo-camp’, described by reporters 
as less conciliatory. General Gato, who replaced Manuvakola as Secretary General in 
1995, was referred to as one who “see[s] peace with Luanda as compromising UNITA 
and also as a threat to their [UNITA cadres’ (KS)] personal security.”315 Three months 
later, however, observers reported differences between a ‘conciliatory’ Savimbi, 
actively performing on the international diplomatic arena, and ‘his hardline military’.316 
Although this development was rejected as a bargaining ploy, it further underlined the 
turbulence within a leadership partaking in high-stake negotiations for legitimate access 
to the state. The impression of a diminishing cohesion within the UNITA-leadership 
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316  Cf. AC: Angola: Inside the Tent, Vol. 36, No. 14, 1995, pp. 5-6.  
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 was reinforced when a high-level UNITA-representative defected in 1995.317 The 
fractionalization between moderates and hardliners began to take form in 1997, when 70 
UNITA-deputies took their seats in the National Assembly, in accordance with the 
election results from 1992. Four UNITA-members were appointed ministers and 7 
Vice-Ministers, to the national government of unity, the Governo da Unidade e de 
Reconciliaçâo de Angola (GURN), inaugurated on April 11, 1997. Influential 
personalities within UNITA’s political structure, such as Jorge Valentim, Abel 
Chivukuvuku, Jaka Jamba, Isaías Samakuva, Demóstenes Chilingutila and Ben-Ben 
now resided in the capital Luanda and participated actively in civilian politics. Savimbi 
was based in the Central Highlands, moving between Andulo and Bailundo, and relied 
on a group of military hardliners for decisions on UNITA’s future strategies. Savimbi’s 
group included Secretary-General Gato, Vice-President Antonio Dembo, and the 
Generals Bock and ‘Numa’. A growing division between “UNITA-Luanda” and 
“UNITA-Bailundo” was recognized, as the Luanda-branch allegedly enjoyed “good life 
in Luanda”, while the atmosphere in Bailundo was described as “isolated and mired in 
paranoia. Now there are reports of heavy drinking, bitter arguments and detentions.”318 
The ultimate break between the two camps came in 1998 when a ‘renewed’ party, 
UNITA Renovada (UNITA-R), was launched under the leadership of Jorge Valentim. 
The MPLA-government played a central role in the initiation of this new party, and was 
believed to have granted the five founders of UNITA-R three million US dollars 
each.319 By isolating the militarist camp around Savimbi and directing attention 
exclusively to UNITA-R, the government intended to continue the implementation of 
the Lusaka Protocol without further delay. Prior to the public announcement of the new 
party, the government on August 31, 1998 suspended UNITA-ministers and deputies, 
and stopped the supply of services (salaries, electricity, telephone, transport) to those 
refusing to disassociate themselves from Savimbi.320 With such an obvious link to the 
government, UNITA-R failed to establish a credible challenge to Savimbi’s Bailundo-
faction, and several central UNITA-representatives in Luanda refused to join the new 
party. The fragmentation of the Luanda-camp was obvious when the leader of the 
UNITA-members of parliament, Abel Chivukuvuku in November 1998 announced a 
further UNITA faction and rejected both UNITA-R and Savimbi’s camp. As a well-
respected politician in Luanda, abroad and among UNITA members, Chivukuvuku 
represented a potentially serious challenge to Savimbi‘s leadership.321 However, also 
Chivukuvuku failed to recruit influential supporters, and consequently, the Luanda-
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 camp appeared fractionalized and lame. The beneficiaries of this development within 
UNITA’s Luanda-camp were the MPLA-government, who managed to paralyze a 
potentially powerful opposition, and Savimbi: “There [in Luanda (KS)], the 
government, mixing blandishment and patronage, has divided UNITA into rival 
factions, while Savimbi is using the crisis to purge potential opponents from the 
party.”322 The pattern of fragmentation in UNITA recently consolidated and in 2001, 
five factions were recognized.323 Firstly, the militarist oriented UNITA-Savimbi was 
recognized as the dominant faction. In tight co-operation with ‘Gato’, Savimbi 
continuously opted for a military solution, and infrequently expressed willingness to 
negotiate. The MPLA-sponsored UNITA-R, now with Manuvakola as the leading figure, 
fell into political oblivion. Abel Chivukuvuku continues to gather support for his 
candidacy as a ‘presidential hopeful’, thus the label UNITA-Autonome. Yet another 
faction in Luanda, UNITA-Luanda, was critical to Savimbi’s militarist faction, but its 
leader, Jaka Jamba, refused to initiate a government-influenced party. Among UNITA’s 
international representatives, UNITA-International, there were indications of 
increasingly tense relations with Savimbi.324 In this state of fragmentation, Savimbi was 
forced to rely on a diminished number of trusted aides as well as on a new generation of 
UNITA-leaders. While most cadres during the 1980s were either among the founding 
members of UNITA (first generation) or joined the insurgent movement during the re-
mobilization in 1974-1976 (second generation), most UNITA commanders are now 
young. This ’third generation’ was brought up in UNITA-controlled zones and educated 
in Jamba or on UNITA-scholarships abroad, and this dependence on the movement has 
eventually ensured their loyalty.325 Central figures in Savimbi’s immediate leadership 
since the mid-1990s, were Vice-President Dembo, Secretary General Gato, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Alcides Sakala, Chief of Staff General Geraldo Abreu ‘Kamorteiro’ and 
General Esteves ‘Kamy’ Pena.326 An increasing centralization in the 1990s was 
intended to secure the continued functioning of the administration, and “Savimbi’s 
personal grip means that even the most highly placed defectors cannot give the 
government precise information.”327 Savimbi’s concern for domination, not only within 
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 UNITA, but in the general restructuring of the Angolan political system, was apparent 
when he denied the position as Vice-President, offered to him by the MPLA-
government.328 The centralization of power within UNITA was based on the principle 
of keeping knowledge about the different administrative units at an absolute minimum. 
The internal administration operates in a cell structure with marginal horizontal 
coordination. There are four political commissions, but these are all subordinated to the 
‘General Political Commission’, chaired by Savimbi, who is responsible for the 
coordination of all activities. Consequently, the General Commission also functions as a 
central internal control mechanism.329  
The increasing centralization of UNITA during the 1990s led to frequent comments 
on Savimbi’s hegemony over the movement, illustrated by headlines such as “Savimbi’s 
War” and “Savimbi’s Personality Drives Angolan War”.330 With reference to the 
“psychological make-up of Savimbi” Hodges states that “[h]is [Savimbi’s (KS)] role in 
the Angolan conflict confirms the importance of the individual in history.”331 Yet 
another scholar notes that “up to 100,000 people had been killed – all in the name of 
one man’s [Savimbi’s (KS)] pride.”332 Savimbi’s absolute power is seen as a result also 
of his charismatic qualities legitimizing the control apparatus: “This is a product partly 
of his personal charisma and genuine leadership qualities, but it is reinforced by a 
fearsome security apparatus, a culture of zero tolerance of dissent and a personality 
cult that has parallels with those of Mao Tse-Tung and Kim Il-Sung.”333 However, the 
role of Savimbi must be assessed in context of the institutionalized system, within 
which this personality operated – a system of power, profit and protection. In his 
elaboration of charismatic domination, Weber noted the difficulty of installing charisma 
as a sustainable form of authority, as charisma tends to be transformed into traditional 
or legal-rational forms of domination. The potential universal character of charisma, 
however, implies that charismatic qualities influence other forms of authority. This is 
the function that Savimbi’s charisma has fulfilled in UNITA’s system of authority: 
Savimbi’s charismatic qualities were beneficial to the functioning of the UNITA ‘social 
order’, but has had a subordinate function in comparison to the traditional basis of 
legitimacy and the control system of the organizational apparatus. A central institution, 
designed to ensure the internal cohesiveness in the UNITA-administration is the 
                                                 
 
 
328  A UNITA-representative explained why Savimbi denied the vice-presidency: “[F]rom the 
government’s point of view, the idea was simply, look, you come here, we give you the vice-
presidency, we give you five Mercedes… and just forget about everything else. From that perspective 
it [was] difficult for somebody like [Savimbi] to take it. It is very hard to simply come out and to say 
now you are the vice-president but all you do is you wake up in the morning, you read the papers and 
then you look at your Mercedes.” Spears, Ian S.: Angola: A Backgrounder. In: Southern Africa 
Report (Toronto), Vol. 15, No. 1, 1999 (pp. 7-9), p. 8. 
329  Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 18 and 22. The four political commissions focus on 
political strategy and external relations; administration of areas under UNITA-control, production 
and financial management; security and juridical issues, and the coordination of political and military 
issues respectively. 
330  Cf. “Savimbi’s War” (“Savimbi’s krig”) in the Third World Magazine-X, 6, 2000, retrieved July 1, 
2001 from http://solidaritetshuset.org/x/0006/savimbi.html and “Savimbi’s Personality Drives 
Angolan War” in The Financial Gazette, South Africa, October 21, 1999, retrieved September 25, 
2001 from www.cyberplexafrica.com/fingaz/99/stage/archive/991020/briefing-index.htm. 
331  Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, p. 19. 
332  Russel: Big Men, Little People, 2000, p. 104. 
333  Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, p. 18. 
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 Brigada de Informaçao Geral (BIG).334 BIG recruits agents within UNITA’s 
operational command structure, in units abroad and in other UNITA cells to observe the 
work of their colleagues and report on disobedient behavior and suspicious information. 
Thus, BIG represents an internal ‘Soviet-style’ control system. The existence of this 
system indicates that intimidation is a central disciplinarian practice within the 
movement.  
UNITA’s military strategy was subject to considerable changes during the 1990s. 
When UNITA in 1992 resumed fighting as a consequence of the, according to UNITA, 
fraudulent election, the tactic was to attack urban areas and undermine the state 
administration of the country. UNITA’s military advances resulted in speculations about 
partition as UNITA’s strategic objective.335 In the renewed military campaign in 1998, 
UNITA aimed at destabilization, by forcing civilians to flee the countryside into the 
already overcrowded cities, referred to as “victory by social explosion.”336 In pursuit of 
this tactic, UNITA committed brutal atrocities against civilians. Although frequent 
mutilations and indiscriminate use of landmines demonstrate UNITA’s authority over 
civilian life, such practices must be examined with regard to its functions: forcible 
recruitment and kidnapping of women and children are mechanisms sustaining 
UNITA’s military apparatus.337 Estimates of UNITA-troops in 1995 amounted to 
60,000 soldiers, but in 1998 western intelligence sources suggested 15,000 high-caliber 
troops and 10,000 support forces.338 During the 1990s, many UNITA commanders 
joined the reorganized government forces, the FAA, and in 1996, one third of the top 
generals in the Angolan army were reportedly ex-UNITA.339 The government advances 
in the Central Highlands in 1999 inflicted problems on UNITA’s command and 
infrastructure located in the area. The government also launched a strategy aimed at 
depopulating the country-side, in order to deny UNITA access to food provided by 
civilians. Reports on UNITA-military units operating autonomously, indicated a 
deteriorating centralized control.340 Consequently, UNITA’s dominance over provinces 
became questionable in the late 1990s. Certain localities remained under UNITA-
control however, and the UN reported in 2001 that UNITA had safe havens at their 
                                                 
 
 
334  BIG is one of two units comprising UNITA’s intelligence unit. The second one is the Service for 
Clandestine Intelligence (clandestinidade), operating primarily in urban areas gathering information 
on the government. See Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 26-27. 
335  In an effort to mediate between the MPLA and UNITA in the tense situation after the elections in 
1992, South Africa proposed a federalized system with a strong “UNITA-state” as a political solution 
to the conflict. Cf. Tvedten, Inge: The Angolan Debacle. In: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
1993 (pp. 108-118), pp. 115-116. 
336  AC: Angola: Savimbi’s Splitters, Vol. 40, No. 14, 1999, p. 6. See also AC: Angola: War Drums 
Sounding, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3.  
337  “UNITA’s rape and enslavement of women and girls for sex is not only a vicious expression of power 
over the individual, but also a means of expressing dominance over the community and acts as a 
rewards system for UNITA soldiers and commanders.” HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, p. 53 
338  Cf. AC: Angola: War Drums Sounding, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3 and AC: Angola: Inside the 
Tent. Vol. 36, No. 14, 1995, pp. 5-6. Currently, as the demobilization of UNITA-troops is being 
prepared, 50,000 UNITA soldiers is frequently cited. This (over-)estimation presumably includes a 
number of ‘support forces’, among them many civilians, with only rudimentary training.  
339  Cf. Brittain, Victoria: Angola: It’s Not Over. In: Southern Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1996 (pp. 3-
7), p. 6. 
340  Cf. AC: Angola: War Drums Sounding, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3. 
 68
 disposal in the north and the northeast.341 Observers assessed the military situation: 
“UNITA’s army isn’t as strong as it was in 1993 and the government’s isn’t as weak. 
UNITA is overstretched and with a serious recruitment problem and divisions in the 
leadership over Savimbi’s strategy.”342 Recent reports on the reorganization of 
UNITA’s military regions indicated a continuously functioning central commando, 
despite lack of vast territorial control in late 2001.343 As a constant destabilizing factor 
in most of the country’s provinces, particularly in Moxico and the Central Highlands, as 
well as in areas close to the capital, UNITA continued to prevent the stabilization of 
government control.344 
In this environment of insecurity, UNITA continued to organize civilian 
administration in many regions until the late 1990s. In 1993, UNITA moved its 
headquarters from Jamba to Huambo, and from Huambo to Andulo and Bailundo in late 
1994. In mid-1993, UNITA was reported to uphold their valuable relations to village 
representatives, who provided food, shelter and soldiers in return for assistance with 
educational and health services.345 The election results from 1992, see appendix IV, also 
indicated a continuous solid civilian support-base for UNITA: among its core 
constituency in the Central Highlands, in the provinces Huambo, Bié, Benguela and 
Cuando Cubango, UNITA won a majority-vote of 57 percent, while MPLA won 30 
percent in these provinces.346 In all other provinces, however, MPLA won, as UNITA 
lost in northern, eastern and southern regions, where they had expected victory.347 In 
rural areas, where the support for UNITA was most profound, UNITA’s social 
organization continued to function throughout the 1990s. The governing of urban areas, 
however, proved troublesome. In Huambo, controlled by UNITA from March 1993 to 
November 1994, it was difficult to activate civil servants, many of whom had not 
received their salary in months. UNITA’s inability to establish a functioning 
administration led to criticism of lack of interest in civilian structures.348 However, in a 
town south of Huambo, Caala, UNITA soon established its own courts, security forces 
and a taxation system.349 UNITA’s difficulties with the administration of urban centers 
were explained with reference to the sharp distinction between an urban economy and 
the subsistence economy in Jamba, and the troublesome transformation from an 
insurgent movement to a democratic player: “UNITA is trapped by its past. It is a 
peasant-based guerrilla movement which has outgrown its military success but does not 
have the structures to convert to government.”350 UNITA managed to sustain an 
administrative and an economic base, but in the latter half of the 1990s, tactically 
                                                 
 
 
341  See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola (S/2001/351), April 11, 
2001, paragraph 16. See also Final-Report 2000, paragraph 15. 
342  AC: Angola: The UN Tries Again. Vol. 40, No. 19, 1999 (pp. 1-3), p. 3.  
343  Cf. SouthScan: Angola: Savimbi ‘set up new UNITA military structure’. Vol. 15, No. 7, 2000 pp. 55-
56 and Supplementary-Report 2001, paragraph 20. 
344  Cf. The Economist: Angola’s War. From a Scorched Land, A Hint of Peace, Vol. 362, No. 8260, Feb. 
16th-22nd, 2002, p. 41. 
345  Cf. AC: Angola: Hope from Abidjan, Vol. 34, No. 9, 1993, pp. 6-7. 
346  Cf. Marcum, John: Angola: War Again. In: Current History, Vol. 92, No. 574, 1993 (pp. 218-223).  
347  In its core constituencies, Luanda, Bengo, Malanje and Cuanza Norte, MPLA won 73 percent and 
UNITA 16 percent. In aggregate, MPLA 54 percent and UNITA 33 percent. Ibid. 
348  Cf. Brittain, Victoria: Angola: It’s Not Over. In: Southern Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1996, p. 7. 
349  Cf. AC: Angola: Hope from Abidjan, Vol. 34, No. 9, 1993, pp. 6-7. 
350  Cf. Ibid., p. 7. 
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 avoided capturing cities, which implied responsibility for civilians.351 UNITA’s 
administration of Jamba also deteriorated, with 40,000 civilians reportedly lacking food 
in 1996, while also being denied freedom of movement by UNITA.352 Troops were 
relocated to the strategically important diamond areas in the northern provinces, while 
4,000 civilians remained in Jamba in 1999, continuously suffering from lack of food 
and medicine.353 UNITA’s civilian organization prevailed, however, in crisis situations, 
as the escape both from Andulo and Jamba prior to government attacks in 1999 was 
organized by UNITA. The UN also reported that UNITA-structures were upheld in the 
Nangweshi refugee camp in Zambia, a camp established to care for the refugees from 
Jamba, and expressed concern about UNITA using the camp as a logistic base and 
recruitment center.354 Although UNITA continuously influenced civilian forms of 
organization, its ability to establish a stable administration with functioning educational 
and health services, yet protection and a centralized control of use of physical force, had 
vehemently deteriorated or even perhaps becoming non-existent in the late 1990s. Even 
issues such as protection and centralized control of physical force had become a 
difficult for UNITA to bear. In late 1997, UNITA’s relationship with traditional 
representatives was increasingly tense and there were numerous reports of UNITA 
killing and publicly executing traditional chiefs.355 In 2001, the UN concluded that 
“with possibly a few exceptions, there is no longer any civilian/administrative UNITA 
organization of importance in the country.”356 
Summary: UNITA’s Political Structure 
A continuous factor in UNITA’s political structure was the village system. The 
organization of community institutions, an agricultural system and the concern for local 
tradition, culture and language were the pillars of these UNITA-villages. Local chiefs 
and traditionally authoritative figures had a central position within the village 
administration, which urged the development of a common interest between the local 
elite and UNITA, both benefiting from the prevalence of this system. The mobilization 
of local responsibility implied that UNITA primarily functioned as a sovereign control 
organ, which also included indiscriminate use of physical force. With regard to the 
perception of legitimacy, the village structure provided both materialistic and idealistic 
incentives for civilian support of UNITA, criteria recognized in the theoretical 
framework in chapter two. UNITA-soldiers profited from well-organized training 
programs, including political justification, and access to medical care. Despite these 
benefits, broad scale voluntary recruitment was dominant only during the 
transformation to independence, succeeded by abduction as the main recruitment 
strategy during the 1980s and 1990s. Concerning the balance between repression and 
legitimacy, UNITA established a monopoly on use of physical force, a military police 
and a secret agent system, which functioned as permanent control mechanisms within 
the UNITA ‘social order’. This control system did, however, not necessarily 
delegitimize UNITA’s authority, due to the prevalence of traditional political ideology 
                                                 
 
 
351  Cf. AC: Angola I: Shell-shocked, Vol. 40, No. 8, 1999, pp. 5-6. 
352  Cf. HRW: Angola. Between War and Peace, 1996, pp. 27-28.  
353  Cf. HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, pp. 63-64.  
354  Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 30 and 33. 
355  Cf. HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, p. 63. 
356  Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 21. 
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 and the acceptance of authoritarian practices in times of crisis. While civilians generally 
did not have much choice, although continued support for UNITA was evident in the 
1992 election results, a significant aspect with regard to the brutality of UNITA’s 
control system, is the reason why high-stake defections did not occur until the early 
1990s, despite knowledge about the nature of the system. The privileged members of 
UNITA’s leadership experienced incentives to be loyal to UNITA, and the internal 
turbulence in the 1990s must therefore be further examined in context of economic 
aspects.  
The village structure and its traditional underpinning primarily contributed to 
UNITA’s legitimacy. UNITA’s efforts to establish a rational-legal foundation of 
legitimacy began early, but despite sustained efforts, rational-legal aspects were not a 
main foundation of legitimacy in UNITA’s system of domination. The charismatic 
qualities of Savimbi must be seen in context of the two other types of legitimacy. 
Savimbi’s charisma was beneficial, but not superior to other functional mechanisms 
such as the control system and the centralized administration. Despite the 
institutionalization of UNITA’s domination, the foundation of legitimacy remained 
primarily traditional. 
4.3. The Economic Structure of the UNITA ’Social Order’ 
During the last decade, UNITA’s involvement in the international diamond trade has 
evoked a debate on the complicity of international corporations and national 
governments in internal wars.357 As the world’s fourth largest diamond producer by 
value, Angola possesses a lucrative potential for the international diamond industry.358 
The economic successes of UNITA have been guaranteed by the insurgents’ ability to 
extract and market diamonds. Primary analytical interest here is in the composition and 
the management of UNITA’s economic structure. In the theoretical framework (Ch. 
3.1.2.), two dimensions were identified, which must be successfully combined as a 
prerequisite to a viable insurgent economy: firstly, the internal dimension of organizing 
the extraction of domestic resources, and secondly, the internal-external dimension of 
interacting with foreign business representatives. The economic dependence on 
exchange with the external environment, in order to achieve access to necessary military 
and non-military equipment, represents a potentially significant external influence on 
the internal functioning of the insurgent ‘social order’. In the following section, both the 
internal and the internal-external dimension of UNITA’s economic structure are 
examined, before and after the peace agreement from Bicesse 1991.  
4.3.1. UNITA Establishing an Economic Structure, 1966-1991 
In accordance with Mao’s theory of guerrilla warfare, the UNITA-leadership 
institutionalized self-sufficiency as a dominant principle in their economic system from 
                                                 
 
 
357  The British NGO Global Witness has played a prominent role in drawing attention to this issue. See 
Global Witness: A Rough Trade. The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict. 
London 1998. 
358  Cf. LeBillon: Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000. In: 
African Affairs, No. 100, 2001 (pp. 55-80), p. 67. 
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 the 1960s on. Food supply was secured through subsistence farming, both on farms 
administered by UNITA-members and civilians, either loyal to UNITA or forced to 
contribute to the insurgent distributional system. A strategy for the acquisition of 
military equipment was established by attacking the supply convoys of the enemy and 
defining the confiscation of supplies as the primary aim of the military strategy. An 
important factor ensuring the success of this strategy was the establishment of technical 
support bases. Captured weaponry, agricultural tools and other equipment were serviced 
and repaired for renewed use on these bases, of which UNITA presumably administered 
30 in the late 1990s.359  
Despite the importance of self-reliance as a prominent organizational principle, 
UNITA was, as most guerrilla movements, by far exclusively financed by internal 
efforts. External assistance was a central factor in the economic structure, and the initial 
support from China, Zambia and Tanzania was vital for UNITA’s survival in the early 
years.360 In the late 1970s, a number of countries contributed to UNITA’s external 
supply line, including Morocco, France, Saudi-Arabia, Congo-Zaire, Iran, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Senegal, Gabon and Sudan, and in the early 1980s, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire were 
also affiliated with this group of external backers.361 Although UNITA had a range of 
external supporters at its disposal, the two primary external supporters were South 
Africa and the USA. While the Clark Amendment in 1976 abandoned further US 
support to UNITA, which had begun in the summer 1975, the Reagan-Administration 
accepted and indirectly encouraged South Africa’s extensive involvement in the 
Angolan conflict. Savimbi explained that UNITA and South Africa agreed on a regular 
supply system in 1980, according to which UNITA submitted requests three months in 
advance of the delivery. Food, medicine, military equipment, spare parts and other 
commodities were brought to UNITA from South Africa by land via Namibia or 
delivered by airdrops, from 1978/79 to the late 1980s.362 For the distribution of supplies 
to the troops scattered around the country, UNITA established a transportation system, 
the ‘Savimbi Trail’, with approximately 300 trucks carrying supplies northwards to the 
Benguela Railway.363 In the mid-1980s, South Africa’s support to UNITA was 
estimated at US$200 million annually.364 With the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 
1985, US support to UNITA resumed and amounted to US$15 million annually in 1986 
and 1987, and increased to US$30 million annually in 1988 and 1989.365 The Bush-
Administration (1988-1992) continued to provide financial assistance to UNITA, 
                                                 
 
 
359  Cf. Potgieter: “Taking Aid from the Devil Himself.” UNITA’s Support Structures. In: Cilliers; 
Dietrich (eds.): Angola’s War Economy, 2000 (pp. 255-273), pp. 257-263 and Bridgland: Jonas 
Savimbi, 1986, p. 89.  
360  Cf. Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, pp. 256-257. 
361  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 189, Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p, 322-325, p. 348 
and Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, p. 260.  
362  Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, pp. 189-191. South African supplies continued on a small 
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363  Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1989, p. 392, pp. 420-421, p. 523 and Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 
1994, p. 190. 
364  Cf. Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, p. 260.  
365  Cf. De Beer; Gamba: The Arms Dilemma, 2000, p. 90, footnote 24 (from p. 79). 
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 despite peace negotiations and preparations for the first elections in independent Angola 
in 1992.366  
Throughout the 1980s, diplomatic activities regarding the political development in 
the region influenced UNITA’s strategic choices and prompted a reorganization and 
diversification of UNITA’s economic structure. Although a settlement on Namibian 
independence was not achieved until 1988, from the early 1980s on, UNITA’s main 
external supporters focused their diplomatic activities on this issue. In this context, 
UNITA considered the loss of their southern supply line inevitable, and began to 
explore alternative routes. Congo-Zaire367 and Zambia became increasingly important 
as transit countries for French and later US support, and explained the location of an 
additional UNITA-supply base in Cazombo in Moxico-province in the mid-1980s. 
Another supply route began to operate from the north in the late 1980s, due to the 
geographical proximity to Congo-Zaire’s port town Matadi. An additional element of 
UNITA’s supply structure was the subcontracting of airborne deliveries to private 
corporations.368 The airborne component, however, played a minimal role in the 1980s, 
and South Africa remained the primary external backer. Nonetheless, UNITA’s strategy 
of diversifying its supply routes provided a strategic advantage for the adaptation of 
UNITA’s economic structure subsequent to the withdrawal of the main external backers 
in the early 1990s.  
By the end of the 1980s, UNITA could rely on multiple supply routes, from the 
south, the north and the east, and on alternative means of transportation, by land and by 
air. Additionally to the reorganization and diversification of supply lines, an internal 
adjustment significantly influenced UNITA’s economic structure in the 1980s. UNITA 
launched a business strategy and established an alternative economic system, parallel to 
external assistance, which emerged as the nucleus of UNITA’s war economy in the 
1990s. By 1979, the export of ivory, rhino horn, animal skins (leopard, antelope) and 
gold generated revenue for UNITA’s war effort. Ivory and hardwood were exported to 
Namibia, and possibly to Zambia and Congo-Zaire, but also diamonds presumably 
contributed to UNITA’s income already in the late 1970s.369 Despite insecurities about 
the level of UNITA’s diamond involvement in the late 1970s, the diamond rich-
provinces Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul became a primary target in UNITA’s military 
                                                 
 
 
366  Lardner, Georg Jr.: How Lobbyist Briefed a Rebel Leader; Memos Prepared for Savimbi Detail 
Who’s Who in Angola Aid Fight. In: The Washington Post, October 8, 1990, p. A21.  
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 strategy from 1983 on.370 UNITA aimed at distorting the MPLA government’s diamond 
revenue by raiding and capturing equipment and diamonds from companies as well as 
garimpeiros, so-called unlicensed diamond diggers operating on a ‘freelance-basis’ in 
the Angolan diamond industry since the late 1970s. In the mid-1980s, UNITA directly 
exploited mines abandoned by commercial mining companies and ‘taxed’ 
garimpeiros.371 How exactly UNITA exported diamonds and generated profits through a 
smuggling network in these early years, remains concealed. There were suggestions that 
South Africa did not serve as the center of UNITA’s diamond trade, leading to 
speculations on the connections via Congo-Zaire and Zambia. Contrary to this version, 
Cilliers refers to reports of UNITA diamonds being brought from the mining areas in 
the northeast to Jamba by foot, and then most likely exported to the international 
diamond market via South Africa or Congo-Zaire.372 Bridgland’s observation of a 
British diamond merchant arriving by plane in Jamba in 1983 indicates that a strategy of 
flying foreign business partners into UNITA-bases, frequently applied in the 1990s, 
already existed at this early stage.373 From the early 1980s, UNITA fortified its diamond 
branch with specialized training of recruits for deployment in the diamond industry. An 
increasingly professionalized commercial strategy was evident also in UNITA’s 
acquisition of special equipment, such as frogmen’s suits to recover diamonds from 
deep rivers, purchased in Europe in 1986.374 These practices apparently resulted in 
increased profitability, as estimates of UNITA’s diamond revenue increased from US$4 
million in 1984 to US$14 million in 1989.375  
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Cafunfo in Lunda Norte. UNITA kidnapped 77 Britons, Portuguese and Filipinos and had them 
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 UNITA’s ability to infiltrate the Angolan diamond sector and advance to a major 
participant in the 1990s, benefited from geographical conditions as well as from the 
nature of the resource. Angola’s known diamond deposits are located in the north-
eastern regions mainly, but also in the central, eastern and south-eastern areas of the 
country (see map, appendix III). The highest diamond concentration is found in the 
Lunda provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, and in the Cuango-valley in the north-
east. Diamonds are found both in riverbeds, in the technical jargon alluvial deposits, 
and in volcanic pipes, so-called kimberlite deposits.376 While the exploitation of 
kimberlite mines requires a relative high level of investment, alluvial production is 
comparably cost-effective with surface mining or diving in rivers executed with 
minimal expensive machinery.377 The spatial distribution378 of alluvial deposits in 
Angola has been an obstacle to thorough government regulation, but is advantageous to 
insurgent infiltration of the diamond industry. In addition to these geographical 
conditions, the nature of the resource is beneficial to an insurgent war economy. 
Diamonds are indestructible and easily concealed and transported, qualities, which 
benefit smuggling activities. With a very high value concentrated in a small size, 
diamonds represent a convenient storage of wealth. When the UN introduced sanctions 
on UNITA bank accounts in 1997, the nature of the resource offered an alternative 
strategy for the storage of wealth, which allowed UNITA to avoid traceable bank 
accounts.379 The government’s poor regulation of the diamond sector as well as 
UNITA’s frequent attacks on mines in the 1980s, led to an increasingly militarized and 
lawless environment, in which multiple actors, such as local strongmen, migrant diggers 
and foreign entrepreneurs, formed a diverse industry prospering from clandestine and 
illegal activities. UNITA has been one of the main beneficiaries of this development, 
and in the late 1980s the extent of UNITA’s involvement in the diamond sector was, 
according to one observer, on a “quasi-industrial scale.”380 Under these conditions, 
UNITA expanded its commercial strategy in the early 1990s.  
4.3.2. UNITA Expanding its Commercial Strategy 
In the early 1990s, the political development in Angola became more inclined towards 
peace and in this reform-oriented environment, the government introduced new laws in 
an attempt to improve regulation and increase government output from the diamond 
sector. In December 1991, possession and sale of rough diamonds by unregistered 
individual diggers were legalized. State-run buying offices were set up through 
Endiama, a corporation representing government interests in the Angolan diamond 
                                                 
 
 
376  Kimberlite is volcanic crust shaped million of years ago, that have been pushed closer to the earth’s 
surface through volcanic activity. Alluvial diamonds have been washed out of kimberlite pipes and 
are found in contemporary or ancient river systems. Cf. Dietrich: Inventory of Formal Diamond 
Mining, 2000, p. 142. 
377  Cf. Global Witness: A Rough Trade, 1998.  
378  Alluvial deposits are spread over a region of at least 300,000 km² in north-eastern Angola. Cf. Le 
Billon: A Land Cursed by Its Wealth, 1999, p. 13. 
379  Cf. Le Billon: Angola’s Political Economy, 2001, p. 67 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 105. 
380  Le Billon: Angola’s Political Economy, 2001, p. 67. 
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 sector since 1981.381 With this initiative, the government created an official method for 
the incorporation of illegally mined diamonds into the legal market, as officially 
registered buyers could now legally buy diamonds from unregistered miners. The new 
legislation was an incentive for prospective miners of various nationalities, who rushed 
to the diamond areas and established illicit mining as a central pillar of Angola’s 
shadow economy. The legal reform was much to the benefit of UNITA, whose 
involvement in the diamond sector was endured. By acting as a political party, 
apparently participating actively in the preparations for elections, UNITA’s commercial 
interests in the diamond industry appeared legitimate to many in the international 
community. While the MPLA relied on oil, UNITA used diamonds as a legitimate 
financial means of sustaining a political opposition.382 In the early 1990s, UNITA 
emerged as a main actor in the illicit, or unofficial, market in a diamond industry 
subdivided into three sectors, overlapping with Lock’s heuristic approach (see p. 10): 
the formal sector comprised of licensed diamond companies, which were registered 
with Endiama and operated mines; the informal sector operated through licensed buyers 
(comptoirs) purchasing diamonds from unlicensed diggers, such as garimpeiros, and the 
illicit or criminal sector including diamonds smuggled out of the country, mainly under 
UNITA-control, or commercialized through unlicensed buyers.383 The ability of 
licensed buyers to legally purchase diamonds from unlicensed (illicit) diggers, 
represented an opportunity for UNITA to access the informal sector, thus the informal 
and illicit sectors considerably overlapped. Gray areas also link the formal and informal 
sectors, as army commanders and politicians issue valid documents to foreign miners, 
not officially registered with the state. With the approval of corrupt state-
representatives, such semi-legal enterprises gain access to the valuable Angolan 
diamond market.  
When UNITA re-launched the war subsequent to the election in 1992, the mining 
areas were the strategic targets. UNITA successfully captured the most lucrative mines 
in the Cuango-valley and established vast control of the alluvial diamond production in 
the northeast, specifically around Dundo and Lucapa, which resulted in a UNITA 
“quasi-monopoly” on diamond exploitation from 1992-1994.384 UNITA’s hegemony in 
the diamond industry continued until late 1997, when political changes in Congo-
                                                 
 
 
381  After independence in 1975, the Angolan diamond industry was organized through the state-owned 
company Diamang (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola), which then established a state monopoly 
on mines through Endiama (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola). 
382  The international community did not take a clear stand on this issue, but it was emphasized that 
UNITA would need a financial base, in order to function as a political party in Angola’s multiparty 
system, and that the contenders therefore would have to reach an agreement on the access to the 
diamond resources. UNITA’s military preponderance in the diamond areas throughout the 1990s 
forced the MPLA to negotiate the distribution of diamond resources with UNITA. After a number of 
secretive talks, without external intermediaries, a memorandum of understanding was singed in 
November 1996. Due to the continued fighting, however, UNITA failed in its attempts to legitimize 
its commercial interests. Cf. Hare, Paul: Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace. An Insider’s Account 
of the Peace Process. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 1998, pp. 124-126 and 
Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 276 and p. 279. 
383  Cf. De Boeck, Filip: Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying & ‘Hunting’ for Diamonds in Angola. In: 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 90, 2001 (pp. 549-562), p. 551, Dietrich: Inventory of 
Formal Diamond Mining, 2000, pp. 150-151 and Dietrich, Christian: Power Struggles in the 
Diamond Fields. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): Angola’s War Economy, 2000 (pp. 173-194), p. 185. 
384  Cf. Le Billon: Angola’s Political Economy, 2001, p. 68 and Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 174.  
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 Brazzaville in June, and the fall of the long-time UNITA-ally President Mobutu Sese 
Seko in Congo-Zaire in May 1997, combined with a government offensive, forced the 
rebels to abandon lucrative mining areas in the Cuango-valley and in the north-east.385 
The UN described UNITA’s dominance in the Cuango-valley between 1992-1997 as 
”the world’s largest diamond smuggling operation.”386 After 1998 UNITA’s diamond 
activities continued, presumably in the eastern Lundas, in the provinces Malanje, Bié, 
Cuanza Sul and Cuando Cubango, with Mavinga and Cazombo as epicenters, as well as 
in the southern areas of Congo-Zaire. The military losses in 1999, particularly Andulo 
and Bailundo, further deteriorated UNITA’s direct control over mines, but the inability 
of the government to establish territorial control over Angola’s vast areas, facilitated 
continued UNITA-mining activities.387 The UN recently reported that UNITA maintains 
control over mines scattered around the country, primarily in smaller locations. The 
provinces Uíge, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul as well as the town Mavinga were listed as 
possible locations in 2000, while Uíge, Lunda Norte and Bié were mentioned in 
2001.388 Due to these changes in geographical control over diamond areas after 1997, 
UNITA’s access to diamond mines can be subdivided into two phases, firstly, 1992-
1997 and secondly, 1998 to the present. The UN did, however, not impose sanctions on 
the purchase of UNITA diamonds until six months after UNITA had withdrawn from 
the most profitable mines, in June 1998. The international community has 
acknowledged its inability to respond adequately to the development of the Angolan 
conflict: “Earlier implementation of these sanctions would have helped prevent or 
shorten the war; the long advance warning allowed UNITA to conceal its diamond 
operations and assets and gave the movement more time to rearm.”389 Despite the lack 
of specific information on UNITA’s current diamond capacity, UNITA’s continued 
access to diamonds, if not from mines, then from stockpiles, is not questioned.390  
The estimates of UNITA’s diamond output reveal the importance of the resource for 
their finances. Various sources note an annual output of US$ 300-400million in 1993 
and 1994, a peak of US$ 600million annually between 1995-1997, with slightly reduced 
amounts in the subsequent years, with estimates at US$ 100-300million annually 
between 1998-2000.391 In comparison, UNITA’s main external supporter, South Africa, 
provided US$ 200million assistance annually in the mid-1980s, while US-assistance 
between 1986-1989 amounted to a total of US$ 90million. The size of UNITA’s profits 
                                                 
 
 
385  Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 182 and Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 280.  
386  Final-Report 2000, paragraph 154. Based on an analysis of statistical information on the output of the 
formal Angolan diamond sector, Dietrich expresses doubts about whether the ‘much cited’ UNITA 
withdrawal from mining areas, actually did occur in 1997. Cf. Dietrich: Inventory of Formal 
Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 153. 
387  Cf. Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, pp. 280-283. 
388  Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 167 and 169, and Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 180. 
389  Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 165.  
390  Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 172. UNITA is believed to maintain a stockpile of diamonds, the 
value of which remains unknown. Ibid., paragraph 167. 
391  This summary of approximate output is based on the comparison of the following sources: De Boeck: 
Garimpeiro Worlds, 2001, p 558, Le Billon: Angola’s Political Economy, 2001, p. 69, Hodges: 
Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, pp. 150-151, Dietrich: Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining, 
2000, p. 148, p. 151, and Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 284. Estimates of UNITA’s 
diamond production are generally extracted from a comparison of statistical information on Angolan 
diamond production both from the government and major diamond companies, such as De Beer.  
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 from diamond trade is, however, unknown. Therefore, despite high estimates of 
production, the income from the diamond trade does not necessarily represent a more 
profitable financial base than external assistance. However, in comparison to external 
financial support, the reliance on internal resources implies that the insurgents 
experienced external dependencies of a different nature. This aspect will be further 
elaborated in chapter four.  
UNITA’s expanding control over diamond-rich areas in 1991 was accompanied by 
the establishment of an administrative system for the exploitation of mines. The 
workforce consisted mainly of garimpeiros, but UNITA-affiliates, either soldiers or 
people in UNITA-villages requisitioned to work in mines, worked at some locations.392 
During 1992, thousands of garimpeiros entered the diamond regions, among them a 
large number from Congo-Zaire, and estimates indicated an increase from 10,000 
garimpeiros in Angola in 1991 to 50,000 in August 1992, with rapid daily increases.393 
According to UN estimates, UNITA managed a workforce, primarily consisting of 
garimpeiros from Congo-Zaire, of 100,000 miners in 1996.394 For the entry of these 
garimpeiro ’guest workers’ into Angola, UNITA established several border checkpoints, 
where the garimpeiros obtained a permit guaranteeing unhindered passage.395  
The administration of mines in UNITA-controlled areas was either directly 
exercised by UNITA or, alternatively, by foreigners for whom UNITA provided 
military protection.396 In the UNITA-controlled mines, garimpeiros were taxed a share 
of their production, either in cash or in rough diamonds. Although UNITA attempted to 
concentrate garimpeiros in certain mines in order to exercise effective control of the 
workforce and increase the output, direct and thoroughly organized administration was 
not established. UNITA provided internal security, while the garimpeiros administered 
their own social organization in the settlement camps. With background in ethnic, 
regional and urban solidarity, the garimpeiros organized cooperative units, appointed a 
leading person, a patron, and distributed other administrative responsibilities in a 
hierarchic organization of the camps. Women were also present in the mining areas, 
frequently working as portables. So-called ‘mining marriages’ functioned as temporary 
‘cooperative economic units’, in which women were responsible for the household, 
sometimes running a little business, and guarded the diamonds in the house when the 
husbands were working the mines. Although UNITA was responsible for internal 
security, the foreign garimpeiros were frequently employed to supervise and control the 
workforce. On the impact of UNITA’s control of these camps, De Boeck concludes that 
                                                 
 
 
392  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 78 and De Boeck: Garimpeiro Worlds, 2001, p. 554.  
393  Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 174. In 1994 the number of Zaïrian diggers operating in the 
Lundas was estimated at 30,000, and in 1999 the government estimated the number of illegal diggers 
at 300,000. Cf. Le Billon: Angola’s Political Economy, 2001, p. 70, footnote 64.  
394  Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 157.  
395  Cf. De Boeck: Garimpeiros Worlds, 2001, p. 554. 
396  The subsequent review of the two forms of mining administration in UNITA-controlled areas, either 
operated by UNITA or by foreigners, is based on the following sources: Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond 
Mining, 2000, pp. 277-278, Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, pp. 174-175, and the Fowler-Report, 
2000, paragraphs 78-79. On the social organization of the garimpeiro workforce and the influence of 
traditional culture in the northern diamond regions, see De Boeck: Garimpeiro Worlds, 2001 and De 
Boeck: Postcolonialism, Power and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives from Zaire. In: Werbner, 
Richard; Ranger, Terence: Postcolonial Identities in Africa. London & New Jersey: Zed Books 1996 
(pp. 75-106). 
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 “very quickly life in the diamond mining camps became better organised and more 
settled.”397 In addition, bartering came to an end and the diamond trade was monetised, 
i.e. ‘dollarization’. Garimpeiros were inspected and taxed during the washing process, 
when sediment is washed to isolate rough diamonds, and the washing location 
functioned as a focal point of control. To what extent garimpeiros managed to withhold 
diamonds from taxation is uncertain, but there were reports of indiscriminate 
punishment when attempts to hide diamonds were discovered.398 Due to the insecure 
environment in the mining areas, garimpeiros profited from the protection provided by 
UNITA. The alternative to UNITA ‘safe zones’ was the constant threat of attacks both 
from UNITA, MPLA and other violent groups such as local strongmen or police.  
UNITA’s administration of the diamond extraction was linked to socio-cultural 
aspects of former long-distance trade between villages in present-day Angola and 
Congo-Zaire. These regional interconnections generated the development of a dynamic 
social structure with a mix of local and global, traditional and modern aspects. UNITA 
recognized the authority of the traditional titleholder in the Cafunfo mining area and 
called upon the titleholder to carry out protective rituals to ‘hide’ the mining town from 
air attacks by the MPLA. In the application of this strategy, UNITA was benefiting 
from the openness of the regional tradition, as the adjustment to external influences 
traditionally empowered the titleholder’s basis of authority.399 For the garimpeiros from 
Congo-Zaire, the Angolan diamond areas represented an opportunity for self-
realization, an idea traditionally linked to being a hunter or a warrior. Crossing the 
border from Congo-Zaire to Angola to get involved in the diamond sector was linked to 
the imagination of being physically strong, enduring pain and gaining stamina.400 This 
influence of traditional beliefs on the ‘work ethic’ of garimpeiros benefited the UNITA-
system of diamond extraction, as traditional beliefs offered an explanation for enduring 
the pain. Hence, traditional elements were influential also in stabilizing the functioning 
of the internal dimension of UNITA’s economic structure. 
In joint operations with foreigners, UNITA did not rely on the inefficient taxation of 
garimpeiros, but established a formal, more transparent system of controlling the output. 
Foreign nationals were allowed access to Angola’s diamond riches under UNITA 
control by paying a fee to the movement.401 While UNITA provided military protection, 
foreigners provided expertise and trained UNITA-personnel in the control and 
management of mines. The foreign entrepreneurs were responsible for investments 
(water pumps, earth moving equipment), which increased output while simultaneously 
reducing the financial risk for UNITA. The output from these jointly operated mines, 
with UNITA protecting, foreigners administering and garimpeiros digging, was split in 
five portions, of which garimpeiros received one in five bags, and UNITA and the 
foreigners two each.402 One of the largest joint mining operations was the Cuango 
Mining Operation, run cooperatively by UNITA and foreign business partners. The De 
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398  Cf. Ibid., p. 555. 
399  Cf. De Boeck: Postcolonialism, Power and Identity, 1996, p. 78 and p. 86. 
400  Cf. De Boeck: Garimpeiro Worlds, 2001, p. 560. 
401  The Fowler Commission referred to UNITA auctions, on which foreigners could bid on a permission 
to exploit mines in UNITA controlled territory. The sanctions regime presumably halted this practice, 
although it remains unclear whether such activities continue. Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 79. 
402  Cf. Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 278. 
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 Decker brothers from South Africa were significant foreign collaborators in UNITA’s 
mining operations. In addition to the mining, the De Decker brothers frequently 
operated as brokers for UNITA diamonds on the international diamond market.403 After 
1997, foreign responsibility for the direct mining process inside Angola diminished, 
perhaps ceasing completely.  
In the UNITA controlled mining areas, the threat or use of physical force functioned 
as a means of ensuring the discipline of the garimpeiro workforce. The militarization of 
the diamond areas was generally beneficial to local strongmen, the armed forces and the 
insurgents, since it enabled them to operate a system in which the commodity ‘security’ 
was exchanged for a share in the diamond production.404 The financial dependence on 
the garimpeiro workers, however, was an incentive to limit the arbitrary use of violence: 
“Warring factions need garimpeiro labour to profit from diamond reserves, making 
severe mistreatment a financial liability.”405 Following the government offensive in 
1997 UNITA’s patron-client relations with garimpeiros came under increasing pressure. 
The deteriorating UNITA control in the northern provinces did however not improve 
the security situation. Rather, the lack of territorial control by the Angolan state, i.e. the 
lack of policing and administration, facilitated further struggle for domination in the 
diamond areas, involving different factions, both the two main parties to the conflict and 
smaller groups of unknown origin.406 As a consequence of the deteriorating military 
situation, UNITA presumably lost its capacity to control a large workforce.407 There is 
no doubt, however, that during the 1990s “UNITA’s “mining rights” were based on 
force majeure.”408  
The intensified competition for access to lucrative mining areas between the two 
main contesting parties, local warlords and foreign entrepreneurs in the Lunda 
provinces, led to a thriving informal economy. The expansion of the diamond sector in 
the 1990s, with an influx of migrant workers and foreign entrepreneurs, necessitated an 
increased supply of both mining equipment and consumer goods. In context of the 
increasing criminalization, a complex pattern of commercial alliances emerged. The 
group controlling the airport taxed goods arriving by air. When goods were transported 
from the airport to the commercial centers, the armed force or the warlord controlling 
the specific territory demanded a fee, for example a 10-15 percent tax to ensure safe 
passage through.409 Thus, garimpeiros were not only valuable as labor, but also as 
purchasing power, providing substantial income to UNITA through high retail prices 
and taxation.410  
During UNITA’s hegemony in the diamond areas from 1992-1997, the primary 
organizational principle of UNITA’s diamond structure was centralization. Diamonds 
                                                 
 
 
403  Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraphs, 155-161. 
404  Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 173.  
405  Ibid., p. 183.  
406  Cf. Cilliers, Jakkie: Business & War in Angola. In: Review of African Political Economy, No. 90, 
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410  Cf. Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 278. 
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 were channeled into a centralized system under the oversight of Savimbi in close 
cooperation with the Secretary General Antonio Dembo, whose pivotal position within 
UNITA’s diamond structure presumably consolidated in 1994/1995.411 UNITA’s 
diamond ministry, the Ministry of National Resources (MIRNA), prepared the precious 
stones for sale or export.412 The town Luzamba in the Cuango-valley functioned as 
UNITA’s diamond headquarters, until they were captured by government forces in 
January 1998. Andulo was an additional diamond center, located close to a valuable 
airstrip. Diamonds were brought to Luzamba and Andulo by plane, making the 
logistical infrastructure an important factor for the functioning of this system. The UN 
described air transport as “an essential and irreplaceable lifeline for the supply to 
UNITA.”413 A prerequisite for the functioning of an airborne transportation system is 
the control of airstrips, and UNITA was in a particularly favorable situation until 1999, 
as the movement controlled a large airstrip in Andulo. In 2000 the UN reported on 
airdrops in UNITA territory, but further information on UNITA’s access to airstrips in 
the subsequent years could not be established.414 The centralized organization of 
UNITA’s diamond administration benefited from the clustered geographical location of 
UNITA-controlled mines in the north-east, the foreign operation of the mines, which 
allowed a more effective control of the otherwise scattered garimpeiros, and ‘relative 
peace’ after 1994. The increasingly uprooted UNITA-control over diamond mines since 
1997, however, facilitated the development of a “diamond democracy.”415 The 
dispersion of UNITA-troops over a wide, increasingly contested area, discouraged a 
centralized supply system. Peripherally operating UNITA bands had to provide for their 
own needs, and Savimbi instructed officers to utilize diamonds for the survival of the 
troops.416 Simultaneously, a continued centralized diamond structure was ensured by 
passing diamonds through the military command to the leadership.417 Thus, in the 1990s 
UNITA’s diamond collection system operated on three levels: the centralized level 
predominant until 1997; the sub-level dominated by the main commanders in UNITA’s 
military regions using diamonds to acquire necessary supplies, and the peripheral level 
of UNITA ‘bandits’ infiltrating the garimpeiro market. The peripheral level served 
primarily individual economic motives, since the diamonds remained in private 
possession. On the two other levels, diamonds functioned as a means of exchange for 
the purchase of equipment and for the satisfaction of the basic needs of the UNITA-
troops. 
As the fundamental means of finance in UNITA’s trading system, diamonds have 
been directly exchanged for material, such as weapons, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, 
food, uniforms and other equipment. Diamonds have also been sold in order to generate 
cash, in the case of which the purchase of equipment is conducted elsewhere. Hence, 
UNITA’s strategy for the sale of diamonds has not necessarily overlapped with the 
strategy for purchase of material. Cross-border transportation of several million dollars 
in cash is, however, riskier than a direct diamonds-for-commodities-system of 
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 exchange, which UNITA apparently preferred.418 The secretive and diverse nature of 
UNITA’s exchange system has been the key to its economic success during the 1990s. 
As a “master of disguise”419 UNITA cultivated a wide range of business contacts 
centered around the central functional logic of a “plethora of options and diversity of 
routes (…) avoiding overreliance on any source or route.”420 This diverse strategy 
complicated the task of hurting the insurgents economically, as numerous options were 
open to UNITA. Despite continued lack of information on the specifics of UNITA’s 
trading system and its international business partners, the work of the UN Sanctions 
Commission on Angola, provided previously undetected insights into the operation of a 
clandestine, and globally interconnected insurgent trading network. Two operational 
spheres in UNITA’s exchange system, an internal and an internal-external dimension, 
define the basic organization of UNITA’s diverse trading system, to which we now turn.  
The internal dimension of UNITA’s exchange system comprised UNITA’s practices 
on the domestic market in Angola, both in regard to the sale of diamonds and the 
procurement of supplies. UNITA’s ability to operate on the internal diamond market 
was rooted in the lack of sufficient regulation allowing “virtually anyone in Angola to 
possess, buy or sell diamonds within the country.”421 These liberal buying practices 
allowed regional and international companies involved in the Angolan diamond 
industry to comfortably deny any knowledge of the origin of the diamonds. During the 
1990s, officially registered buying offices frequently relied on the tactic of buying 
diamonds from sub-contracted middlemen. The middlemen purchased diamonds from 
any source, thereby allowing registered buyers to deny the knowledge of origin. With 
the aim of maximizing profits in a competitive sector, the middlemen experienced a 
financial incentive to buy diamonds from anyone offering the valuable resource.422 If 
one comptoir (buyer) would decline the purchase of a high-value diamond, such as 
those mined by UNITA, another buyer was allowed to profit. Shadowy practices 
benefited from the character of the market, the harsh competition and the intricate 
trading relations with lack of comprehensive regulation and transparency. When foreign 
diamond dealers, who registered with the government, purchased UNITA diamonds, 
either directly or disguised through middlemen, UNITA operated on the informal 
market. When unlicensed dealers acquired UNITA diamonds, these activities were part 
of the ‘illicit’ market.423 There is little clear evidence regarding UNITA’s involvement 
on the internal market, although foreign companies have admitted to not knowing 
whether diamonds have originated from UNITA mines. In 2000, foreign buying 
corporations in Angola were closed, as the government monopolized the diamond 
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 buying practices in a joint operation of the Sociedade de Commercialização de 
Diamantes (SODIAM) and the Angola Selling Corporation (ASCORP). This 
monopolization appears, however, more as an instrument in the process of sustaining 
the functioning of the patrimonial state, by ensuring continued distribution of economic 
privileges to state representatives, rather than an instrument improving transparency in 
the diamond sector.424 Despite the new regulation, one option for UNITA involvement 
in the domestic diamond structure remained, for example, through middlemen providing 
the link to the formal structure. 
UNITA’s domestic exchange system also overlapped with the external trading links 
as foreign diamond traders frequently flew into UNITA-controlled areas by plane in 
order to participate on diamond auctions in UNITA’s diamond centers Luzamba and 
Andulo. These practices presumably prospered from 1995, as the Lusaka Protocol 
ensured a new phase of ‘relative peace’ reducing the risk of flying. Diamonds sold on 
UNITA auctions were paid for either in cash, by transferring money to UNITA bank 
accounts in European or African countries, or directly exchanged for specific supplies. 
While auctions ceased as a consequence of military defeats, foreign diamond buyers 
may have sustained their links to UNITA through a courier.425  
In regard to UNITA’s access to necessary supplies, the prosperous informal market 
in the Lundas allowed UNITA to rely on a domestic procurement strategy, as UNITA-
troops purchased necessities from local traders. One of UNITA’s principal fuel sources 
was the domestic market, as UNITA purchased fuel from corrupt representatives of the 
state oil company Sonangol. The domestic source of petroleum became even more 
important after the fall of Mobutu in 1997, a previously substantial source of petroleum 
for UNITA.426 Equipped with sufficient liquidity, UNITA appears to have enjoyed open 
access to an unrestricted and criminalized marketplace inside Angola.  
UNITA’s armament strategy has also operated within the internal dimension. Since 
the foundation in the 1960s, UNITA continuously practiced the strategy of capturing 
arms from the enemy. In the 1990s, UNITA captured substantial quantities from the 
government. Legitimized by the sustained rebel activity in the country, the MPLA-
government has invested large amounts of the voluminous, insufficiently documented 
oil revenues, in re-armament, making Angola one of the most militarized countries in 
Africa. By providing and sustaining a considerable internal source of arms, a potential 
target of UNITA robberies, the government indirectly contributed to the supply of war 
material to UNITA.427  
In the internal-external dimension of UNITA’s economic structure, i.e. the links 
between UNITA-controlled areas and external suppliers, diamonds functioned as a 
means of finance for the purchase of material. UNITA established direct trading 
relations to diamond cutters and their well-connected intermediaries, and organized a 
tender system operating in various third countries.428 Favored locations for transactions 
between UNITA and foreign businesspartners have included Burkina Faso, Congo-
Zaire (until 1997), Rwanda (after 1998) and infrequently Côte d’Ivoire and Namibia. 
                                                 
 
 
424  Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 186. 
425  Cf. Dietrich: UNITA’s Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 284-286 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 82. 
426  Cf. Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, p. 270, and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 62-63 and 68.  
427  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 39, Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, pp. 63-65 and 
Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, p. 269. 
428  Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 176-177 and Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 178.  
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 UNITA has also infiltrated the informal diamond networks in Congo-Zaire and South 
Africa.429 Due to lax controls within the international diamond industry, the global 
marketability of UNITA diamonds prevailed, despite the existence of a UN sanctions 
regime. Statistical anomalies, such as the extremely high value of diamonds imported to 
Antwerp from Zambia, as well as the high value of diamonds reported to be of 
Rwandan and Ugandan origin when they occurred on the Antwerp market, may be 
linked to the smuggling of UNITA diamonds, although these reports remain 
unconfirmed.430 Diamond exports from a number of African countries may therefore 
have been contaminated with diamonds produced by UNITA.431 A complete 
examination of the various options of marketing Angolan diamonds on the international 
diamond market would therefore include an extensive study of the intricate trading 
networks in the region.432  
The sustenance of UNITA’s external trading system was guaranteed by continued 
access to safe havens for arms- and diamond-deals in ‘friendly’ states. A prerequisite 
for UNITA’s economic success after the end of the Cold War was the willingness of 
private brokers to replace the function of former external allies and co-operate with 
UNITA as external suppliers.433 A central strategy in UNITA’s external business 
relations is the reliance on direct personal contacts. The UN sanctions regime has 
increased the significance of this operational strategy, as secrecy has become even more 
necessary. As a tool for securing the loyalty of their external partners, UNITA used 
diamonds as rewards to friends and potentially new collaborators.434 An extensive 
number of countries and individuals susceptibly operated as brokers on the supply of 
various commodities. The list of countries involved includes Congo-Zaire (until 1997), 
Brazzaville (until 1997), Gabon, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, South Africa, Rwanda, 
Togo, Ukraine and Bulgaria. These countries have supplied fuel, provided transit places 
for arms or storage of arms, provided end-user certificates, ‘safe havens’ for close 
relatives of the UNITA-leadership, supplied non-military commodities, issued false 
                                                 
 
 
429  Several buying offices are located along the border between Congo-Zaire and Angola, and 
international diamond companies, in particular De Beers, were involved in the diamond trade in this 
area. In South Africa, UNITA diamonds have been half-polished in order to conceal their origin. The 
diamonds can then be legally exported as South African diamonds. The diamond trade in South 
Africa has become increasingly important for UNITA (2000), as previous trading channels were 
exposed. Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 82-84, Final-Report, 2000, paragraphs 85, 180-183. 
430  Between February and May 2001, imports to Antwerp from Zambia were 20 times more valuable 
than the entire officially recorded diamond exports from Zambia between 1995-1998. Neither 
Rwanda nor Uganda have any known diamond deposits. These diamonds may, however, come from 
mines in Congo-Zaire, not necessarily Angola. Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 215 and 
Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 192. 
431  The Diamond Office examining all imports into Antwerp has listed 15 countries, whose exports 
might fall into this category. Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 196. 
432  An indication of the interconnectedness of regional markets was the dynamic response to new 
regulations in Congo-Zaire in 1998, as Kabila attempted to nationalize the ‘informal’ diamond trade. 
In response, trading conditions in Brazzaville were relaxed and caused an exodus of traders from 
Congo-Zaire. Cf. De Boeck: Garimpeiro Worlds, 2001, p. 556. 
433  Cf. Peleman: The Logistics of Sanctions Busting, 2000, p. 295. A link between former military 
involvement and business contacts during the 1990s was indicated by the revelation that one of the 
De Decker brothers was a former officer in the SADF, although whether he was deployed in Angola 
or not, could not be ascertained. Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 162. 
434  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 99 and 131. 
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 passports or supplied air transportation.435 The supply of fuel, however, increasingly 
became a problem for UNITA. In the mid-1990s, a strategy of stockpiling fuel was 
initiated, but the intensification of war in 1998 induced high consumption, and the 
problem prevailed. In 2001 the UN reported that UNITA offered pilots up to US$ 
100,000 per delivery.436 When UNITA re-adopted guerrilla strategies in 1998, the 
demand for heavy weaponry decreased, as did also the demand for fuel. The UN 
concluded that “whatever reaches UNITA today, it is highly reduced compared to the 
period up to the end of 1999.”437  
From an interview with deserted UNITA officers, the UN gained insight into how an 
arms-for-diamonds-deal was brokered between UNITA and foreign business 
representatives.438 A number of contacts on the international weapons market operated 
as intermediaries between UNITA and the arms suppliers, i.e. governments. These 
middlemen presented their goods and prices to UNITA. With access to several brokers, 
UNITA chose the one with the best price to offer. In order to settle the price in 
diamonds, both the arms broker and UNITA would bring in their diamond experts to 
assess the value of UNITA’s diamonds. UNITA’s interaction with external trading 
partners thus functioned according to an economic rationale: through negotiations of 
prices and quantities, as well as the value of diamonds, trade deals were concluded. The 
functional logic of UNITA’s internal-external dimension was a rational profit-
maximizing logic. Middlemen would provide transportation to UNITA-bases and 
organize additional education in the use of the equipment, if necessary. In consequence, 
UNITA did not interact with suppliers beyond the middlemen. The functioning of 
UNITA’s arms procurement strategy relied on the willingness of governments to supply 
arms without certain knowledge of the exact end-user. This ignorance of certain 
governments and the eagerness of individuals in the international community to act as 
intermediaries, guaranteed the functioning of UNITA’s procurement strategy for 
arms.439  
Within UNITA’s internal organization, the responsibility of these external contacts 
was only shared between a handful UNITA-representatives. Central figures in the 
management of UNITA’s diamond sales are recognized as UNITA’s representative in 
Belgium Azevedo Kanganje, Rui Oliveira in Portugal and Marcial Moises Dechala 
‘Karrica’, presumably in Burkina Faso.440 Karrica is said to be the external head of 
UNITA’s diamond ministry MIRNA with Joao Katende ‘Jo Prata’ as his closest 
partner.441 Karrica and Jo Prata manage the extensive network of UNITA’s business 
partners, travel extensively, know all the key buyers, and “without them UNITA’s 
                                                 
 
 
435  See Fowler-Report, 2000; Final-Report, 2000; Supplementary-Report, 2001. For the procurement of 
arms, for example, UNITA relied on forged end-user certificates and a network of available arms 
brokers, who established the links to governments on behalf of UNITA. End-user certificates are 
required in international arms trade among states.  
436  Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 131 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 60-61. 
437  Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 19. 
438  Cf. United Nations: ANGOLA – Film shown to Security Council by Ambassador Robert Fowler 
(Canada) January 18, 2000. Retrieved September 6, 2001 from  
www.un.org/news/dh/latest/fowlangola.htm 
439  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 51. 
440  Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 182. 
441  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 20 and 149 and the Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 174.  
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 external diamond sales structure would be disrupted.”442 In 2001 Jo Prata was 
reportedly staying in Angola, with major responsibility for MIRNA in the interior. 
UNITA’s diamond structure inside Angola has otherwise been tightly controlled by 
Savimbi personally. Savimbi practiced a strategy of giving family members 
responsibility for UNITA’s diamond wealth, such as in Malange province, where 
Savimbi’s brother-in-law Paulo Kalufele was the head of MIRNA.443 During the 1990s, 
a small number of influential individuals in the interior and a niche of powerful 
UNITA-members abroad controlled the administration of UNITA’s diamond structure. 
This elitist structure further aggravated the turbulence over power and influence among 
UNITA-cadres.  
Summary: UNITA’s Economic Structure 
Although UNITA benefited from generous external assistance in the 1980s, the parallel 
establishment of a commercial strategy emerged as a profitable financial base. Already 
in the 1970s, UNITA traded in various resources, but diamonds became the single most 
important resource in the 1980s. Both the nature of the resource (indestructible, easily 
concealed, transportable, high value concentration) and the geographical conditions of 
diamond existence in Angola (spatial distribution, riverbeds, minimal investment) were 
beneficial to the insurgent economy. UNITA established a system of exploitation based 
on a garimpeiro workforce and on cooperation with foreign mining operators. Within 
this system, UNITA was the central control instance (demanding taxes/fees) and the 
security provider (guaranteeing protection and sanctioning disobedience). UNITA’s 
system of exchange functioned both on the domestic and the international level. A 
domestic procurement strategy benefited from the thriving informal and criminalized 
market in Angola. UNITA’s territorial control allowed the insurgents to demand fees on 
transportation through ‘their’ territory. Although UNITA-soldiers were frequently 
involved in pillage, UNITA’s war economy was not a bottom-up organized structure, 
but was dominated by a centralized structure. Savimbi preferred to give responsibility to 
family members and relied on a handful of influential individuals for the administration 
of the diamond structure. On various levels, both in the extraction of diamonds and in 
the interaction with garimpeiros and external trading partners, UNITA’s economic 
structure was well-organized. On the international arena, UNITA sold diamonds 
through a tender system and established business relations with a number of middlemen, 
who obtained the requested material on behalf of UNITA. In order to gain access to 
‘safe havens’ abroad, UNITA used diamonds to pay for loyalty. In sum, the main forms 
of UNITA’s economic activity consisted of labor exploitation, monopolistic control of 
trade, and a diamond economy. The ‘democratization’ of this structure in the late 1990s, 
reflected upon the general deterioration of the UNITA-system.  
                                                 
 
 
442  Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 174. 
443  Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 118 and Supplementary-Report, 179. This may imply that 
regional heads of MIRNA exist. 
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 5. Intertwinement of Political and Economic Structures 
In the theoretical chapter, patrimonialism was defined as the main analytical approach 
to the analysis of the intertwinement444 of political and economic structures in an 
insurgent ‘social order’. The applicability of patrimonialism to our object of analysis 
was justified with reference to the concept of quasi-state, according to which the 
organizational system of an insurgent movement can qualify as a quasi-state in terms of 
empirical and/or juridical statehood. In the UNITA ’social order’, the provision of basic 
needs and the administration of hospitals, schools and churches in UNITA-controlled 
villages over an extended period of time, albeit on different levels of 
institutionalization, represented a form of empirical statehood. As a participant in 
negotiations on the future of the independent Angola in the mid-1970s, UNITA was 
accepted as a legitimate actor in Angolan politics also by external actors, and these 
diplomatic activities represented an alternative form of juridical statehood. Although 
UNITA was excluded from the 1988 Tripartite agreement in New York between South 
Africa, Cuba and Angola (i.e. MPLA), the perception of UNITA as a legitimate party to 
negotiations was strengthened in the intensive years of diplomacy between 1988-1991 
and 1993-1994. Foreign governments distanced themselves from UNITA after the 
collapse of the election process in 1992, but UNITA’s role as a legitimate political 
contender in Angola prevailed, a view which was supported also by the UN Under-
Secretary General and Special Adviser on Africa Imbrahim Gambari, who defined the 
role of UNITA as being that of a “valuable interlocutor”445 in Angolan politics. The 
acceptance of UNITA’s involvement in the diamond trade, evident in the weak 
implementation of laws and regulations improving transparency in the Angolan 
diamond market, implied an acceptance of UNITA’s right to secure the funding of its 
political campaign. Thus, although UNITA does not fully qualify in terms of juridical 
statehood, in combination with the exercise of empirical statehood, UNITA qualifies as 
a quasi-state.  
With the ability to transfer the concept of quasi-state to UNITA, the application of 
patrimonialism is justified in the context defined here. Patrimonialism was defined as 
the main framework for explaining the interconnection between political organization 
and economic activities in an insurgent ‘social order’. In order to account for the 
external influences on an insurgent order, patrimonialism was supplemented by an 
’open approach’. This adjustment was necessary due to doubts about the explanatory 
effectiveness of patrimonialism and the usefulness of this concept for the assessment of 
the impact of external factors on the internal structure of an insurgent system of 
organization. These considerations were included in the hypothesis on the hybridization 
of an insurgent ’social order’, introduced in chapter 3.3. The task of this chapter is to 
summarize how the intertwinement of economic and political structures have 
                                                 
 
 
444  The term intertwinement generally expresses an intertwined state or condition. Intertwinement is here 
used to describe the close interaction between economic and political structures in patrimonialism, 
see chapter 3. Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Vol. VII, Hat – Intervacuum, keyword: 
intertwinement. 
445  Press-Briefing on Angola by Under-Secretary-General Gambari. Retrieved April 18, 20002 from 
www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/gambaribrf.doc.htm  
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 determined the functional logic of the UNITA ‘social order’ in context of external 
influences, and then test our conclusions on the hypothesis. To begin with, we ascertain 
the external influencing factors, in correspondence with the core objective of this paper.  
In the empirical analysis above, the following external factors were linked to the 
UNITA ‘social order’: Foreign businesspartners, international organizations, national 
governments, relief agencies and the Angolan state. UNITA’s links to external 
businessmen were particularly important in the 1990s as foreigners participated both in 
UNITA’s system of exploitation and in the trading system. The interaction between 
UNITA and these external trading partners was based on the economic rationale of 
profit-maximization. ‘Friendly’ governments or government officials, who allowed 
UNITA to operate their business cartel in their country, were frequently compensated 
by rewards in diamonds and were thereby incorporated into UNITA’s patrimonial 
system. UNITA’s external business links were therefore a basic feature of the 
insurgents’ economic structure. In contrast, international organizations have influenced 
the UNITA ‘social order’ only indirectly. The UN has on the one hand contributed to 
the perception of juridical statehood, as have national governments, by interacting with 
UNITA on the diplomatic level. On the other hand, the UN adopted sanctions against 
UNITA with increasing severity in 1993, 1997 and 1998, which increased the 
transaction costs of UNITA’s diamond trade. International relief agencies have not 
supplied goods to UNITA’s economic structure to any considerable extent, as they have 
been refused access to vast UNITA-controlled areas. The only exceptions have been 
some incidents of UNITA looting relief goods, but these have not emerged into a main 
insurgent strategy for the generation of income.446 In contrast, the Angolan state 
influenced the functioning of UNITA’s ‘social order’ on various levels. Although the 
adoption of new laws for the Angolan diamond market in the early 1990s was aimed at 
generating more tax income by legalizing previously unregulated transactions, these 
regulations simultaneously improved the conditions under which UNITA could trade in 
diamonds. In addition, the widespread corruption among state officials resulted in 
UNITA having access to a domestic procurement strategy. In recent years, the Angolan 
government has exercised a growing pressure on UNITA’s political structure, with a 
strategy aimed at uprooting UNITA’s social base on the country-side. Civilians have 
been moved from rural areas into centralized camps for internally displaced persons, 
frequently operated by international relief agencies. In context of UNITA’s already 
deteriorating relationship with civilians in the latter half of the 1990s, this government 
strategy made it even more difficult for UNITA to obtain food and other basic needs 
from the rural population. In regard to the determination of external influences on the 
insurgent ‘social order’, the Angolan state was recognized as an indirect partner, while 
external business-relations were a central pillar of UNITA’s economic structure. 
UNITA’s interaction with these external actors was based on the logic of profit-
maximization.  
                                                 
 
 
446  International relief agencies were not explicitly examined as an external influencing factor in chapter 
3, due to their limited access to UNITA-controlled areas. Since the cease-fire in April 2002, relief 
agencies are allowed access to previously inaccessible provinces in Angola, see for example reports 
by ‘Doctors without borders’ (Médesins sans Frontieres), www.msf.org. On looting on relief goods, 
see HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, pp. 58-59. 
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 Prior to the expansion of UNITA’s diamond involvement in the 1990s, the two main 
external supporters, South Africa and the USA, provided considerable financial 
assistance to the insurgent economy. The functional logic of UNITA’s interaction with 
these external backers was defined by the context of the Cold War, i.e. a patron-client 
relation. In this system, UNITA was subordinated to the political interests of the 
patrons. When the USA in the early 1980s intensified its diplomatic efforts to reach a 
settlement on the question of Namibian independence, which, of course, would also 
include South Africa, UNITA expected these political interests over time to influence its 
links to the main external allies. As a counter-strategy in the early 1980s, UNITA began 
to diversify its supply lines and launched attacks on diamond mines. The infiltration of 
the diamond market thus rested upon the tactical consideration of achieving greater 
independence from external patrons.  
The generous external assistance, or Cold War-patronage, primarily financed the re-
mobilization of UNITA during the transition to independence and the subsequent 
stabilization of the UNITA quasi-state in southeastern Angola. The SADF-deployment 
also outweighed the military weakness of the insurgents. Inspite of military 
preponderance, the main strategic advantage of UNITA’s war was the management of a 
UNITA-system of organization. With links to local authorities, UNITA mobilized 
influential individuals as an integrated mechanism in the insurgent system of 
domination. Due to the specific nature of interaction between Ovimbundu traditions and 
Protestant institutions, the Protestant structures were also included in this system. A 
common interest between the insurgents and a range of influential individuals thus 
guaranteed the stabilization of the insurgent ‘social order’ in rural areas, i.e. the UNITA 
quasi-state. The societal infrastructure of schools, churches and health institutions 
ensured the supply of basic welfare services to the villagers. In return, villagers supplied 
UNITA with food, labor and loyalty. Hence, reciprocity was the main pillar of 
UNITA’s civilian administration. Although the forced displacement of villagers strained 
the relationship between insurgents and civilians, the stability of the system was ensured 
by the link between UNITA and local authorities. Both the insurgent leadership and 
traditional authorities had a common interest in the continuation of UNITA’s (neo-
)patrimonial system of domination.447 Thus, a patrimonial logic stabilized the insurgent 
order.  
On the basis of this stable system of organization, UNITA initiated a diamond 
strategy in the early 1980s. UNITA’s diamond structure included training in mine work 
and the value assessment of precious stones. A UNITA-ministry of natural resources 
was set up in order to control the insurgent involvement in the diamond market. 
Villagers were only minimally integrated into the system of extraction, as primarily 
Congo-Zairian garimpeiros were exploited as labor. These ‘foreign workers’ were the 
fundamental pillar of UNITA’s system of exploitation also when the insurgents 
expanded its involvement in the diamond industry in the early 1990s. The organization 
of this system of exploitation was similar to UNITA’s political structure: the foreign 
garimpeiros established a form of social organization based on their traditional beliefs 
and norms of interaction. UNITA established links to traditional authorities in the 
Angola-Congolese border region, which proved beneficial to the administration of the 
                                                 
 
 
447  The use of patrimonialism as term of reference, despite the ‘neo’-character of the UNITA-system of 
domination, was explained in chapter 3.2.2. 
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 garimpeiros. UNITA was the primary security provider and control organ in this system 
and installed rules and principles for the garimpeiros to obey, including unconditional 
sanctioning of disobedient behavior. Both the traditional underpinning of this system of 
extraction, the mobilization of garimpeiro responsibility and UNITA’s role as a security 
and control mechanism, resembled the organization of UNITA’s system of domination. 
Hence, the experience with civilian administration influenced the administration of 
UNITA’s economic structure. More so, the insurgent infiltration of the Angolan 
diamond market in the early 1980s was made possible by a stable system of patrimonial 
domination: the stability of UNITA’s ‘social order’ was the prerequisite for the transfer 
of insurgent domination to the diamond regions.  
Throughout the 1980s, UNITA’s involvement in the diamond trade co-existed with a 
relatively stable political structure and financial assistance from external patrons. When 
the diamond strategy was intensified in the late 1980s/early 1990s, the income from the 
diamond trade initially guaranteed the continuation of the patrimonial logic, when 
external assistance terminated. UNITA adjusted the material base of its patrimonial 
system from external patronage to an internal economic structure. Simultaneously, the 
insurgents participated in high-stake negotiations on the future distribution of power and 
influence in Angolan politics. In this phase, UNITA was in the state of being both an 
insurgent movement and a political party, and as this process continued throughout the 
1990s, UNITA simultaneously experienced increasing internal turbulence. The various 
material benefits enjoyed by UNITA cadres, such as education abroad, frequent 
international traveling, safe havens for their families and a life in abundance in Jamba, 
became a source of conflict. This conflict over the form of partimonial distribution did 
not, however, immediately destabilize UNITA as an insurgent movement, as leading 
figures could be rapidly replaced within the context of the patrimonial system. 
Unsatisfied UNITA members could exchange the UNITA patrimonial logic with an 
entry into the neo-patrimonial system of the government, i.e. the two competing 
partimonial systems in Angola ensured the continuation of a stable elite of well-off 
insurgents and army men. This logic was underlined by the ability of the government to 
‘buy’ UNITA-representatives in the capital, explicitly observed in the creation of 
UNITA-R. Despite the turbulence among its central cadres, UNITA thus managed to 
sustain the patrimonial logic of its system of domination. While UNITA’s internal 
organization was dominated by patrimonialism, the external links were dominated by 
interaction with international trading partners. Hence, two functional logics co-existed 
within UNITA’s ‘social order’: on the one hand, the insurgents were interacting with 
international trading partners on the basis of a rational-economic logic. On the other 
hand, a relatively stable system of domination was organized in the interior, including 
both a village structure and a garimpeiro system of organization.  
The patrimonial system of distributing economic benefits to central UNITA-
representatives also incorporated a control mechanism, including spying and violent 
punishment, with which the emergence of any individual power base within UNITA 
was prevented. Violent coercion, as a means to securing obedience to the authority, was 
thus continuously used to stabilize the UNITA ‘social order’. Traditional political 
ideology offered a justification for autocratic practices, and the use of violence did 
therefore not necessarily delegitimize UNITA as a system of domination. A direct link 
between the sustenance of UNITA’s authority and traditional beliefs cannot be proved, 
as mentioned above. The logic of this argument, however, is contained also in De 
Boeck’s analysis of the interdependence between central (national) and local rural 
authorities in Congo-Zaire. De Boeck conducted extensive field research in Congo-
 90
 Zaire and in the border areas to Angola between 1987-1994. He observed that 
traditional beliefs are incorporated into the political legitimacy of central authorities as a 
justification for the use of violence: “The notion of ritualised legitimate use of 
nocturnal power as constitutive act related to the office of the traditional titleholder is 
thus subverted and successfully used to cover up acts of violence and unlawful 
coercion.”448 While acknowledging the inability to support my study with field 
research, the analysis of the literature strongly suggests that UNITA has been able to 
rely on a similar form of disguise of its violent regime: the perversion of traditional 
elements was a functional mechanism in UNITA’s ‘social order’. Thus, physical force 
was not used primarily as means to achieving individual economic benefits, but instead 
functioned as an integrated mechanism in UNITA’s patrimonial system of domination. 
The primary focus on economic motives for violence in the economic approach to 
conflict studies, clearly expressed in Elwert’s elaboration on ‘markets of violence’ (see 
Ch. 2.1.), must thus be rejected in the case of UNITA’s ‘social order’.  
Throughout the 1990s, however, the patrimonial logic previously ensuring the 
stability of the UNITA system of domination came under increasing pressure. The 
disruption to the functional logic of UNITA’s ‘social order’ emerged in context of 
changing external dependencies: the logic of external interactions was initially 
dominated by the Cold War system of patronage, but gradually, the nature of UNITA’s 
external dependencies changed. From being a client, UNITA emerged as a patron in its 
interaction with ‘friendly’ governments, while the relations with external 
businesspartners were based on a rational-economic logic. While the generous external 
assistance during the Cold War had not required considerations of economic 
sustainability, the administration of the diamond system did. The extraction of 
diamonds had to be shared with external trading partners and garimpeiros, who were 
integrated into UNITA’s economic structure. The principle of profit maximization 
underlying UNITA’s economic structure gradually challenged the functioning of the 
patrimonial logic. The competition for access to economic benefits within the UNITA 
‘social order’ increased, as did also the potential for personal enrichment. The 
fragmentation process was accelerated by the ability of UNITA cadres to enter into 
another patrimonial system or to exploit individual access to the diamond riches. The 
economic rationale of profit-maximization thus disturbed the patrimonial logic and 
resulted in a hybridization of the insurgent social order. The hybridization of the 
UNITA ‘social order’ was initially limited to those elements involved in the external 
economic dimension, i.e. the leadership. Over time, however, the inability to administer 
the hybridization of the leadership-structure gradually affected the insurgent system of 
social organization. UNITA’s monopolistic domination of the diamond market in the 
1990s also required the transference of administrative resources from UNITA’s political 
structure into the diamond system. The hybridization of the UNITA ‘social order’ 
therefore helps explaining the simultaneous disintegration of both UNITA’s political 
and economic structure. The increasing pressure on the patrimonial logic is recognized 
as the main explanatory variable for the inability to sustain the reproduction of the 
UNITA system of domination.  
                                                 
 
 
448  De Boeck, Filip: Postcolonialism, Power and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives from Zaire. In: 
Werbner, Richard; Ranger, Terence: Postcolonial Identities in Africa. London & New Jersey: Zed 
Books Ltd. 1996 (pp. 75-106), p. 81. 
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 The erosion of UNITA’s system of domination coincided with reports of frequent 
attacks on the backbone of the UNITA-village structure, local village chiefs and 
prominent traditional representatives, particularly in 1997. Increased use of violence, 
thus, corresponded with decreasing legitimacy and disruptions to the symbolic means of 
orientation. The use of physical force was aimed at enforcing consent in context of the 
destabilization of the system: The disruption of the patrimonial logic was compensated 
by violent coercion.  
The initial prevalence of UNITA’s civilian administration in the first half of the 
1990s, underlined the functional logic inherent in this system: the system of insurgent 
domination was not based upon the diamond economy. On the contrary, the existence of 
a stable system of insurgent domination was the basis for an insurgent infiltration of the 
diamond market. The prevalence of the UNITA ‘social order’ was an indication of the 
persistence of the system. 
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 6. Conclusion, Or How to Study War Economies  
The inspiration for this study was drawn from the economic approach to conflict 
studies. Both constructive contributions and theoretical shortcomings within this 
approach were observed and influenced the formulation of the core analytical focus of 
this paper. The economic approach emphasizes the necessity to examine contemporary 
war economies within the context of global economic interconnection, in particular the 
increasing informalization of the world market. While contemplating the impact of 
economic factors on contemporary wars, political factors cannot be excluded, as leading 
scholars within the economic approach emphasize. The analytical focus should be on 
the interaction of economic and political agendas in order to account for the emergence 
of alternative socio-economic power arrangements. Beyond stating that war economies 
influence the development of alternative forms of social organization, however, the 
economic approach has not theorized substantially on this aspect. This paper has 
addressed this shortcoming both on a theoretical level, by developing a theoretical 
framework, and on an empirical level, by conducting a case study. 
In this study, the war economy of an insurgent movement was conceptualized as a 
form of social organization, termed ‘social order’, comprising both a political system of 
authority and an economic structure. The core analytical question concerned the 
reciprocal influence of political and economic structures and how this reciprocity 
determines the internal functional logic of an insurgent system of organization. The two 
structures were approached using different theoretical frameworks. As a heuristic guide 
to the empirical analysis of the political structure, Weber’s classical sociology of 
domination was adapted to the analysis of an insurgent ‘social order’. In Weber’s 
theory, ideal typical categories are the scientific tool for comparing, testing and 
explaining empirical reality. In addition, insurgency-oriented studies were used to 
specify a matrix of questions on the foundation of legitimacy of insurgent movements. 
The theoretical framework for the analysis of the economic structure was based upon 
the economic approach to conflict studies. The analytical focus was on how insurgent 
movements mobilize internal resources and administer an external exchange system. 
The central concern within the economic approach is how economic activities influence 
conflict dynamism, such as insurgents’ strategic choices (mobility vs. territorial 
control), organizational patterns (top-down vs. bottom-up) and the coherence of an 
armed movement.  
The concept of patrimonialism was adopted as an analytical tool for the 
conceptualization of the reciprocal influence of political and economic structures. By 
reviewing the concept of quasi-state, we established the viability of an alternative 
applicability of this term to an insurgent system of organization. Patrimonialism was 
supplemented with an ‘open’ approach, which allowed us to account for external 
influencing factors. Due to these external influences on the internal system of 
domination, structural heterogeneity was recognized as the central feature of an 
insurgent ‘social order’, which comprises two forms of logics: The internal logic 
emphasizing the organization and the sustenance of an insurgent order in its internal 
context, and the external logic comprising the interaction between this internally 
operating system and external factors. We then put forward the hypothesis that the co-
existence of an internal patrimonial logic and a rational economic logic of interaction 
with external factors, results in a hybridization of the insurgent ‘social order’. Thus, the 
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 hypothesis theorized on war economies in an international context. The main object of 
analysis was however the internal functional logic, but the analysis also comprised an 
explicitly defined interest in how external factors influence and possibly alter the 
internal structure of an insurgent ‘social order’. The introduction of the hypothesis 
therefore ensured that both the internal and the external dimensions of contemporary 
war economies were included in the scope of our analysis.  
From the empirical analysis of the UNITA ‘social order’ we recognized that external 
dependencies affected the functioning of the internal system, in accordance with the 
hypothesis. The changing nature of insurgent interaction with external actors 
corresponded with disruptions to the internal system of domination over time. As a 
client in a Cold War-patronage system, the stabilization of the patrimonial logic of 
UNITA’s system of domination was financed with generous external assistance. When 
the external patronage eroded, the expansion of the diamond trade initially guaranteed 
the continuation of the patrimonial logic and thus, the reproduction of the insurgent 
‘social order’. The insurgent infiltration of the diamond market was explained by the 
necessity to ‘feed’ the patrimonial system. However, the diamond structure required 
considerations of economic sustainability as interactions with external trading partners 
were based on a rational economic logic. In response to the requirement of profit-
maximization, the patrimonial logic of UNITA’s ‘social order’ came under increasing 
pressure. Over time, the rational economic logic of the diamond trade disrupted the 
patrimonial logic. This hybridization of the UNITA ‘social order’ resulted in the 
destabilization of the UNITA system, with growing turbulence in the leadership 
structure due to increased competition for access to patrimonial benefits, and eventually 
caused the collapse of civilian administration in the late 1990s. Thus, the changing 
nature of external interaction gradually affected the functioning of the internal system of 
organization. This finding underlines the importance of examining insurgent systems of 
organization in context of external influences, as emphasized by the economic 
approach. 
From the empirical study it was also recognized that a stable system of organization 
was an essential condition for the establishment of an insurgent economy. Violence was 
an integrated mechanism in this system, as means to enforcing coherence and stability. 
The deterioration of legitimacy and the symbolic means of orientation were 
compensated with increased use of violence  
The results from the empirical study must now be assessed in context of the original 
theoretical motivation for the conduct of this study. The economic approach to conflict 
studies emerged as a response to the irrationality-argument, according to which 
contemporary conflicts are the result of natural disruptions to political and social 
environments, e.g. exponential population growth and resource scarcity. In contrast, the 
economic approach emphasizes that seemingly irrational developments may represent 
reconstituted systems, in which the political and economic interests of various actors are 
involved. In order to understand the logic of interaction in such systems, researchers 
must assess the possible positive effects of war, and particularly, the emerging 
economic opportunities in a conflict environment. The economic approach argues that 
the perpetuation of contemporary wars is linked to belligerents’ individual economic 
agendas. Furthermore, the continuation of a violent status quo-situation is considered a 
prerequisite for the continued ability to reap economic benefits. Although the economic 
approach addresses important questions concerning the changing economic agendas in 
contemporary wars, an exclusive focus on belligerents’ individual economic motives 
cannot explain the continuation of conflict. Greed cannot explain the stability of 
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 systems of organization, since greed as such does not function as an organizational 
mechanism for the establishment of war economies and the perpetuation of war. Rather, 
any individual motive for greed can only be met by instrumentalizing a system of 
organization. With an actor-centered approach, any attempts by individuals to gain 
access to resources for their own exclusive objectives within a system of organization, 
are recognized. The analytical focus, however, must be on the social system of 
organization within which greed can be exploited, i.e. an insurgent system of 
domination.  
From the analysis of UNITA’s ‘social order’ we learned that both the establishment 
and the disruption of an insurgent system of organization could be examined in context 
of the functional mechanisms of a patrimonial logic. In order to understand the 
perpetuation of an insurgent form of social organization, the central research interest 
must be in the ‘logic of reproduction’ within such systems. War economies cause the 
perpetuation of conflict when the system of insurgent domination is stabilized on the 
basis of a patrimonial logic. This study exemplified patrimonialism as the central 
analytical variable with which to examine the interaction of economic and political 
structures in contemporary war economies. 
As an analytical concept, patrimonialism comprises the social mechanisms of a 
stable system of organization as both the existence of political structures and economic 
means are accounted for. Most importantly, the interconnection between political and 
economic structures is the main object of analysis. For the analysis of a patrimonial 
system, two main analytical categories are ascertained, firstly, the foundation of 
legitimacy, including the symbolic means of orientation, and secondly, the production 
of material means to ensure the financial basis of the system. The use of physical force 
is a further analytical component, but is per definition incorporated into the two other 
categories. The main focus must be on the societal system, within which these 
categories function. Thus, a prerequisite for further analysis of war economies is the 
conceptualization of war economies as a form of social organization. A comprehensive 
focus on the societal structures within which war economies exist must then be 
combined with a consideration of external influences. With such an approach, which 
includes both an in-depth consideration of societal structures in war-torn societies as 
well as the global context, a comprehensive examination of the functioning of 
contemporary war economies is attainable.  
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